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SUMMARY 
This thesis took a discourse approach to analyze BHP Billiton’s failed acquisition of Rio Tinto 
in 2007-08 to better understand what happens during strategizing. The research highlighted 
the structure and dynamics of the discourse, as well as the role of time and context in the 
social construction of meaning in strategizing. In doing so, the thesis provided new insights 
into how actors were able to influence such important strategic events. 
The thesis adopted a multi-modal discourse analytic framework and analyzed media reports, 
corporate videos, press releases and communications to shareholders, as well as slides and 
full transcripts of key presentations by both BHP and Rio leadership. The analysis identified 
the main internal and external actors as either decision-makers (BHP’s leadership, 
shareholders, competition regulators) or influencers (Rio’s leadership, analysts, media, 
customers). It further identified a range of multi-modal discursive practices and rhetorical 
strategies that were brought to bear to negotiate the meaning of three key constructs that 
shaped the discourse, that is, the additional value pool, the fair share exchange ratio, and 
the impact on competition. Further, the findings showed how time and context were 
discursively constructed and influenced the meaning of the three key constructs.   
These findings enabled a number of contributions to the discourse and M&A literature. 
While most research into acquisition discourses has routinely ignored the pre-acquisition 
discourse, this thesis focused on the period preceding the transaction. An initial contribution 
was to show that, in a pre-acquisition discourse, external actors were not a passive audience 
but played a significant role as rhetor and audience. Also, while previous empirical studies of 
discourse have emphasized the role of language, this thesis considered multi-modal 
discursive practices, including speech, writing, imagery, location and calculative devices. The 
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thesis made a further contribution by showing how actors worked to persuade each other 
through multi-layered rhetorical strategies that were also brought to bear through non-
linguistic modes. This contribution was extended by showing how these practices functioned 
as transgression markers that signaled convergence or divergence of meaning of the key 
constructs. A detailed analysis of calculative devices enabled further contributions. An initial 
contribution was that it showed how calculative devices developed as boundary objects over 
four stages: identification, calculation, negotiation, and objectification. Further, the thesis 
showed how calculative devices were imbued with logos and ethos through, for example, 
the calculative logic, accounting standards and data sources that were woven together in 
the symbolic manipulations of the device. Lastly, the thesis showed how calculative devices 
acted as boundary objects, and made a contribution to theory by proposing a third criterion, 
legitimacy, to complement widely acknowledged criteria of adaptability and commonality.  
In addition to these dynamics, the thesis outlined a discursive epistemology of strategizing 
through its analysis of the role of time and context in the social construction of meaning in 
strategizing. While the role of time and context is widely acknowledged in organizational 
discourse, it remained unclear what was specific to strategizing. The thesis argued that the 
purpose of strategizing is to construct and negotiate new or improved options for a 
preferred future and the actions to bring this about, and made a contribution to a discursive 
epistemology of strategizing by showing how temporal and contextual work in strategizing 
extends the horizon of discourses that relate to the future and discourses that relate to the 
broader discourse. This reconstructs the tapestry of interwoven discourses that make up the 
local strategy discourse, and creates new strategic options. 
PhD Thesis Maurizio Floris 
 Page vi 
CONTENTS  
 
1 Introduction ............................................................................. 1 
1.1 Background .................................................................................................................. 1 
1.2 Issues in strategy theory ............................................................................................. 2 
1.3 Theoretical framework and case study ....................................................................... 5 
1.4 Contributions to discourse and M&A theory .............................................................. 7 
1.5 A discursive epistemology of strategizing ................................................................. 10 
1.6 Structure of this manuscript ..................................................................................... 12 
2 Literature Review ................................................................... 14 
2.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................... 14 
2.2 Recent strategy theory .............................................................................................. 15 
2.3 Philosophical foundations of Strategy Theory .......................................................... 27 
2.4 Strategizing as Multi-modal Discursive Practice ....................................................... 40 
2.5 Analytical frame and research questions .................................................................. 87 
2.6 Summary of chapter .................................................................................................. 92 
3 Methods and Approach .......................................................... 94 
3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................... 94 
3.2 Background to the study ........................................................................................... 95 
3.3 Research method .................................................................................................... 109 
3.4 Summary of chapter ................................................................................................ 124 
4 Analysis of the Acquisition Discourse.................................... 126 
4.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 126 
4.2 Key actors ................................................................................................................ 127 
4.3 Discursive practices of key actors ........................................................................... 130 
4.4 Time ......................................................................................................................... 138 
4.5 Broader discourses .................................................................................................. 145 
PhD Thesis Maurizio Floris 
 Page vii 
 
4.6 Constructs................................................................................................................ 153 
4.7 Multi-modal rhetoric ............................................................................................... 174 
4.8 Calculative devices as boundary objects ................................................................. 179 
4.9 Discursive practices as transgression markers ........................................................ 194 
4.10 Summary of chapter ................................................................................................ 199 
5 Discussion and Theoretical Implications ............................... 201 
5.1 Structure and dynamics of the pre-acquisition discourse ...................................... 202 
5.2 Temporal and contextual work in strategizing ....................................................... 221 
5.3 Summary to chapter ................................................................................................ 236 
6 Conclusions .......................................................................... 238 
6.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 238 
6.2 Implications and contributions to theory ............................................................... 238 
6.3 Implications and contributions to practice ............................................................. 242 
6.4 Research limitations ................................................................................................ 243 
6.5 Future directions ..................................................................................................... 244 
6.6 Closing ..................................................................................................................... 246 
7 Appendix: Reflections on becoming a social constructionist . 247 
8 List of References ................................................................. 255 
 
PhD Thesis Maurizio Floris 
 Page viii 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 1-1: Structure of the Thesis ............................................................................................ 13 
Table 2-1: Descriptions of Schools of Strategy ........................................................................ 20 
Table 2-2: Metaphors of Strategizing in Practitioner Language .............................................. 26 
Table 2-3: Ontological and Epistemological Positions ............................................................. 37 
Table 2-4: Conceptions of Power ............................................................................................. 54 
Table 2-5: Examples of Modes, Affordances and Media ......................................................... 68 
Table 2-6: Is ‘Font’ a Mode? .................................................................................................... 69 
Table 2-7: Rhetorical Frameworks in Organization Studies ..................................................... 82 
Table 2-8: Research Questions ................................................................................................ 90 
Table 3-1: Prior Approaches between BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto ......................................... 102 
Table 3-2: Examples of Discursive and Temporal Context .................................................... 106 
Table 3-3: Data Set ................................................................................................................. 110 
Table 3-4: Indicators as a Distinct Mode ............................................................................... 119 
Table 4-1: Structure of the Acquisition Discourse ................................................................. 126 
Table 4-2: Discursive Practices of BHP Leadership ................................................................ 131 
Table 4-3: Discursive Practices of Regulators ........................................................................ 133 
Table 4-4: Discursive Practices of Rio Tinto Leadership ........................................................ 134 
Table 4-5: Discursive Practices of Analysts ............................................................................ 135 
Table 4-6: Discursive Practices of Customers ........................................................................ 136 
Table 4-7: Discursive Practices of Media ............................................................................... 137 
Table 4-8: Key Constructs and Time ...................................................................................... 138 
Table 4-9: Key Constructs and Broader Discourses ............................................................... 146 
Table 4-10: Influencing the Meaning of Additional Value Pool ............................................. 155 
Table 4-11: Influencing the Meaning of Fair Share Exchange Ratio ...................................... 163 
Table 4-12: Influencing the Meaning of Impact on Competition ........................................... 169 
Table 4-13: Multi-Modal Rhetoric - Create promotional video (BHP) ................................... 176 
Table 4-14: Multi-Modal Rhetoric - Fly Journalists over Port (Rio) ....................................... 178 
Table 4-15: Examples of Rules and Codifications .................................................................. 186 
Table 4-16: Shift of Calculative Device Focus ........................................................................ 193 
Table 4-17: Examples of Transgression Markers ................................................................... 197 
 
 
  
PhD Thesis Maurizio Floris 
 Page ix 
LIST OF FIGURES  
Figure 2-1: Bodies of Literature ............................................................................................... 15 
Figure 2-2: Schools of Strategy ................................................................................................ 17 
Figure 3-1: Coding of Key Constructs ..................................................................................... 115 
Figure 3-2: Coding of Broader Discourses ............................................................................. 116 
Figure 4-1: Additional Value from Cost Savings ..................................................................... 139 
Figure 4-2: Additional Value from Revenue Enhancement ................................................... 139 
Figure 4-3: BHP Project Pipeline ............................................................................................ 141 
Figure 4-4: Primacy of Shareholder Value ............................................................................. 147 
Figure 4-5: Becoming a Mining-Super-Major ........................................................................ 150 
Figure 4-6: Additional Value from Combining Assets ............................................................ 156 
Figure 4-7: Discursive Practices and Share Price Development ............................................ 166 
Figure 4-8: Deconstruction of Rio Price Objective ................................................................. 191 
Figure 5-1: The Structure of a Pre-Acquisition Discourse ...................................................... 205 
Figure 5-2: Examples of Modes versus Rhetorical Strategies ................................................ 211 
Figure 5-3: Model of a Discursive Practice ............................................................................ 212 
Figure 6-1: Locating Contributions to Theory ........................................................................ 239 
 
PhD Thesis Maurizio Floris 
 Page 1 
1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
What is strategizing? When I was asked this question, after having been a strategy 
consultant for nearly four years and having run three businesses over a 12-year period, I 
was stumped. I could talk about strategizing, give many examples, and even describe it 
for a particular purpose or position in an organization, but I could not succinctly identify 
what the similarities were between a CEO, an HR manager or a sales person trying to 
decide on their next step, all of whom might have been ‘strategizing’. One of the 
difficulties in answering this question is that, contrary to what is sometimes suggested, 
strategizing is not just about competitive advantage. Further, for each of these 
organizational roles the situation is so completely different that they may require 
tailored tools and frameworks. This multitude of practical applications obscures what is, 
in essence, strategizing.  
The desire to better understand strategizing, and not finding a comprehensive and 
satisfactory answer in the literature, was a major motivator for this PhD research. This 
thesis is a long response to that original question. A short version of that response, 
which emerged from an iterative process of analysis and review of the literature, is this: 
Strategizing is a multi-modal discourse in which internal and external actors of an 
organization socially construct and negotiate options for a preferred future and a set of 
actions to bring about that future. This definition is applicable to different people in 
different roles. This thesis takes a discourse-based perspective to strategizing and will 
add additional theoretical and philosophical layers to this response. It does so by 
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providing a detailed analysis of a particular case study, anchoring it in the literature, and 
discussing generalized potential theoretical contributions to the literature.  
This chapter will discuss how recent strategy literature, discourse literature and other 
complementary literatures on rhetoric, social semiotics, and the sociology of finance 
have informed the main purpose of this research. The research is a case study of the 
failed acquisition of Rio Tinto by BHP Billiton. As will be argued, this case study 
contributes to theory development in mergers and acquisitions (M&A) strategy as well 
as discourse theory. At the same time, it explores and theorizes key dimensions of an 
epistemology of strategizing. 
 
1.2 ISSUES IN STRATEGY THEORY 
Getting the strategy of an organization right is often considered key to organizational 
success. Unsurprisingly, there is a never-ending supply of recommendations on how to 
do this. In recent years many of these recommendations have been drawn from a range 
of different concepts, including developing a sustainable competitive advantage (Reed 
and DeFillippi, 1990); core competence (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990); resource-based 
strategy (Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984); SWOT analysis (Ansoff, 1965); business 
process reengineering (Hammer, 1990); industry structure analysis (Porter, 1980); the 
learning organization (Senge, 1990); creative thinking (De Bono, 1971; Pink, 2005); and 
Blue Ocean strategy (Kim and Mauborgne, 2005). While many of these concepts are 
based on solid theories or insights from practice and may find a permanent place in a 
manager’s toolbox, others may prove to be passing management fads (Birnbaum, 2000; 
Mintzberg et al., 1998; Perkmann and Spicer, 2008).  
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In order to bring some structure to this richness, there have been efforts at a number of 
levels of abstraction to group different approaches to strategy development. For 
example, Mintzberg et al. (1998) propose ten different schools of strategic thought, and 
differentiate these in part on their perspective of the external environment (knowable 
or not) and internal processes (logical or organic). Different schools, Mintzberg and 
colleagues (1998) suggest, may be appropriate for different organizations, different 
industries or different stages of development.  
More recently, a number of scholars have suggested alternative ways of categorizing 
different strategy approaches by looking at their theoretical and philosophical 
foundations. For example, Stacey (2003) groups approaches to strategy according to a 
variety of different system perspectives (system dynamics, open systems, cybernetic 
perspectives and critical systems thinking) that seem to underpin these approaches, and 
suggests that we should develop approaches to strategy based on complex responsive 
process thinking. Snowden (2007) also provides a high-level description of approaches 
to strategy development, differentiating between simple, complicated, complex and 
chaotic contexts. Others have proposed a discursive approach (Chia, 2000; Fairclough, 
1992; Grant et al., 2004; Grant et al., 2001; Grant and Marshak, 2011; Hardy et al., 2000; 
Hardy and Phillips, 2004) or a practice approach (Chia and MacKay, 2007; Golsorkhi et 
al., 2010; Jarzabkowski, 2005; Jarzabkowski et al., 2007; Johnson et al., 2007; Rasche 
and Chia, 2009; Regner, 2003; Vaara and Whittington, 2012; Whittington, 2007) to 
understand what we do when we strategize. These different approaches have made 
significant contributions to a more critical understanding of – amongst other fields – 
strategizing. 
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While discussions about the philosophical foundations of organizational theory in 
general are not uncommon (Fairclough, 2005; Holt and Mueller, 2011; Miller and Tsang, 
2010; Morgan, 1988; Peters et al., 2013; Reiss et al., 2008), these are much scarcer in 
the strategy literature, with only a handful of exceptions (see e.g. Durand, 2002 ; Kwan 
and Tsang, 2001; Mir and Watson, 2000, 2001; Powell, 2002). Developing an 
understanding of the foundations of strategy or strategizing is further hindered by an 
inconsistent or even confused use of philosophical concepts like ontology, 
epistemology, realism, constructionism and constructivism (Al-Amoudi and Willmott, 
2011; Crotty, 1998; Fleetwood, 2005). This thesis will define how these terms will be 
used and what position is taken. Also, while each of these theorizations has some merit, 
something frequently appears to be lost in the process of generalization. To some 
extent this is implicit in a process of abstraction or generalization. However, what is not 
always made explicit is what is specific to strategizing as opposed to other 
organizational activities.  
This thesis draws on insights into the philosophical and theoretical foundations of 
discourse analysis in order to explore epistemological foundations of strategizing, that 
is, how knowledge is created when we strategize. Before doing that, it will discuss 
strategy theory and practice to define what appears to be the essence of strategizing as 
opposed to other organizational activities. It then develops a theoretical framework for 
investigating a particular M&A case study in a way that keeps the essence of strategizing 
in focus. The resulting insights from the case study offer a number of theoretical 
contributions to discourse theory and M&A strategy. In addition, they enable theorizing 
critical dimensions of a discursive epistemology of strategizing.  
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It will be argued that the purpose of strategizing is to socially construct options for a 
preferred future, and the actions to bring about that future. Critically, as the analysis 
demonstrates, the number and quality of strategic options can be increased by moving 
in the direction of two ‘horizons’: looking further ahead in time and considering a 
broader context.  
 
1.3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND CASE STUDY 
From the outset this research was intended to be a broader research program. Its 
greater objective is to contribute to the development of an epistemology of strategizing. 
There was no assumption that this could be comprehensively realized in the context of a 
doctoral thesis. What was realistic was, first, to examine from a discursive analytic 
perspective selected elements of the dynamic of socially constructing strategic options, 
and second, to consider what this dynamic tells us about how we construct and 
negotiate meaning in strategizing. In order to do this a discursive theoretical framework 
was devised that draws on discourse theory as well as a range of complementary bodies 
of literature, including social semiotics (Iedema, 2003, 2007; Kress, 2010; Royce and 
Bowcher, 2006), critical perspectives on finance and accounting (Callon and Muniesa, 
2005; Chua, 1995; Macintosh and Shearer, 2000; Macintosh et al., 2000; McGoun, 1997; 
Morgan, 1988), strategy-as-practice (Jarzabkowski, 2003, 2004; Johnson et al., 2007; 
Kaplan, 2007; Whittington, 1996) and rhetoric (Aristotle, 1991; Erkama and Vaara, 2010; 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969; Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005). A detailed 
analysis of selected elements of a strategy discourse has enabled this research to make 
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a number of contributions to areas identified in these particular literatures and to make 
an initial contribution towards an epistemology of strategizing.  
A case study approach was adopted, involving a detailed examination of the failed 
acquisition attempt by BHP Billiton (BHP) of Rio Tinto (Rio) during 2007/08. Had the 
acquisition gone ahead it would have created the largest mining company in the world. 
Instead, BHP abandoned its attempt. The fact that BHP abandoned its acquisition of Rio 
makes its attempt to do so no less significant or interesting as a focus of study. Rather, 
the attempted acquisition can be seen as a ‘snapshot’ in a continuum of strategic 
activity, which, in recent years, has seen these two mining giants compete and, in some 
ventures, collaborate. The strategizing under scrutiny in this study spanned 12 months, 
beginning with the announcement by BHP of its intent to acquire Rio in November 2007, 
and ending with the announcement in November 2008 that it had abandoned the 
attempt. The term ‘acquisition discourse’ is used to refer to all actions and interactions 
between actors that relate to BHP’s intended acquisition transaction.  
The case study focuses on the acquisition discourse prior to an actual decision by 
shareholders and competition regulators to proceed or reject the proposed transaction. 
This pre-acquisition stage is of significant interest and warrants research as it may 
culminate in a high stakes decision that is likely to transform an acquired business, and 
potentially also the acquirer itself. Also, the majority of acquisitions do not create 
shareholder value (Vaara and Whittington, 2012), making any acquisition a high risk 
strategy. Consequently, once the decision is made, actors with a stake in the transaction 
may be locked into a path that leads to major financial consequences, with a limited 
ability to influence how it unfolds. This does not just include shareholders, but also for 
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example investment bankers, fund managers, employees (managerial or otherwise) and 
customers. This may create a dynamic during the pre-acquisition discourse where a 
broad range of actors with no formal power may try to influence and persuade decision 
makers to act in a way that protects their interests. Discourse analysis is well suited to 
offer insights into such dynamics as it takes note of the social construction of meaning 
in the lead up to a decision while taking account of the how actors draw on different 
sources of power to negotiate meaning and influence the outcome. 
The theoretical framework for the case study contributes to discourse theory, studies of 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A), and the development of a discursive epistemology of 
strategizing. These contributions are discussed next. 
 
1.4 CONTRIBUTIONS TO DISCOURSE AND M&A THEORY 
Previous research has established that the performance targets and the motivation for 
M&A have increasingly been aligned with shareholder value (Ryan, 2012; Stewart, 
1991), and coincide with the increased influence of capital market actors (Lok, 2010; 
Ryan, 2012). Studies of M&A that have used a discursive lens have identified how 
internal actors of the combined organization aim to influence the discourse in order to 
shape the strategy of the organization following a merger or acquisition (e.g. Halsall, 
2008; Hellgren et al., 2002; Kuronen et al., 2005; Risberg et al., 2003; Vaara, 2002; Vaara 
and Tienari, 2011). This research shows how these transactions were justified or 
legitimized by actors (Halsall, 2008; Leonardi and Jackson, 2004; Vaara and Monin, 
2010; Vaara and Tienari, 2002), or how success may have been discursively constructed 
(Hellgren et al., 2002; Vaara, 2002). Some of these studies have also sought to examine 
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the important role of rhetoric in this process (Halsall, 2008; Kuronen et al., 2005; 
Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005). 
This study of BHP’s attempted acquisition of Rio contributes to discursive studies of 
M&A by showing how key actors external to BHP, as well as actors internal to the 
company, influenced the pre-acquisition discourse. The study shows that external actors 
are not simply a passive audience, but instead play an active role in influencing the 
structure, meaning and outcome of discourse during the pre-acquisition stage.  
The thesis makes a second contribution to discursive M&A studies by showing how both 
internal and external actors employed a range of multi-modal discursive practices in 
order to influence the meanings attached to constructs that were central to the pre-
acquisition discourse. The study contributes to studies of rhetoric (Aristotle, 1991; 
Cheney et al., 2004; Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969; Suddaby and Greenwood, 
2005) more broadly by showing how appeals to logos, ethos and pathos (Aristotle, 
1991) were embedded in non-linguistic modes such as imagery, location and calculative 
devices, which emerged from the data as distinct modes used by actors during the pre-
acquisition discourse.  
The pervasive presence of calculative devices led to an in-depth analysis and enabled a 
third contribution to the literature on boundary objects. Boundary objects are discursive 
devices that facilitate the negotiation and collaboration of different sets of actors. 
Previous research (Star & Griesemer, 1989) had identified two criteria for such objects, 
that is, they must offer commonality and robustness across different groups of actors, 
as well as the ability to localize a situation to the particular circumstances of those 
actors. Extending Oswick and Robertson (2009), who show that they can also enact 
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barricades and mazes, this research demonstrates that this suggests an additional 
criterion. An analysis of the role of calculative devices showed that they had to be 
legitimate and acceptable to key actors to be able to take on a role as boundary object. 
This emphasizes that these objects are not neutral but enables actors to protect their 
interests by structuring the discourse in line with these interests. Further, the study 
demonstrates how calculative devices develop as boundary objects over four stages: 
identification, calculation, negotiation and objectification. The effect of objectification is 
that the interests of key actors are increasingly obscured behind other, generally 
accepted discourses that are embedded in the calculative device.  
This study makes a separate and fourth contribution in developing the concept of 
transgression markers. Transgression markers are discursively constituted and multi-
modal cues from one actor that signal disagreement with another actor, who has 
overstepped acceptable limits for a practice or assertion. As such, transgression markers 
bring power to bear on the strategy of an organization and play a role in the social 
construction and negotiation of strategy by actors. 
It is argued that paying attention to both internal and external actors, their use of multi-
modal discursive practices, rhetorical strategies, boundary objects and transgression 
markers is critical if we are to appreciate how meaning in a local strategy discourse is 
constructed and negotiated. In addition to these dynamics, prior research also analyzes 
how meaning results from interweaving (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997) and 
intertextuality (Grant et al., 2005; Hardy and Phillips, 1999; Keenoy and Oswick, 2004; 
Oswick and Robertson, 2009; Riad et al., 2012; Vaara et al., 2006) of the local strategy 
discourse with discourses that relate to other times and broader contexts. As described 
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in the next section, this thesis argues that the specific role in strategizing of these 
fundamental epistemological dimensions of time and context is not well understood. 
 
1.5 A DISCURSIVE EPISTEMOLOGY OF STRATEGIZING 
This study makes a number of contributions by outlining a discursive epistemology of 
strategizing. The discursive analysis of the failed acquisition identifies how actors drew 
on two critical dimensions of an epistemology of strategizing: time and context. While 
these dimensions are well recognized in the discourse literature (e.g. Keenoy and 
Oswick, 2004; Sabelis et al., 2005), the thesis explores what is specific about strategizing 
as discourse in relation to these dimensions. These dimensions are developed as 
‘horizons’. Taschdjian (1977) defines a ‘horizon [as] a boundary which moves back as we 
move towards it’ (in Das, 1991, p.53), implying that we can keep moving in that 
direction ad infinitum. As will be argued, epistemologically strategizing is the social 
construction of options for a preferred future and actions to bring about that future 
while moving in the direction of these horizons, namely, a time horizon and a context 
horizon.  
Moving towards a time horizon suggests extending how far ahead we try to look when 
determining a preferred future and necessary actions. This does justice to strategizing 
as a future-oriented activity (Baghai et al., 1999; Das, 1987; Johnson et al., 2011; 
Mintzberg, 1994; Mintzberg et al., 1998; Mosakowski and Earley, 2000; Taschdjian, 
1977; Wright et al., 1996). As the case study will show, the proposed acquisition only 
appears to be a potential strategic option if the time horizon is set out far enough into 
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the future to include accounts of projected synergies over the coming years, and far 
enough to include a discourse of emerging competitors.  
Strategizing by expanding the contextual horizon suggests taking into account broader 
discourses, variously described as ‘macro’, ‘meta’, ‘grand’, ‘capital D’ or ‘mega’ 
discourses (Alvesson and Karreman, 2000; Boje, 2001; Keenoy and Oswick, 2004; Phillips 
et al., 2008; Robichaud et al., 2004). The case study in this thesis illustrates an 
increasingly strategic perspective when comparing the perspective of a shipping 
manager who discusses the bottleneck of a port in exporting iron ore; the Division Head 
for iron ore who draws on the global iron ore market discourse; and the CEO who 
relates the company’s overall performance in terms of a shareholder value discourse. 
These expansions are not necessarily sequential or linear, and while it is sometimes 
suggested that actors have some ability to cherry pick what other broader sets of texts 
they want to draw on (Fairhurst, 2011; Vaara et al., 2004), this thesis will argue that this 
ability is restricted by the need to cohere with the worldview of other actors (Perelman 
and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969; Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005). The case study also 
identifies how such a contextual horizon, if conceptualized as an actor network (Briers 
and Chua, 2001; Law and Hassard, 1999; Steen et al., 2006; Whittle and Spicer, 2008), 
can be extended by taking into account, first, external decision-makers, then influencers 
of these external decision-makers, and finally influencers of these influencers. 
A progressive change of the discourses that are woven into a local strategy discourse by 
extending the time and context horizon may question taken-for-granted truths and 
meanings and create a fluidity that will enable subsequent recombining of that which 
was bracketed (Weick, 1979; Weick et al., 2005) in a different way. The more these two 
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horizons are extended, the greater the potential for reconstructing a very different and 
potentially preferable future for particular actors. While infinite regress is possible for 
strategizing on each of these horizons, an appropriate horizon must be tailored to the 
task at hand to enable convergence by actors on strategy. This conceptualization of 
strategizing appears to take full account of what is specific to strategizing, and can be 
generalized irrespective of the role or seniority of a particular actor.  
In addition to these main aims, the study also shows how the acquisition discourse 
shaped opinions and influenced behaviours that led to material outcomes, including the 
failure of the acquisition attempt. In this way this study responds to Chia and Mackay’s 
(2007) call for studies that demonstrate that strategizing as discourse can have 
significant material outcomes. 
Table 1-1 summarizes the structure of the thesis. It lists the two questions that guided 
the research; the opportunities for contributions that were identified in the literature; 
and the contributions that this thesis offers based on the analysis of the case study. 
 
1.6 STRUCTURE OF THIS MANUSCRIPT 
The next chapter provides a review of the different bodies of literature, develops the 
theoretical framework and formulates the research questions. Following that, the 
research methods and approach are described, and the different stages are discussed in 
detail. The findings are discussed and theoretical implications are presented in chapter 
5. The final chapter summarizes the contributions, limitations and suggests future 
directions for research.  
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Table 1-1: Structure of the Thesis 
Questions What the literature tells us Contributions 
In the structure 
and dynamics of a 
pre-acquisition 
strategy discourse, 
what is the role of:  
- external actors; 
- multi-modal 
discursive 
practices, in 
particular 
calculative 
devices; and  
- rhetorical 
strategies? 
Research into acquisition discourse routinely ignores the structure and dynamics 
of pre-acquisition discourse (Teerikangas and Joseph, 2012; Vaara, 2002). 
Previous research has focused on internal instead of external actors in strategy 
discourse (Hellgren et al., 2002; Kuronen et al., 2005; Teerikangas et al., 2012).  
Empirical studies of discourse should consider multi-modal discursive practices 
(Grant et al., 2004b; Iedema, 2007; Jacobs & Heracleous, 2007; Royce et al., 
2006).  
Previous research of organizational discourse has focused on rhetorical strategies 
of language (Erkama and Vaara, 2010; Sillince, 2005; Suddaby and Greenwood, 
2005).   
While previous studies show how actors use calculative devices to legitimize 
decisions (e.g. Baxter et al., 2003; Briers et al., 2001; Denis, Langley, & Rouleau, 
2006), most ignore the calculative aspect (Callon et al., 2005), and do not pertain 
to pre-acquisition discourse. 
Research has shown how boundary objects build bridges between groups because 
they are adaptable to, and robust across, groups (Bechky, 2003; Spee and 
Jarzabkowski, 2009; Star and Griesemer, 1989), but few studies show how they 
may reinforce existing power structures (Oswick and Robertson, 2009).  
This thesis shows that external actors are not a passive audience but play 
a significant role in a pre-acquisition discourse and swap roles as rhetor 
and audience on an ongoing basis. They determine key constructs, 
persuade other actors and decide on the acquisition outcome. 
In contrast to previous research, the thesis shows how this role is 
enacted through a broad range of multi-modal discursive practices 
(including speech, writing, imagery, location and calculative devices), and 
that multi-layered rhetorical strategies are brought to bear not only 
through linguistic but also non-linguistic modes.  
The thesis develops the concept of transgression markers as multi-modal 
cues that signal convergence or divergence during the negotiation of 
meaning of key constructs and may shape strategy.  
The thesis identifies calculative devices as a distinct and critical mode. 
They act as boundary objects through which much of the acquisition 
discourse is enacted. This thesis proposes a third criterion – legitimacy – 
for boundary objects, which explicitly acknowledges how they reinforce 
power structures (Oswick and Robertson, 2009), and shows how they 
develop over four stages (identification, calculation, negotiation and 
objectification).   
What is the role of 
time and context in 
the social 
construction of 
meaning in 
strategizing? 
Temporal work (Kaplan et al., 2013; Keenoy et al., 2004) and contextual work 
(Grant et al., 2005; Hardy et al., 1999b; Keenoy et al., 2004; Riad et al., 2012) must 
construct coherent, plausible and acceptable connections between local and 
broader discourses, as well as discourses of the past, present and the future to 
enable agreement on strategic choices (Kaplan & Orlikowski, 2013) 
Few studies explore how local and broader discourses interact (Erkama et al., 
2010; Hardy, 2004). Also, previous studies on time and local discourse focus on 
how they change over time (Bushe and Marshak, 2009; Ford and Ford, 2008; Grant 
and Marshak, 2011; Huy, 2001), which is backward looking.  
Further, while the importance of time and context are acknowledged in 
organizational discourse, it remains unclear what is specific to strategizing. 
The purpose of strategizing is to construct and negotiate new or 
improved options for a preferred future and the actions to bring these 
about. This thesis shows how temporal and contextual work in 
strategizing extends the horizon of discourses that relate to the future 
and to the broader context, which creates new strategic options by 
reconstructing the tapestry of interwoven discourses that make up a local 
strategy discourse.  
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
This chapter develops a perspective on organizational strategy, which emerged from 
an iterative process of analysis and literature review and underpins the analytical 
framework for the case study. According to this perspective:   
Strategizing is a multi-modal discourse in which internal and external 
actors of an organization socially construct and negotiate options for a 
preferred future and a set of actions to bring about that future, while 
looking further ahead in time and considering a broader context. 
The term ‘strategizing’ is used to emphasize the discursive practices that constitute 
the development of a strategy (i.e. a preferred future and a set of actions to bring it 
about). The development of this perspective traces strategy theory from its military 
origins, reviews different schools of thought that have emerged over the last 50 or so 
years in the field of business strategy formation, and connects these with practitioner 
references to strategizing. Further, in order to establish a solid philosophical 
foundation, the thesis proceeds with a review of different foundations that may 
underpin strategizing theory and clarifies the philosophical position taken in this 
research. This is followed by a review of the literature on discourse theory, mergers 
and acquisitions (M&As), practice theory, multi-modality, sociology of finance and 
rhetorical strategies. Figure 2-1 maps the different bodies of literature that are 
brought together in this thesis. 
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Figure 2-1: Bodies of Literature 
 
 This literature is combined into a framework that has enabled a discursive analysis of 
strategizing of the case study. Lastly, the literature review also identifies the areas in 
which this research aims to make a contribution and summarizes opportunities for 
theoretical contributions into two overarching research questions that have guided 
this research. 
 
2.2 RECENT STRATEGY THEORY 
ORIGINS AND DEFINITIONS OF STRATEGY 
Strategy as we know it today has its origins in warfare and the military. This is 
embedded in the term ‘strategy’, which comes from the Greek στρατηγία, meaning 
‘the art of planning and directing overall military operations and movements in a war 
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or battle’ (Oxford Dictionaries Online, 2013). Two frequently mentioned sources on 
military strategy are On War (Clausewitz, 1832) and The Art of War (Tzu, 1988). 
According to von Clausewitz strategy is: 
‘the employment of the battle to gain the end of the War ... Strategy forms the 
plan of the War, and to this end it links together the series of acts which are to 
lead to the final decision, that is to say, it makes the plans for the separate 
campaigns and regulates the combats to be fought in each.’ (Clausewitz, 1832, 
Book III. Of Strategy in General; Chapter I. Strategy) 
These military origins still have an impact on strategy practice (Ansoff, 1965; 
Whittington, 2001) and, according to Ohmae, ‘[t]here is important common ground 
between the task of the military strategist on the one hand and the key strategic 
activities of middle and top management on the other’ (Ohmae, 1982).  
In the context of organizations, strategy has many different definitions. For example, 
Johnson et al. define strategy as the long-term direction of an organization (2011, p.3). 
For Wright et al. strategy refers to the plans of, specifically, top management ‘to attain 
outcomes consistent with the organization’s mission and goals’ (1996, p.4). A more 
comprehensive definition from Mintzberg et al. (1998) sees strategy as, variously, a 
plan, a pattern of consistent behaviour, a position of particular products in particular 
markets, a perspective (i.e. a fundamental way of doing things), and a ploy (i.e. a 
manoeuver to outwit a competitor). The next section will draw on and build on 
Mintzberg et al.’s (1998) structure for differentiating schools of strategy.   
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SCHOOLS OF STRATEGY 
Over the last 40 to 50 years, there have been many different approaches to strategy 
and strategizing. Mintzberg et al. categorize these as different ‘schools of strategy’ 
(Mintzberg et al., 1998), based on the schools’ respective perspectives on the external 
world and the internal workings of an organization (see Figure 2-2). Whittington uses a 
similar horizontal axis (i.e. a deliberate or accidental strategy development process), 
but differentiates approaches to strategy vertically according to their focus on profit 
maximization outcomes (Whittington, 2001). 
These different schools can be seen as different approaches that have merit in 
particular contexts or during different stages of a business’ lifecycle, but they may not 
be appropriate in all situations. This categorization of the landscape will be used to 
review some of the main schools, key ideas and literature that have shaped recent 
mainstream strategizing. 
Figure 2-2: Schools of Strategy 
 
Source: Based on Mintzberg et al., 1998, p.369. 
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According to Mintzberg et al. (1998), the design school is the most influential school in 
recent times. It introduced some fundamental notions of strategic management, 
including that of distinctive competence (Selznick, 1957) and the connection between 
the strategy and the structure of an organization (Chandler, 1962). The key message of 
strategists within this school is that of a ‘fit’ (see Table 2-1), that is, the internal 
capability of an organization must fit with the opportunities and threats in the external 
environment. Similarly, there must be a fit between an organization’s strategy and 
structure, with the CEO being seen as the person to ‘architect’ a strategy that will 
deliver organizational success. The best strategy is selected from a range of options 
that are evaluated on consistency, consonance, advantage and feasibility. This means 
there should be no inconsistent or conflicting goals, the strategy should align with the 
external environment, create or maintain a competitive advantage, and be feasible 
with available resources. Further, the strategy should be deliberate, simple and 
explicitly formulated prior to implementation. Importantly, it should preclude ‘external 
actors from the process [of strategizing] altogether’ (Mintzberg et al., 1998, p.31).  
Since the publication of Corporate Strategy (Ansoff, 1965), many different formal 
strategic planning models have been developed, each with their own sets of precise 
steps, checklists, templates and flow diagrams that create inflexible blueprints for 
strategizing. Ansoff acknowledges that accelerating change and environmental 
turbulence requires a different approach to strategizing than that adopted by mature 
and stable industries (Carden, 2002). However, overall, the planning school 
overreached its potential and saw formal planning as strategizing, rather than as a 
support to strategizing, ignoring the complex cognitive and social processes that form 
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part of organizational strategy making (Carden, 2002; Johnson et al., 2011; Mintzberg 
et al., 1998). While the design school has an ongoing influence on the practice and 
theory development of strategizing, the planning school lost much of its popularity 
during the 1980s, when overly formalized, large-scale and sometimes mechanistic 
planning lost its credibility.  
While the positioning school rejected an overly mechanistic approach to strategizing, it 
retained a focus on analysis. This analysis, it posited, must drive the selection of the 
best strategy from a limited set of generic strategies (Porter, 1980). According to 
Mintzberg, the positioning school remains the closest to the military origins of strategy 
with its emphasis on winning over the competition, and employing military terms like 
attack, overwhelm, counterattack, flanking, defensive positions and fallback (1998, 
p.93). The emphasis of this school on quantitative analysis like margins, market shares 
and production costs remains part of mainstream strategy theory and practice. The 
design, planning and positioning schools fall into what Whittington (2001) calls the 
‘classic’ approach to strategy, which is characterized by a focus on rational analysis, a 
separation of strategy formulation and execution, and a commitment to profit 
maximization. This emphasis on profit maximization echoes Adams’ 18th-century free 
market economics (Whittington, 2001). 
PhD Thesis Maurizio Floris 
 Page 20 
Table 2-1: Descriptions of Schools of Strategy  
 
 
Planning Positioning Design Environ-
mental 
Entrepre-
neurial 
Power Learning Culture Cognitive 
Base 
discipline 
None Economics, military Architectural
metaphor 
Biology, political 
sociology 
None Political science Learning theory / 
Chaos theory 
Anthropology Psychology 
(cognitive) 
Message* Formalize / 
Program 
Analyze / Calculate Fit / Think Cope / Capitulate Envision / 
Centralize (then 
hope) 
Grab / Hoard Learn / Play Coalesce / 
Perpetuate 
Frame / Worry or 
imagine 
Central 
actor 
Planners Analysts CEO (as architect) ‘Environment’ Leader Anyone with power 
(micro); whole 
organization (macro) 
Learners 
(anyone who can) 
Collectivity Mind 
Situation Simple and stable 
(and so 
predictable), ideally 
controllable 
Simple, stable and 
mature (therefore 
structured and so 
quantifiable) 
Delineable (into 
social, economic, 
technical, etc.) and 
stable 
Competitive, 
delineated 
Dynamic but simple  
(so comprehensible 
by leader) 
Divisive, malevolent 
(micro); controllable 
or cooperative 
(macro) 
Complex, 
dynamic, novel 
Ideally passive, 
can become 
exigent  
Incomprehensible 
Leadership Responsive to 
procedure 
Responsive to 
analysis 
Dominant, 
judgmental 
Powerless Dominant, intuitive Weak (micro);
unspecified (macro) 
Responsive to 
learning  
(of self and others)
Symbolic Source of cognition, 
passive or creative 
Environ-
ment 
Acquiescent 
(checklist of factors 
to be forecast or 
controlled) 
Competitively 
demanding but 
economically 
analyzable; 
ultimately 
acquiescent when 
understood 
Expedient (whether 
source of threats or 
opportunities) 
Exigent Manoeuverable, full 
of niches 
Contentious (micro); 
acquiescent or 
negotiable (macro) 
Elaborate, 
unpredictable 
Incidental Any of columns to 
the left, so long as 
categorical 
Organi-
zation 
Structured, 
decomposed, 
acquiescent (for 
programming) 
Source of 
competitive 
advantage, 
otherwise incidental 
Ordered, 
acquiescent (for 
‘implementation’), 
font of given 
strengths and 
weaknesses 
Acquiescent, simple Malleable, simple Conflictive, disjointed, 
uncontrollable 
(micro); aggressive, 
controlling or 
cooperative (macro) 
Eclectic, flexible Normative / 
Cohesive 
Incidental 
Key words Programming, 
budgeting, 
scheduling, 
scenarios 
Generic strategy, 
strategic group, 
competitive analysis, 
portfolio, experience 
curve 
Distinctive 
competence, 
strategic fit, SWOT, 
formulation / 
implementation 
Adaptation, 
evolution, 
contingency, 
selection, 
complexity 
Bold stroke, vision, 
insight 
Bargaining, conflict, 
coalition, 
stakeholders, political 
game, alliance 
Emergent 
strategy, sense 
making, venturing, 
core competence 
Values, beliefs, 
myths, culture, 
ideology, 
symbolism 
Map, frame, 
concept, schema, 
perception, 
bounded rationality 
Source: Based on (Mintzberg et al., 1998, pp.354-359) 
Note: *Intended / Realized message 
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The schools in the bottom left-hand quadrant of Figure 2-2 differ from those in the 
bottom right-hand quadrant. While there is still a fair sense that the external 
environment can be known, an organization’s internal processes are driven less by 
rationality and more by either an entrepreneur or by power games played by anyone 
with power. According to Mintzberg (1998), the entrepreneurial school sees 
organizational success as dependent on the bold actions and bright insights of the 
entrepreneur, guided by an unrelenting focus on potential opportunities. Strategy 
formation is therefore opportunity driven, rather than process or analysis driven, and 
is often not even documented. Whittington marks this as a shift from the discipline of 
the market to a Darwinian ‘law of the jungle’ and a survival of the fittest approach to 
strategizing (Whittington, 2001). 
For the power school success is driven by the accumulation and use of power. 
Mintzberg’s (1998) differentiation between the use of power within an organization 
(micro) and the exercise of power by the organization as a whole (macro) can be seen 
in Figure 2-2. Both are equated to political behaviour and may involve the use 
‘illegitimate and alegitimate’ means, even though the political ends can be legitimate 
(Mintzberg et al., 1998, pp.235, 243). Micro power includes conflicts of interest 
between individuals or departments, for example, the re-allocation of profitable 
market segments or new customers in a new strategy, which may affect the 
profitability of a division and hence the bonus payments of individuals who head up 
those divisions. An example of power on a macro level in organizational strategy 
development may include the lobbying of government regarding particular legislation, 
for example, feed-in-tariffs for electricity generated by private solar panels, or the 
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Australian ‘open air’ policy that forbids international airlines to pick up passengers for 
domestic legs within Australia. These examples also illustrate why a macro perspective 
of power appears to provide ways to know and control the external environment 
more, while the micro school – in its highlighting of internal organizational politics – is 
more skeptical of the rationality of internal organizational processes. While power and 
politics have always been part of organizations, the literature is, according to 
Mintzberg et al. (1998, p.235) ‘rather small, hardly more than a trickle since the early 
1970s’. In their discussion of this body of literature, they discuss power as directly 
exercised by individuals. What is excluded from this analysis is how power can play out 
without conscious decisions on the part of particular actors or groups of actors. This 
form of power is analyzed under the cultural school (see below). Critical discourse 
theory and practice theory have established a large body of literature that describes 
these power dynamics in terms of, for example, individual, episodic actions and 
characteristics of systems (Lawrence et al., 2001). While this thesis does not take a 
critical discourse perspective, it will consider some of these power dynamics where 
they are enacted through rhetorical strategies. These strategies will be reviewed later 
in this chapter. 
The cognitive school broke new ground by asking questions about what happens in the 
minds of strategists, and how that influences the processes and outcomes of 
strategizing. It drew on research that came from cognitive psychology, decision theory, 
intercultural research or organizational behaviour. Mintzberg et al. (1998) identify two 
distinct wings of the cognitive school. One wing, closer to the design, planning and 
positioning schools, takes an objectivist view of the world. According to this 
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perspective, it is important to take note of distortions and cognitive biases, which get 
in the way of an accurate and objective view of the organization and its environment. 
These may come from, for example, different judgmental biases, cognitive 
preferences, cultural background or decision-making processes (Greenfield, 2005; 
Herrmann, 1991; Myers et al., 1985; Nisbett, 2004; Russo et al., 1990; Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1981). The other wing of the cognitive school sees cognition as a social 
construction. This school of thought is more closely connected to the learning and 
culture schools, which are discussed next. However, a more in-depth discussion of 
constructionist approaches to strategy will follow in section 2.4 of this thesis.  
The concept of a learning organization was first introduced by Argyris but was 
popularized by Senge (1990). In the area of organizational strategy, the learning school 
inverts some of the most fundamental assumptions of the design, positioning and 
planning schools. As the external environment is seen as too complex to comprehend 
or control, strategists proceed through a messy ‘trial and error’ process in which 
strategy formulation and implementation go hand in hand, instead of formulation 
(including analysis, strategic choices and planning) preceding and being separate from 
implementation. Over time a pattern of behaviour is learned and established. A major 
strategy shift would thus be the incremental consequence of many small steps across 
the organization by many people (see e.g.  Tan and Heracleous, 2001), and not the 
outcome of a new strategy centrally designed by a CEO, planner or analyst, and simply 
implemented by others. The underlying logic of the many small steps would follow 
from a consensus among the executive team (Mintzberg et al., 1998). Such an 
interpretation of incrementalism enables the CEO and top team to remain the central 
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architects of strategy. Other concepts or variations of the learning school include 
strategic venturing (e.g. Burgelman, 1996; Gore, 1993; Pinchot, 1985) and sense 
making (retrospective or emergent) (Weick, 1979). These different learning schools 
largely share: an appreciation of the complexity or organizational environments; a 
suspicion of our ability to deliberately control organizations in great detail; an 
acknowledgement that strategizing is carried out by many people in the organization 
and that strategy emerges from organizational learning; and the belief that the role of 
leadership is to manage a process of learning (Mintzberg et al., 1998, p.208).  
While the dynamic and social perspectives of the learning school and cultural school 
are quite similar, there are some important differences. These differences appear to 
emanate partly from the idea that learning leads to change, while culture dynamics 
are mainly about coalescing around and perpetuating existing dynamics (see, e.g. 
Spicer, 2011). This implies that strategic change is difficult, and suggests that the role 
of a leader is largely symbolic, with little real influence over the achievements of the 
organization. Strategy is seen as a perspective that is deeply ‘rooted in collective 
intentions’ (Mintzberg et al., 1998, p.268), which are embedded in its culture, (i.e. 
patterns of sanctioned behaviours, tacit assumptions, espoused values and artefacts) 
(Schein, 1985). Also, in contrast to the term ‘learning’, ‘culture’ has a connotation of 
ideology and organizational beliefs or myths. The difficulty of changing an 
organization’s deeply embedded culture also means that a strong culture can offer a 
source of sustainable competitive advantage (Barney, 1986) as other organizations 
would struggle to emulate its culture.  
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The cognitive, learning and cultural schools link to Whittington’s (2001) processual 
school, and echo its two fundamental themes. First, actors can only consider a handful 
of factors at any one time, instead of conducting a rational, unbiased and unlimited 
search for information. Second, strategy involves bargaining and compromise and is 
better characterized as a political rather than a profit-maximizing calculation.   
STRATEGY IN PRACTICE 
The objective of the literature review is to develop a discursive perspective on 
strategizing, grounded in theory, which takes note of other strategy schools. However, 
in order to ensure that such a discursive perspective also resonates with and can be 
translated into tools and frameworks for practitioners, it is worthwhile to explicitly 
formulate the fundamental purpose of strategizing by identifying key metaphors 
(Cornelissen and Kafouros, 2008; Lakoff and Johnson, 2003; Morgan, 2006; Oswick et 
al., 2002) that express this purpose in the language used by practitioners. 
First, in order to understand what strategy is, it can be useful to understand what it is 
contrasted with. In the case of its military origins, strategy is contrasted with tactics 
(Ansoff, 1965). The latter can be defined as the ‘the art of disposing armed forces in 
order of battle and of organizing operations, especially during contact with an enemy’ 
(Oxford Dictionaries Online, 2013). In a business context, the contrast is similar but 
cast in terms of operations management and the employment of allocated resources 
(Ansoff, 1965). This suggests that, while the emphasis of tactics is on dealing with the 
here and now, strategy takes into account a broader context, looks further ahead, and 
develops a new perspective on a familiar situation before committing to the allocation 
of resources. Practitioner references to strategic thinking or strategizing reflect the 
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perceived importance of these particular aspects of strategizing in at least three 
metaphors (see Table 2-2).  
Table 2-2: Metaphors of Strategizing in Practitioner Language 
Look ahead in time Scan the environment Consider alternative 
perspectives 
 
• Foresight 
• The art of the long 
view 
 
• Big-picture thinking 
• Helicopter or bird’s-
eye view 
 
 
• Creative thinking  
• Reframing 
 
The critical reason for looking ahead in time (i.e. being able to respond earlier), 
scanning the environment (i.e. having a more comprehensive understanding of a given 
situation) and changing perspective (i.e. being able to see things differently) is to 
expand the number and quality of strategic options and hence increase the likelihood 
of success. It is about making sure that the time, arena and perspective are carefully 
chosen to create advantage and proactively shape the competitive situation, rather 
than responding to a situation after it has already emerged.  
These considerations suggest that a discursive perspective of strategizing, in order to 
be meaningful to a practitioner’s needs, may need to consider time, context and 
perspectives. Existing schools of strategy have done this in different ways. Schools that 
presume we can know the external environment, and that the internal processes of an 
organization can be understood rationally, expect to be able to look further ahead in 
time, or observe a broader context. This is because their stance implicitly presumes 
that the current perspective is not inherently flawed. However, other schools of 
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thought, for example, the cognitive or learning school, have less confidence that our 
perspective on the here (narrow context) and now (immediate future) provides a 
singular basis for strategic decisions. These schools are more likely to ask critical 
questions about knowledge and how it is created. As such questions are central to this 
research, the next section will review relevant debates and develop a philosophical 
foundation for the thesis. This is followed by a review of the literature that has shaped 
the discursive approach to strategizing taken here.  
 
2.3 PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF STRATEGY THEORY 
The above analysis of schools of strategy offers a broad overview of the different 
approaches to strategy. However, there is more to be said about the foundations of 
how different schools make sense of the internal processes of an organization and its 
external worlds. This requires an exploration of the philosophical foundations of 
strategizing, as different schools are based on fundamentally different perspectives of 
how we know the world in which we operate. In order to understand the 
opportunities and limitations of these different perspectives, we must unearth and 
explore them. While more common within organization studies, such an exploration of 
foundations is largely absent from the mainstream strategy literature. 
THE NEED FOR A FOUNDATION OF STRATEGY 
The design, planning and positioning schools of thought assume that the external 
environment can be known as a result of a rigorous analysis of facts, and that an 
organization’s response can be managed and controlled because organizations are 
predominantly rational. This notion perhaps aligns best with large, slow-moving 
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corporations in mature industries as these appear to be more conducive to systematic, 
long-term strategies that are embedded in numerous organizational layers. These 
three schools have their roots in the study of major US corporations in the 1960s and 
1970s (see e.g. Chandler, 1962; Sloan, 1964). The relative stability of these 
corporations encouraged the perception that phenomena in the external and internal 
environments can be objectively studied and manipulated. The Cynefin framework 
calls this an ordered universe (Snowden and Boone, 2007). Strategizing in an ordered 
environment starts with ‘sensing’ (i.e. information gathering) in order to determine an 
appropriate response, and is considered the domain of fact-based management. The 
problems that a leader would have to resolve in an ordered universe are ‘tame’ (Grint, 
2005). An ordered universe is not necessarily simple, and can be complicated. 
However, through an expert analysis of solid evidence it is possible to determine an 
effective strategic response. Within the schools that operate predominantly from the 
presumption of an ordered context, problems with analysis or quantification are seen 
as issues of accuracy or availability of data. Many professional managers 
predominantly see themselves in this space, where delivering organizational success 
appears possible as long as they have accurate data and follow a rational process. In 
contrast, unsuccessful managers ‘are left with little option but to conclude that they 
have been incompetent  ... [or]  ... that other people have been incompetent in some 
way’ (Stacey, 2003, p.79). Stacey argues that this perspective is underpinned by a 
cybernetic systems view of the actors, interactions and causality within the 
organization. Such a view sees organizations as goal-seeking systems that are 
regulated by negative feedback from the environment, with a clear boundary between 
the organization (system) and its environment; events and outcomes are predictable 
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in a probabilistic (not deterministic) sense; and no attention is paid to the richness and 
importance of relationships between people, or to an organization’s historical and 
behavioural patterns that may create a propensity to move in a particular direction in 
spite of external feedback for change (Stacey, 2003, pp.44, 81).  
In contrast, the learning, culture and constructionist wings of the cognitive school 
operate in an unpredictable universe, in which connections between cause and effect 
are not immediately apparent (Snowden and Boone, 2007). In this universe 
strategizing is more appropriately conceptualized as pattern-based management or 
processual (Whittington, 2001): through trial and error patterns that emerge after 
certain actions can be identified. The complexity of context means that these 
emerging patterns cannot be predicted deterministically, and problems in this space 
are often ‘wicked’, that is, they are: 
 ‘complex, rather than just complicated, it is often intractable, there is no 
unilinear solution, moreover, there is no ‘stopping’ point, it is novel, any 
apparent ‘solution’ often generates other ‘problems’, and there is no ‘right’ or 
‘wrong’ answer, but there are better or worse alternatives.’  (Grint, 2005, 
p.1473).  
A strategist operating from the assumption of an unordered context also 
acknowledges issues with accuracy and quantification, but is likely to see these as 
inescapable and not a simple matter of accuracy or availability.  
In order to understand strategizing in an unpredictable context, it is critical to see it as 
an eminently social activity, where success depends on developing shared knowledge, 
PhD Thesis Maurizio Floris 
 Page 30 
meanings and truths across often large and diverse groups of actors. This means that a 
strategist must develop an appreciation of the complexity of the human dynamics that 
constitute the patterns of activities and meaning making that a strategist is trying to 
influence. Part of this is about developing an understanding of ‘the phenomena that 
are being talked about when the terms “strategy” and “organisational change” are 
used … [and how] … human beings make sense of phenomena’ (Stacey, 2003, p.2). 
Another aspect of this is that strategizing itself is a complex human dynamic. 
While Stacey (2003) categorizes schools of strategy in a somewhat different way, the 
schools of strategic thought in the upper right-hand quadrant of Figure 2-2 (Mintzberg 
et al.’s Schools of Strategy) can be interpreted as being based on a variety of different 
system perspectives. Such a meta approach to understanding the people and 
organizations that do the strategizing can enable a deeper probing into the nature of 
strategizing, whether it is conceptualized as a type of system, as a complex responsive 
process (Stacey, 2003), as a ‘complexity-reducing and reality-constituting activity’ 
(Chia, 1998, p.363), or – as argued in this thesis – as a discursive activity.  
In its analysis of the epistemological and philosophical foundations of strategy, the 
next section will draw on some of the philosophical debates in strategy and, more 
broadly, organization studies in order to develop a rigorous foundation for a discursive 
perspective on strategizing.  
ONTOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGY 
While an exploration of the foundations of strategy is necessary, such an exploration is 
hindered by inconsistent use of key concepts to describe these philosophical and 
theoretical foundations, specifically ‘ontology’ and ‘epistemology’ (Al-Amoudi and 
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Willmott, 2011; Crotty, 1998; Fleetwood, 2005). Crotty observes that ‘writers in the 
research literature have trouble keeping ontology and epistemology apart 
conceptually’ (1998, p.10). As these concepts are critical to positioning the current 
research, its aspirations and its claims, this section will analyze the use of the terms 
’ontology’ and ‘epistemology’ in the literature, the implications for the philosophical 
foundations of strategy, and argue and define a consistent use of these concepts in 
this thesis.  
Crotty (1998, p.10) defines ontology as the study of being, which ‘is concerned with 
“what is”, with the nature of existence, with the structure of reality as such’. It is 
derived from the Greek οντος (‘being’) and λογία (‘theory’ or ‘study’). However, the 
way things are may differ from how they appear to us. Epistemology (ἐπιστήμη or 
‘knowledge’ or ‘understanding’) is concerned with the latter, and can be defined as ‘a 
way of understanding and explaining how we know what we know’ (Crotty, 1998, P.3).  
A literature review of the ontological or epistemological positions of mainstream 
strategy research identified a dearth of discussion of its philosophical foundations. 
When it was mentioned, it was most often in relation to non-mainstream theoretical 
perspectives like discourse analysis (Fairclough, 2005; Holt and Mueller, 2011), 
strategy-as-practice (Chia and MacKay, 2007; Golsorkhi et al., 2010), or general 
attempts to shift research away from the naïve realist approach that has marked 
traditional mainstream management research (Al-Amoudi and Willmott, 2011; 
Fleetwood, 2005; Mir and Watson, 2000; Peters et al., 2013; Powell, 2001, 2002).  
For example, Fleetwood discusses the importance of ontology and epistemology, 
insisting on consistency because ‘if we have inconsistent ontological commitments, we 
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are likely, sooner or later, to make inconsistent ontological statements’ (Fleetwood, 
2005, p.207). This, Fleetwood (2005) suggests, would undermine a solid foundation for 
management and organizational theory. Similarly, Thomson cautions researchers to 
guard against epistemic-ontological movements where ontology and epistemology 
drift out of alignment (Thompson, 2011). This implies that social researchers need to 
understand and be true to their philosophical foundations, and indicates the 
attribution of importance to both ontology and epistemology. However, the 
importance of epistemology appears to be more generally accepted. As research is 
concerned with how the world appears to us, this is hardly surprising. However, as will 
be argued, there is less agreement on the need to commit to, or specify, ontological 
foundations.  
The term ‘social reality’ may serve to illustrate one of the main debates. Social reality 
relates to the question of whether there is a real world out there – one that exists 
outside the human mind, one that can be known, and one that provides a solid basis 
for knowledge claims. The reference to a ‘world as it is’, independent of our individual 
or social manipulations, originates in Immanuel Kant’s Ding an sich (literally ‘the thing 
in itself’) {Kant, 1976 #611`, first published in 1781}, though the concept can be traced 
back to, at least, Plato’s ‘Allegory of the Cave’ (Plato, 2012). A thing or world ‘in itself’ 
needs to be understood since Kant as a negative abstraction: it is that which remains 
once we have stripped away everything we can meaningfully talk about. If we try to 
describe it, that description constitutes a new conceptual layer that also needs to be 
stripped away in order to arrive at the Ding an sich. As a consequence, we cannot talk 
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about any thing in itself or as it really is (ontology), but only about things as we know 
them (epistemology). The former Kant calls ‘noumenon’, and the latter ‘phenomenon’. 
This raises questions about our ability to generate true or objective knowledge. 
Whereas naïve realism does not consider this problematic, critical realism accepts that 
there is no one-on-one correspondence between our knowledge of the world and the 
world as it exists in itself. From a critical realist perspective there is no theory neutral 
or unmediated access to the world as it really is (Fairclough, 2005; Fleetwood, 2005; 
Reed, 2000). However, there is more to the world than just our thoughts or discourse, 
and it is this world as it is that provides an anchor and stability of meaning for the 
world as we know it. Others are not so sure. Coming from a different perspective, Chia 
(2000) talks about ‘social objects’, which ‘have to be forcibly carved out of the 
undifferentiated flux of raw experience and conceptually fixed and labeled’ in order to 
construct a ‘social reality’ (p.513). Chia’s ‘undifferentiated flux’ (2000, p.513) avoids 
the suggestion that we can conceptualize the pre-conceptual as a thing, entity or 
object. It is the carving and labeling that creates the objects that make up our social 
reality. Because of this, Chia calls organizational action ‘first and foremost an 
ontological activity’ (2000, p.514) because this action would be able to generate, make 
or construct socially real entities. Fleetwood (2005, p.206), a critical realist himself, 
disagrees and calls Chia’s description of constructionism ‘ontological exaggeration’. 
According to Fleetwood (2005) socially real entities do exist, and not just in discourse, 
but they have extra-discursive or pre-discursive properties that exist even if the entity 
has never been identified as such. However, Chia (2000) is careful to point out that it 
would be inappropriate to mistake our socially constructed conceptions of reality for 
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reality itself, and that ‘describing reality as it is in itself must be set aside’ (p.515). 
Echoing Kant’s negative abstraction, he suggests that this lies beyond analysis and 
words and instead in the domain of art or spirituality.  
Weick (2011) demonstrates a similar sentiment in his reflection on change agents as 
‘poets’, who do not describe organizational reality but whose role it is to rework such 
illusions of organizational concreteness back into an undifferentiated flux that allows 
people to ‘reimagine forms, shapes, locales and names’ (p.13). While not uncommon, 
calling the social construction of reality an ontological activity enables ambiguity 
regarding the meaning of reality (social or ‘reality itself’) and ambiguity regarding the 
meaning of ontology (socially constructed or Ding an sich). While Chia (2000) himself is 
explicit and careful to define his use of these terms, others are less clear and 
contribute to the confusion that exists. 
In other cases the confusion stems from conflating terms that should be used more 
carefully, like ‘realism’ and ‘constructivism’ (or ‘constructionism’) (Al-Amoudi and 
Willmott, 2011). For example, Mir and Watson state that ‘Constructivism occupies a 
methodological space characterized by ontological realism and epistemological 
relativism’ (Mir and Watson, 2000, p.941). However, Kwan and Tsang (2001) argue 
that Mir and Watson (2000) erroneously conflate naïve, dogmatic realism and critical 
realism, as well as moderate and radical constructivism. According to Kwan and Tsang 
(2001) the space of ontological realism and epistemological relativism is occupied by 
critical realism. Other leading advocates of critical realism also stress the centrality of 
epistemological relativism (Al-Amoudi and Willmott, 2011) as part of critical realism, 
rather than as a contrast to constructivism. Further, Crotty (1998) argues that it is 
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possible to be a realist in ontology and a constructionist in epistemology. So, while Mir 
and Watson (2000) seem to suggest that constructionism implies an ontological 
realism, Kwan and Tsang (2001) deny this. Also, Al-Amoudi and Willmott (2011) appear 
to use constructionism as an ontological notion, while Crotty sees constructionism as 
an epistemological notion. Again, the inconsistent use of terms confuses the debate.  
The aim of the discussion above is not to suggest a superior position in the argument, 
but to demonstrate the confusion and ambiguity that surrounds the debate regarding 
ontology and epistemology, in order to prevent the same ambiguity from arising in this 
thesis. Some of the confusion may result from the different ways in which the term 
‘ontology’ is used in the philosophy literature versus the ways it is used in some of the 
discipline-specific literature. According to Crotty (1998), philosophically the term 
refers narrowly to a pre-conceptual reality in itself. In contrast, the research literature 
often talks about ‘ontology’ to refer to a reality that is the subject of research. Crotty 
(1998) would prefer to call this a theoretical perspective as it is about knowledge of 
the subject, that is, epistemology.  
COMBINATIONS OF PHILOSOPHICAL POSITIONS 
As the aim of this thesis is to explore and extend some of the boundaries of current 
strategy research, it seems appropriate and necessary to clarify the ontological and 
epistemological positions taken in this thesis. In order to prevent ambiguity, some key 
concepts and philosophical positions are defined here. The intention is to present a 
reasonable overview that is able to provide a conceptual anchor for this thesis. 
Following on from the discussion above, there is no suggestion (or possibility, due to 
inconsistency) that all the literature reviewed aligns with the definitions presented 
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here. The matrix below provides an overview of combinations of ontological and 
epistemological positions. The matrix does not mean to suggest that all these 
combinations can be found in equal measure in the literature, or that all combinations 
fit together comfortably. For example, it is not logical to combine ontological idealism 
with epistemological objectivism: the latter requires objects to reside outside the 
human mind, whereas the former denies that possibility. Similarly, it appears 
inappropriate to combine naïve realism with social constructionism, as it could be 
argued that if the reality is clear to see, there is not much left to socially construct.  
In the context of this thesis, the term ‘ontology’ is narrowly reserved to denote a 
philosophical position, which relates to the acceptance or denouncement of a reality 
or world that exists independently of us. Ontology has been divided into realism (i.e. 
the presumption that reality exists outside our minds) and idealism (i.e. there is no 
reality independent of us). To be clear, this means that ontologically there is no 
difference between naïve realism and critical realism. However, the epistemological 
differences are significant, as will be elaborated below. 
The term ‘epistemology’ denotes the location where meaning originates. The main 
positions as defined here are that meaning originates from social interactions (social 
constructionism), individual interpretations (subjectivism), or from objects themselves 
(objectivism). These definitions establish a matrix in which we can locate a number of 
other concepts that are frequently used or misused. 
Following Phillips et al. (2006), the term ‘constructionism’ (as opposed to 
‘constructivism’) is used to differentiate between a social construction and an 
individual construction of meaning. However, it is recognized that some of the 
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literature uses constructivism to indicate a social process, or it is not clear whether it 
refers to either a process of meaning making that is social, individual or both. In this 
thesis constructivism will only be used if the original reference is not specific or does 
not differentiate between social and individual meaning making. To avoid confusion, 
this thesis will generally use the term ‘subjectivism’ to denote that knowledge and 
meaning is rooted in an individual’s mind. 
Table 2-3: Ontological and Epistemological Positions 
 ONTOLOGICAL POSITIONS 
Realism Idealism 
  
Positions 
Reality exists outside the mind There is no reality 
independent of us 
EP
IS
TE
MO
LO
GI
CA
L 
PO
SI
TI
ON
S 
Co
ns
tru
ct
io
ni
sm
 
(Naïve) realism Critical realism 
Meaning is 
socially 
constructed 
(1.1) Problematic position: 
there is a ‘world always already 
there’. We build our knowledge 
of this world by combining and 
integrating our observations 
and reasoning with others. 
Through social interaction we 
can, over time, increase the 
accuracy and completeness of 
our knowledge of the world as it 
really is. 
(1.2) There is a ‘world always 
already there’. However, we 
can only approach that world 
with our socially constructed 
concepts and theories, so 
objective knowledge is not 
possible. Nevertheless, the 
pre-conceptual world 
anchors and structures what 
we can call knowledge. 
(1.3) There is no 
world already there. 
Therefore all 
knowledge is relative 
and socially 
constructed.  
Su
bj
ec
tiv
ism
 
Meaning is 
created in an 
individual’s 
mind and 
depends on 
individual 
concepts/ 
theories 
(2.1) Problematic position: there 
is a ‘world always already 
there’. We know the world 
through our individual, unique 
observations and theories. This 
makes it difficult to develop 
generally accepted and 
accurate knowledge that 
corresponds with the world as it 
really is. 
(2.2) There is a ‘world always 
already there’. However, we 
can only approach that world 
with mental (individual) 
concepts and theories, so 
objective knowledge is not 
possible. Nevertheless, the 
pre-conceptual world 
anchors and structures what 
we can call knowledge. 
(2.3) There is no 
world already there. 
Therefore all 
knowledge is relative 
and a construct of 
our (individual) 
minds. 
Ob
jec
tiv
ism
 
Meaning exists 
in objects, and 
accurate & 
objective 
knowledge is 
possible 
(3.1) There is a ‘world always 
already there’. We can know 
that world in increasing detail 
through reasoning, observing 
and accumulating objective 
and accurate knowledge that 
corresponds with the world 
as it really is. 
(3.2) Problematic position: there 
is a ‘world always already 
there’. Although we can only 
approach the world with our 
(individual or social) theories 
and concepts, we can work 
towards an increasingly closer 
(though never fully attained) 
correspondence with the world 
as it really is. 
(3.3) Untenable 
position: if you do not 
accept that a world 
exists outside the 
human mind, then you 
cannot strive to 
develop objective 
knowledge of that 
world. 
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The matrix shows that the difference between naïve or dogmatic realism and critical 
realism is a difference of epistemology. Whereas the former assumes meaning as 
something unproblematic that we can observe or discover through proper research 
design, critical realism states that the world as we know it is different from the world 
as it is of itself. The term ‘positivism’, that is, a combination of a realist ontology with a 
naïve, objectivist epistemology will be equated to the position (3,1) in Table 2-3, that is, 
a combination of a realist ontology with an naïve, objectivist epistemology.  
It could be argued that the positions defined in (1,1), (2,1) and (3,2) in the table above 
are not tenable. However, a naïve realist might want to argue that subjective (2,1) or 
socially constructed (1,1) knowledge is possible or even unavoidable on the path to 
achieving objective knowledge. Also, a critical realist might argue that, while purely 
objective knowledge is not possible, over time we can describe the real world with a 
high degree of accuracy, even if that description is not perfectly objective (3,2). While 
these three positions are considered problematic, they do not play a role in this 
research, and will not be explored further. 
Kwan and Tsang’s (2001) definition of a moderate constructivist epistemology is 
reflected in position (1.2), and their definition of a radical constructivist epistemology 
is represented in position (1.3). The broader term ‘epistemic relativism’ (Al-Amoudi 
and Willmott, 2011) might cover rows 1 and 2, as meaning can be considered relative 
due to either individual interpretation or social construction.  
The matrix, as drawn here, allows proponents of both critical realism and idealism to 
claim a social constructionist epistemology, accept that all knowledge is socially 
constructed, and that we have no access to an unmediated, preconceptual reality, 
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either because all knowledge is socially mediated (critical realism) or because such a 
reality simply does not exist (idealism). This position enables a constructionist 
epistemology of strategy that is consistent with both a critical realist as well as idealist 
ontology. What is essential for such an epistemology of strategizing is to avoid any 
ontological claims, and use the term constructionism only to denote an 
epistemological position (Alvesson and Deetz, 1999; Crotty, 1998). According to Holt et 
al. (2011, p.71), ‘For Gergen (1994, p.72) constructionism does not want to engage in 
ontological debate about what is more real or less real: indeed, constructionism is 
ontologically mute. Whatever “is” simply is’. 
This discussion of philosophical positions is necessary to define terms like 
constructionism and epistemology and avoid misinterpretations of how these are used 
in this thesis. In line with the position discussed above, this research is ontologically 
mute, that is, it does not make any claim as to whether the fixing of meaning is due to 
or helped by an independent world that exists in itself. In this way it avoids the 
assumption of an objective world that exists independently of our descriptions. 
However, this position is only feasible if the term ontology is reserved narrowly to 
denote a pre-conceptual reality, and is not allowed to encroach on descriptions of any 
socially constructed reality. While it is acknowledged that in social research the term 
‘ontology’ is, at times, used to indicate a reality that is social rather than pre-
conceptual, this thesis will therefore avoid such usage. Consequently, this research is 
limited to constructionist epistemological claims about how meaning can be seen to 
be negotiated and fixed socially, in the interactions between humans during 
strategizing, and how that leads to material outcomes.  
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Strategizing is seen as the development of an organization’s strategy that emerges 
from its daily practices or as a vision of the future. A constructionist epistemology of 
strategy is therefore centered on how meaning is constructed in the social interactions 
(i.e. strategizing) of actors. However, the current literature does not provide an explicit 
discursive perspective on an epistemology of strategizing and how this may differ from 
organizational studies more generally. This thesis will therefore consider how meaning 
is discursively constructed in strategizing. In order to identify how we socially 
construct meaning in strategizing, we need to consider what is specific about 
strategizing in both strategy theory and practice. In order to do that, this review of the 
existing literature will proceed with a review of constructionist approaches to strategy 
or strategizing to create a theoretical framework and develop the research questions 
for the case study.   
 
2.4 STRATEGIZING AS MULTI-MODAL DISCURSIVE PRACTICE 
Constructionist perspectives on strategy go hand in hand with an appreciation of the 
role that language plays in how we understand ourselves and the world in which we 
live, and has influenced much of the humanities and critical business studies over the 
last 30 to 40 years (Alvesson, 2000; Derrida, 1998; Fairhurst, 2009; Foucault, 1977; 
Rorty, 1991; Rorty et al., 1980; Rorty, 1992; Wittgenstein, 1967). This linguistic turn 
became a fertile ground for the emergence of approaches, including discourse 
analysis, which questions how people perceive the external world and why it appears 
the way it does (Alvesson, 2000; Grant et al., 1999; Mumby, 2011).  
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A discourse approach to strategy is firmly based on a social constructionist 
epistemology and fights a ‘two front war’ (Alvesson and Deetz, 1999, p.199). On the 
one front discourse analysis faces an objectivist epistemology of much of traditional, 
mainstream strategy theory, which locates knowledge in accurate observations of the 
external environment or organization. On the other front it must deal with 
subjectivism, which locates such knowledge in unique observations of phenomena by 
individuals. In contrast, a discourse approach to strategy sees organizational 
phenomena as neither independent of human experience, nor as the exclusive domain 
of individual subjective experiences. Instead, they are the outcomes of ongoing social 
negotiations, and as such are intersubjective (Hardy and Phillips, 2004).  
Discourse analysis is not simply a method but a methodology of how we know and give 
meaning to the world around us, and includes a broad set of different methods 
(Phillips and Hardy, 2002). There is an extensive body of work that explores 
organizations through discourse. This body of work may be a general exploration of 
discourse analysis in relation to organizational change (Alvesson and Karreman, 2000; 
Clegg and Hardy, 1999; Grant et al., 2001; Grant et al., 2002; Oswick et al., 2005); or 
may focus on power relations or resistance (Phillips et al., 2004; Putnam et al., 2005), 
organizational identity (Hardy et al., 2005b; Phillips et al., 2004), gender in the 
workplace (Ainsworth, 2002), accounting practices (Chua, 1995; Ezzamel and Willmot, 
2008; Macintosh et al., 2000; MacKenzie, 2006), technology implementation (Grant et 
al., 2006; Heracleous and Barrett, 2001; Shepherd, 2006), micro/macro discourses 
(Alvesson and Karreman, 2000), sense making (Clegg and Hardy, 1999), or leadership 
(Fairhurst and Grant, 2010; Grint, 2005; Harrison and Young, 2005). The breadth of this 
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research on discourse and organization suggests that a discursive perspective can be 
meaningfully applied to many aspects of organizational activity. Going only one step 
further, the combined research suggests that organizations only exist ‘insofar as their 
members create them through discourse’ (Mumby & Clair, 1997, p.181; in Grant et al., 
1999). Similarly, the ‘Methods and Approach’ chapter shows how the case can be seen 
to emerge from the data as broader discourses, key constructs, actors, and discursive 
practices are constructed through recurring themes and patterns in the acquisition 
discourse. 
STRATEGIZING AS DISCOURSE 
As will be argued, a discursive approach to strategy maps across the top right quadrant 
of Mintzberg et al.’s (1998) schools of strategy thought (see Figure 2-2: Schools of 
Strategy, p.17), cutting across the (social constructionist wings of the) learning, power, 
cognitive and cultural schools of strategy. The review of the discourse literature below 
commences with a discussion of some of the main concepts of discourse analysis and 
how they are applied to strategizing. These concepts include discourse, text, context, 
meaning, (discursive) practices, power and agency. 
DISCOURSE  
Potter and Wetherell (1987, p.7) define discourse as ‘all forms of spoken interaction, 
formal and informal, and written texts of all kinds’. Following Grant and Marshak 
(2011) discourse is defined as ‘instantiated in the daily communicative practices that 
are integral to social interaction and thus social structure. It is a set of interrelated 
texts that, along with its production, dissemination and consumption, brings an object 
or idea into being (Fairclough, 1992; Hardy et al., 2005b; Parker, 1992). Discourses, 
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therefore, do not simply reflect but constitute reality; they produce rules, identity, 
context, values and procedures (Fairclough, 1992; Hall, 2001; Taylor et al., 1996) and 
these shape what can be said and who can say it (Deetz, 1992).   
Discourse analysis takes a critical look at how, through discourse, particular ways of 
framing organizational phenomena become broadly accepted. This acceptance 
influences what is highlighted or hidden, and thus influences what meaning is 
attributed to an organizational phenomenon. Framing is not neutral, as all ways of 
seeing de-emphasize or hide other ways (Fairhurst, 2011; Phillips and Hardy, 2002). 
For example, ‘shareholder value’ has become such a dominant frame to evaluate 
corporate performance (Lok, 2010) that other frames, which may highlight the 
interests of other actors, are often considered secondary. 
TEXT 
Potter and Wetherell’s (1987) earlier definition (see above) identifies text as spoken or 
written. While discourse scholars have since expanded this definition to include other 
forms of communication (Fairhurst, 2007; Hardy et al., 2005b), most empirical 
research has remained limited to either speech or writing. The recent emergence of 
social semiotics in organizational studies (Iedema, 2003, 2007; Kress, 2010; Kress and 
Van Leeuwen, 2001) has led to an increase in research that also involves non-linguistic 
modes to address this omission in strategic research (see the section on Social 
semiotics: Multi-modality, p.66). Nevertheless, multi-modal analysis of strategizing 
discourse is still scarce and has shaped the research here (the literature on social 
semiotics and multi-modality is reviewed in detail further on).  
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Owing to the social nature of meaning making, discourse analysis looks at bodies of 
interrelated texts, rather than individual texts (Phillips and Hardy, 2002). While an 
individual text can provide an example or material manifestation of a discourse, it 
cannot be extrapolated beyond its particular instance. The absence of an objective, 
invariable reality that is reflected in the text means that in a different context the 
meaning of the text is not anchored in ‘reality’ but depends on somewhat different 
interpretations by different actors with potentially different frames and interests.  
This distinguishes discourse analysis from, for example, narrative analysis (Barry and 
Elmes, 1997), in that it puts more emphasis on analyzing accumulated bodies of text 
(Phillips & Hardy, 2002) than individual texts. As a result it allows negotiations to be 
observed across different iterations, interpretations or contexts. The discourses in 
which we partake at different points in time also shape each other in ongoing dynamic 
patterns of interaction and meaning making. This means that, when analyzing an 
organization’s strategic discourse, it is essential to understand the context in which 
strategic texts come into existence.  
CONTEXT 
A discourse of strategy within an organization does not occur in isolation but is 
embedded within a context of broader discourses (Grant and Hardy, 2004). However, 
few discursive studies of strategy explore how a particular organization’s local strategy 
discourse interacts with that ‘broader’ context (Erkama and Vaara, 2010; Hardy, 2004). 
A broader discourse can be defined as a discourse that is shaped predominantly by 
actors beyond the organization, and has been variously described as ‘macro’, ‘meta’, 
‘grand’, ‘capital D’ or ‘mega’ discourses (Alvesson and Karreman, 2000; Boje, 2001; 
PhD Thesis Maurizio Floris 
 Page 45 
Keenoy and Oswick, 2004; Phillips et al., 2008; Robichaud et al., 2004). Rather than 
look at such broader discourses as operating on a different level, this thesis views 
them as interwoven. This avoids a suggestion of hierarchy while still acknowledging 
the dependency and influence of different discourses on each other.  
One example that does analyze such interactions is Vaara et al.’s (2004) study of 
strategy-related discourses in the airline industry. This study illustrates how a 
discourse regarding the necessity of airline alliances can be understood as a particular 
instance of a broader societal discourse on ‘corporatization’ and ‘globalization’. 
Specifically, the study provides an example of an early ‘revolutionary’ protagonist, Jan 
Carlzon, who drew on broader societal discourses in order to challenge traditional 
views in his own airline, SAS. As these broader discourses came to dominate in the 
airline industry by the late 1990s they compelled other actors in the industry to view 
them in similar terms (Vaara et al., 2004). The analysis suggests a transition from a 
judicious drawing on broader societal discourses by an early protagonist to a situation 
where these broader discourses were taken for granted industry-wide. Such a position 
of dominance of a broader contextual discourse does not occur from one day to the 
next but emerges from ongoing changes in the daily interactions between key actors.   
The discussion of broader discourses does not imply that they are a given for 
organizational leadership. While one actor or group of organizational actors generally 
may not be able to significantly change a broader discourse in which they are not one 
of the main or dominant actors, they do have some control over the context of their 
local strategic discourse by choosing or shaping what is seen as the most relevant 
broader discourses (Fairhurst, 2009). In the example above, Jan Carlzon was an early 
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protagonist who chose to make the broader societal discourse on ‘corporatization’ and 
‘globalization’ part of the context for SAS’ local strategic discourse. This construction 
of a context for a local strategic discourse is not neutral. Actors bring their own 
interests to the discourse, and these interests may shape the discursive practices of 
actors, including which broader discourses are made relevant, and ultimately what 
meaning is assigned to organizational phenomena. In order to show this dynamic, the 
broader discourses that were essential to the acquisition discourse were not taken for 
granted, but their emergence is shown from the patterns of discursive practices that 
were brought to bear by actors (see stage 2 of the ‘Methods and Approach’ chapter). 
As mentioned, few studies have examined the dynamic relationship between a 
particular local strategic discourse and broader discourses (Erkama and Vaara, 2010; 
Hardy, 2004). This thesis will examine that relationship and identify how broader 
discourses were brought to bear on particular strategic discourses, and what role they 
played in shaping the acquisition discourse that is the subject of this research.  
In addition to drawing on broader discourses, a particular discourse may also draw on 
sets of texts that relate to either the past or the future. As this is particularly relevant 
to strategizing, the next section will explore the notion of time in strategizing 
generally, as well as how this applies to strategizing as discourse.  
TIME 
The future orientation of strategizing has been well recognized in strategy theory 
(Baghai et al., 1999; Das, 1987; Johnson et al., 2011; Mintzberg, 1994; Mintzberg et al., 
1998; Mosakowski and Earley, 2000; Taschdjian, 1977; Wright et al., 1996). Time is 
embedded in all organizational activity, but it is not often explicitly used as a lens for 
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analyzing those activities (Ancona et al., 2001; Das, 1991; Goodman et al., 2001; Shi et 
al., 2012). Previous research on time (Ancona et al., 2001; Goodman et al., 2001; Shi et 
al., 2012) proposes a number of temporal variables, including timing, pace, cycles, 
rhythms, flow, temporal orientation and the cultural meaning of time. However, these 
variables typically do not specifically relate to strategizing but are drawn from a wide 
range of management areas.   
Attention to the temporal dimension can be seen in all major schools of strategy and is 
generally positioned as anticipating or forecasting the future and acting accordingly 
(Baghai et al., 1999; Kaplan and Orlikowski, 2013; Mintzberg et al., 1998). For example, 
the dominant design and positioning schools of thought for strategizing (Mintzberg et 
al., 1998) see the future external environment as more knowable and predictable, and 
the internal environment as more rational in anticipating and acting on future changes 
relating to that environment. This makes future-oriented strategizing and prescribing 
effective action more straightforward. Time also plays a role in other strategy thought, 
which sees the future as less predictable, less rational and more complex and organic, 
and hence more difficult to anticipate (Mintzberg et al., 1998). Here strategizing is less 
about a long-term vision and more about trying to shape patterns of organizational 
practices, which would allow a preferred future to emerge from those patterns. In a 
complex environment this requires a constant monitoring of, and adaptation to, those 
patterns (Snowden and Boone, 2007). For example, the cultural school emphasizes the 
difficulty in deliberately shaping such patterns, while the learning school stresses the 
possibility of doing so.  
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The future orientation that defines strategizing is captured in the concept of a time 
horizon (Baghai et al., 1999; Das, 1987; Taschdjian, 1977). Taschdjian (1977) defines a 
‘horizon [as] a boundary which moves back as we move towards it’ (in Das, 1991, 
p.53). What constitutes an appropriate time horizon for strategizing is not fixed and 
may vary with, for example, someone’s role or seniority in an organization. Jacques 
(1979) equates a longer ‘time span of discretion’ with more senior levels of an 
organization. This means that while a frontline manager may have to consider the next 
3 to 12 months, a Group CEO’s time span might extend to 10 to 20 years or beyond. 
Other temporal research also identifies that appropriate time horizons may vary as 
time is not necessarily an objective measure. While time is most often considered as 
clock time, research into strategizing suggests it can also be measured by the passing 
of particular events, or stages in a cycle (Orlikowski and Yates, 2002; Shi et al., 2012), 
and has been studied as personal inclination (Das, 1987, 2004), or as a cultural 
phenomenon (Mosakowski and Earley, 2000; Nisbett, 2004). While Shi and colleagues 
specifically look at mergers and acquisitions (M&As) and alliances, the same can also 
be said when comparing industries with inherently different ‘speeds’. Such a speed 
may be expressed in, for example, typical investment cycles or product life cycles in 
that industry. This emphasis on cycles rather than clock time also shifts the attention 
away from strategy as a vision for the future, to an emergence of strategy from such 
patterns of investment or product life cycles. If we see strategy as something we have, 
then looking further ahead in time, whether in clock time or in (investment or product) 
cycles, allows opportunities and threats to be anticipated earlier, and as such provides 
more options for adjusting one’s vision (Baghai et al., 1999). If we see strategy as 
something ‘we do’, attention to a temporal dimension of strategizing provides more 
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time to adapt or overcome resistance inherent in the recursive patterns of cognition, 
power or habit. Therefore, a company may improve its strategic options by either 
looking further ahead in clock time, or by accelerating its patterned activity to create 
more time in terms of investment or product cycles.   
While the concept of time has been explored in the discourse literature, this has 
typically been an exploration of how a particular discourse is reiterated or adapted 
over time as part of organizational change. In contrast, the discussion above suggests 
that in strategizing the concept of time is used somewhat differently. Instead of 
emphasizing how a particular discourse changes over time, it now refers to how that 
discourse at a particular moment in time draws on sets of texts that refer to other 
(mainly future) moments in time. Keenoy and Oswick (2004) develop the concept of 
‘textscape’ to signify how each instance of discourse is informed by a retrospective, 
real-time and projective context that is woven through that instance. This concept is of 
immediate relevance to strategizing, which takes note of context and the future. 
Strategizing by ‘looking forward’ in time now becomes a matter of drawing on texts 
that relate to a future point in time. By becoming part of the current strategy 
discourse, they play a role in shaping an organization’s strategy.  While Kaplan and 
Orlikowski (2013) take a practice instead of a discourse perspective, they describe a 
similar dynamic. For them, temporal work in strategizing is about constructing 
coherent, plausible and acceptable connections between the past, present and future. 
This is needed to create a strategic account that enables actors to agree on a particular 
strategic choice and action and move forward. Kaplan and Orlikowski (2013) label a 
failure to negotiate adequate agreement through temporal work a ‘breakdown’ that 
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leads to organizational inertia. To explore this dynamic in detail from a discursive 
perspective in the case of a M&A scenario, this thesis will look at how actors draw on 
texts that relate to (particularly) the future, and what role these texts play in 
constructing an organization’s strategy (see stage 6 of the ‘Methods and Approach’ 
chapter). As will be argued, this can be understood in terms of the convergence or 
divergence of meaning of key constructs that shape the acquisition discourse. The next 
section will therefore review meaning making as it has been discussed in the literature.  
MEANING 
Discourse can be seen as a meaning-making activity (Weick, 1979; Weick, 2004). The 
meaning that actors attribute to, for example, a concept or text, does not depend on 
one singular instance in which that concept or text occurs. Rather, its meaning 
emerges over the course of a series of instances of similar situations where its use has 
been sanctioned, thus confirming the meaning of the concept; or it emerges from the 
critique of other actors in particular instances in which the text or concept has been 
used inappropriately, that is, the limits of appropriate usage have been transgressed.  
These instances of meaning making include conversations (Grant and Marshak, 2011) 
or other interactions. Meaning making may occur through ‘borrowing’ traits from 
similar concepts (analogies, similes, metaphors) or contrasting traits with dissimilar 
concepts (anomaly, paradox, irony). In particular, the study of metaphors has seen a 
major increase in popularity over the last 25 to 30 years since groundbreaking 
publications from Lakoff and Johnson (2003, originally published in 1980) and Morgan 
(2006, originally published in 1986). Similarity and dissimilarity have been explored as 
meaning-making tools by a number of organizational scholars (Oswick et al., 2002, 
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2003; Putnam et al., 1999). This research shows that managers are not 
deterministically locked in by similarities or dissimilarities but that they are active 
agents who, for example, can (and do) mix their metaphors to understand new 
situations.  
Part of the negotiation of meaning across different groups may involve the use of 
boundary objects. Boundaries between different social groups can result from 
different practices, interests or cultures, and may hinder the ability of groups to work 
together and share knowledge with each other (Orlikowski, 2002). Boundary objects 
are objects that can help transfer, translate and transform knowledge (Carlile, 2002) 
between different groups. Examples of boundary objects include: repositories, ideal-
type objects, coincident boundaries and standardized forms (Star and Griesemer, 
1989); data repositories, visionary objects, ideal-type objects, coincident boundaries 
and standardized protocols (Briers and Chua, 2001); machines (Bechky, 2003); objects, 
models and maps (Carlile, 2002); and strategy tools (Spee and Jarzabkowski, 2009). 
While boundary objects can be abstract or concrete (Star and Griesemer, 1989), two 
criteria are generally acknowledged as essential: they must be ‘plastic enough to adapt 
to local needs …  yet robust enough to maintain a common identity across sites’ (Star 
and Griesemer, 1989, p.393). This thesis draws on the existing research to identify 
boundary objects in the case study, and analyzes the process and conditions necessary 
to construct such objects.  
Law and Singleton (2005) describe how the concept of boundary objects was 
developed as part of research influenced by Actor Network Theory (ANT), which 
imagines objects as either ‘volumes in Euclidean space; stable networks of relations; as 
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fluids that gently reshape their configurations’, or fire, which jumps ‘creatively, 
destructively and more or less unpredictably from location to location’ (p.347). ANT 
finds its genesis in Science and Technology Studies (Callon, 1986; Latour, 1987; Law, 
2009), but is contributing increasingly to organizational studies (Baxter and Chua, 
2003; Whittle and Spicer, 2008; Woolgar et al., 2009). Key characteristics of ANT 
include its equal attention to artefacts and actors, which are grouped under the label 
‘actants’; analysis of the network of relevant actants; and the construction of 
technological artefacts and scientific ‘discoveries’. Such innovations can be defined 
very broadly and, when applied to business studies, may refer to organizational 
strategies that are solidified as networks increasingly coalesced around dominant 
interests (e.g. Skærbæk and Tryggestad, 2010).  
While ANT research emphasizes how human and non-human actors stabilize meaning 
and create such objects, others shows how stability occurs through intertextuality 
(Oswick and Robertson, 2009) and recursivity, that is, relationships with other texts 
that are woven through a strategy discourse and patterns of discursive practices that 
bring the world continuously into being. Although these perspectives of actors or 
interwoven discourses as stabilizers are connected (Law, 2009), they have a different 
emphasis. In addition, whereas ANT emphasizes that change is difficult because it 
requires adjusting the relationships between actants, a discourse analytic perspective 
highlights how this difficulty originates in the complexity of interrupting recurring 
patterns of discursive practices or discourses. 
However, in spite of this fixing and labeling, some level of potential confusion and 
ambiguity between actors regarding the meaning of any object or construct remains 
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(Weick, 2004). In the pragmatic context of strategizing it can be argued that the aim is 
not to resolve all ambiguity, but merely to negotiate sufficient convergence of 
interpretation to enable actors to decide what action to take next. Observing this 
process involves identifying what this point in the negotiation looks like, and how 
actors know whether it has been reached. Analysis of the discursive practices used to 
influence one another and the exercise of power to make decisions therefore becomes 
critical to understanding how strategy is practiced.  
POWER 
Such an exercise of power can occur in different forms. Power can be defined as ‘the 
probability that a person can carry out his or her own will despite resistance’ (Weber 
(1947) in Kim et al., 2005, p.800). Discourse is not neutral and a change in discourse 
may further the interests of one actor over another. Consequently, an analysis of 
discourse can be particularly effective in unearthing struggles between actors as the 
exercise of power to control discourse (Grant and Hardy, 2004). This can be achieved 
by putting power dynamics at the centre of the overall analysis, as is the case in critical 
discourse analysis, or by being sensitive to power dynamics without putting it at the 
centre of the research, as is the case here.  
The earlier discussion of schools of strategy included the power schools (micro and 
macro) and the cultural school. Whereas the micro and macro power schools assume 
the deliberate exercise of power by an actor, the culture school hints at a systemic 
power that is embedded in the culture of an organization, which results in resistance 
to change. According to Mintzberg et al. (1998), an analysis of power is largely absent 
in mainstream strategy theory, with only a trickle of publications on the topic. 
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However, extensive analysis does exist in the broader organizational literature and is 
increasingly connected with strategy theory.  
Lawrence et al. (2001) integrate prominent theories of power in an overarching 
framework of conceptions of power. While initially developed in the context of 
institutionalization, the framework has also been applied successfully in the context of 
negotiation (e.g. Kim et al., 2005). The framework differentiates the mode (systemic or 
episodic) and treatment of the target (as object or subject) to create a 2x2 matrix (see 
Table 2-4).  
 
Table 2-4: Conceptions of Power  
  Treatment of the target as 
  Subject Object 
M
od
e 
Episodic 
 
Influence Force 
Systemic 
 
Discipline Domination 
Source: Lawrence et all., 2001 
Within this framework ‘influence’ specifically refers to episodic attempts by actors to 
exercise power over a subject in order to further their own interests. A range of 
rhetorical frameworks were explored (see Table 2-7: Rhetorical Frameworks in 
Organization Studies, p.82) in order to determine how to analyze rhetoric used by 
actors to influence BHP’s attempted acquisition of Rio. Episodic attempts can be one 
off or a pattern of attempts to exercise power. However, these patterns would still be 
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delineated by time and not naturalized or internalized by the system in which they 
occur. It presumes either the existence of a conflict of interest that requires the use of 
power (Lawrence et al., 2001), a manipulation of people’s ‘perceptions, cognitions, 
and preferences’ (Lukes, 1974, in Lawrence et al., 2001, p.633) or, as this thesis will 
show, the negotiation of meaning of key constructs. Well-known conceptualizations 
related to power that include this conception of power include a typology of power 
bases (French and Raven, 1959), which distinguishes five bases from which an actor 
can draw power: rewards, expertise, legitimacy (or lawful authority), referent power 
(or the desire of a person to be accepted by the actor) and coercion. This fifth base 
(coercion) is part of what Lawrence et al. call ‘force’. Others focus on the influence 
tactics used by managers, for example, pressure, legitimation, exchange, coalition 
building, rational persuasion, inspirational appeal, consultation or personal appeal 
(Kipnis et al., 1980; Yukl and Tracey, 1992).  
Force relates to a ‘direct, overt use of power to overcome another actor’s intentions or 
behaviors’ (Lawrence et al., 2001, p.635). It is connected to a particular act or practice 
(episodic), and objectifies the target by removing the target’s choice altogether. As 
previously noted, French and Raven’s coercion falls under this interpretation of force, 
while lawful authorities can also exercise force. Obvious organizational actors that may 
use force include the police, the military and prisons. However, other organizations 
(like competition regulators and foreign investment review boards) can use non-
physical force when they exercise power and make actors do something against their 
will. This research is sensitive to this form of power as it underpins the role of 
competition regulators in the pre-acquisition discourse. 
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The exercise of power through discipline provides a systemic, routine signal that 
sanctions certain meanings or behaviours, and discourages others. Foucault (1977) 
describes how discipline works through a combination of three mechanisms, that is, 
hierarchical observation, normalizing judgment and examination: continuous 
surveillance identifies potential breaches of established rules and, upon examination, 
may generate punishment. The disciplinary mechanisms may initially reside outside 
the targeted actor, but ‘their power comes from their integration into and effect on 
the identity of the target’ (Lawrence et al., 2001, p.636).  
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) has been particularly useful in understanding how 
systemic power can create subtle discursive webs of power in which all actors are 
situated. For example, Hardy and Phillips (1999) look at how power embedded in 
refugee systems produces identity in refugees. This perspective on power can help 
make sense of how power is used to produce alternative meaning, or how objects 
come into being, and how this leads to material outcomes for actors. In this form 
power is not something that is possessed by an individual, but is relational and 
productive (Foucault, 1990).This means that power does not simply emanate from a 
central or sovereign source, but each actor in a system has varying degrees of local 
agency and contributes to a continuous dynamic that holds meaning in place or 
produces alternative meanings.  
Power as discipline does not require that an actor is conscious of exerting it or being 
subjected to it. While actors continue to repeat what they do in line with the 
dominating patterns in their environment, much of what they do is likely to remain an 
unconscious dynamic of discipline. To see this dynamic play out, research can focus on 
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moments of resistance or contestation and analyze discursive practices that are 
brought to bear by actors, and the material effects of these practices; or research can 
focus on the disciplinary and punitive responses that incentivize the actor to return to 
the dominating pattern (Foucault, 1977). As such they shape what can or cannot be 
said or done in a particular context (Hardy and Clegg, 1999). This does not mean that a 
target becomes objectified as choice is not necessarily removed, but may come with 
consequences as the price to pay for that choice. If choice were to be removed 
entirely, the exercise of power shifts from discipline to domination. The pursuit of 
shareholder value by company executives is an example of internalized discipline, 
which is complemented by systemic domination (e.g. through the ability to sue 
directors who have not acted in the interests of shareholders).  
Lawrence et al. define phenomena of domination as phenomena that share the ‘ability 
to support patterns of social action in an ongoing way and without the complicity of 
those on whom they act’ (Lawrence et al., 2001, p.637). Hence, they are systemic and 
treat the target as object. In an organizational setting this may include an assembly 
line that imposes particular practices on workers. However, many such phenomena 
are more subtle. Lawrence et al. call the former ‘material technologies’, and consider 
‘actuarial practices’ an example of the latter, which transform ‘the lives of social 
actors, not through their own actions but through their placement in a social order 
abstracted from their lived experiences (Lawrence et al., 2001, p.637). This study is 
sensitive to the exercise of power through accounting standards. As will be argued, 
such standards are examples of dominant broader discourses that impose a particular 
social order and shape meaning, and which individual actors typically have no or 
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marginal ability to change. This does not just happen on a micro level in how, for 
example, profit needs to be calculated, but also on a macro level through the 
accounting perspective of an organization. Morgan (1988, p.483) argues that ‘[m]uch 
accounting practice is geared to providing and sustaining a shareholder view of 
organization’. An organization’s accounting perspective therefore privileges the 
interests of shareholders over those of other actors such as employees or community 
members. 
While this research does not put power dynamics at the centre of its analysis, it is 
sensitive to such dynamics and the findings highlight, for example, the power (force) of 
shareholders and regulators to decide on the outcome of an acquisition; the systemic 
power (domination) of accounting standards; and the role of rhetoric in influencing 
strategy during the acquisition discourse. Research into power during M&As has been 
fairly limited. Tienari and Vaara (2012) review the M&A literature on power-related 
issues but, in order to do that, they revisit seminal M&A studies where power is often 
only treated implicitly. Some of the research they identify is discussed in the next 
section, which reviews studies into M&A strategy discourse more widely. The 
literature review will then explore discursive practices and multi-modality before 
proceeding with an analysis of rhetoric in organizational research. 
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS STRATEGY DISCOURSE 
M&As have remained an important strategy for organizations (Kolev et al., 2012). The 
motives for a merger or acquisition can be traced back to distinct motivation theories, 
including efficiency and monopoly theories (Trautwein, 1990). Efficiency theories view 
these transactions as sources of potential financial, operational or managerial 
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synergies. Monopoly theories focus on the potential increase of market power of 
these transactions, which may enable the combined organization to extract higher 
prices for its products or lower prices from its suppliers. However, while the potential 
for synergies or market power is acknowledged, research has consistently confirmed 
the difficulty in delivering sought-after performance targets through M&A (King et al., 
2004). Since the 1980s these performance targets have increasingly been aligned with 
shareholder value (Ryan, 2012; Stewart, 1991), coinciding with the increased influence 
of capital market actors (Lok, 2010; Ryan, 2012). Research into M&A has traditionally 
been ‘founded on an objective approach to the scientific endeavor, a realist ontology, 
and a non-critical perspective’ (Teerikangas et al., 2012, p.662). Only since the late 
1990s or early 2000s has M&A research that takes an interpretive, constructionist 
approach to M&A emerged (Teerikangas et al., 2012). While small in number these 
studies demonstrate that there is a clear case for the potential of a discursive lens to 
help our understanding of strategy, including M&A strategy (Tienari and Vaara, 2012; 
Vaara et al., 2004).  
A number of these studies have looked at how these transactions are justified or 
legitimized by actors (Halsall, 2008; Leonardi and Jackson, 2004; Vaara and Monin, 
2010; Vaara and Tienari, 2002), or how success may have been discursively 
constructed (Hellgren et al., 2002; Vaara, 2002). This research shows that the 
discourse surrounding a merger or acquisition draws mostly on rational arguments 
(Hellgren et al., 2002; Tienari et al., 2003; Vaara and Tienari, 2002) and, in the case of 
cross-border transactions, arguments related to national culture and identity (Halsall, 
2008; Hellgren et al., 2002; Mittra, 2006; Riad and Vaara, 2011; Sarala and Vaara, 
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2010; Tienari et al., 2005; Tienari et al., 2003). Further on the literature review 
identifies studies of rhetoric during major organizational changes and discusses the 
rhetorical strategies used during M&A transactions in detail. 
Some studies that take a discursive lens to M&As connect a particular M&A discourse 
with broader discourses of globalization, global capitalism or industry consolidation 
(Leonardi and Jackson, 2004; Mittra, 2006; Tienari et al., 2003). For example, Leonardi 
and Jackson (2004) discuss the mergers of US West with Qwest and AOL with 
TimeWarner, and show how actors connected these mergers to broader discourses of 
technological change. The merger of pharmaceutical companies Sanofi-Synthelabo and 
Aventis was connected to broader discourses on global innovation, industry 
consolidation, regional capabilities and French national interests. A similar connection 
to a discourse of national interests is identified by Tienari et al. (2003) in the 
acquisition of Norwegian Christiania Bank og Kreditkasse by Merita-Nordbanken, 
consisting of a Swedish and a Finnish bank.  
Other studies look at language during a take-over. For example, Hirsch (1986) 
identifies a range of genres and image clusters (e.g. golden parachutes, cyanide pill) in 
his study of the normative framing of hostile take-overs (Hirsch, 1986). A previous 
study by Hirsh and Andrews (1983) identifies metaphors like ambushes, shoot-outs 
and knights of the roundtable in the language of corporate take-overs.  
This thesis contributes to that growing but still small body of research that analyzes 
elements of the discourse surrounding M&As in a few ways. First, the above-
mentioned discourse-focused literature on M&A predominantly looks at what happens 
following an M&A transaction but we know little of the discourse that may precede a 
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transaction. Therefore, this thesis will analyze the structure and dynamics of a pre-
acquisition discourse. Further, the existing research is mostly limited to an analysis of 
the linguistic practices that shape the discourse. However, organizational scholars 
increasingly suggest we need to look beyond linguistic practices (Grant et al., 2004; 
Iedema, 2007; Jacobs and Heracleous, 2007; Royce and Bowcher, 2006). Consequently 
this study looks at both the linguistic and non-linguistic modes that constitute a pre-
acquisition discourse. Lastly, most studies examine the role of internal actors or, in 
some cases, the role of the media (Hellgren et al., 2002; Kuronen et al., 2005; Vaara 
and Tienari, 2002). Previous research has not told us much about how, for example, 
customers, suppliers or competitors react to M&A (Teerikangas et al., 2012). In 
contrast, this thesis will consider the role of internal and external actors during the 
pre-acquisition discourse. To do this, the remainder of this chapter will review other 
bodies of research to develop a broader discourse analytical framework. Specifically, it 
reviews strategy-as-practice, social semiotics, the sociology of finance and rhetoric to 
develop a detailed analytical framework. This framework will enable the analysis of 
strategizing during the pre-acquisition discourse as a multi-modal discursive practice.  
DISCURSIVE PRACTICE AS MULTI-MODAL RHETORICAL STRATEGY  
DISCURSIVE PRACTICES 
Genuinely extending a discursive analysis beyond written and spoken texts requires 
fundamentally integrating non-linguistic practices, their modalities and how they bring 
to bear power into the analytical framework. While the discourse literature 
acknowledges that text goes beyond language, the primary association of ‘text’ 
remains rooted in the spoken and written word. In order to avoid such an association 
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and extend this analysis further, this research develops the notion of multi-modal 
rhetorical strategies as a unit of analysis.  As will be argued, these rhetorical strategies 
are enacted through discursive practices. Strategy-as-practice explicitly focuses on 
how practices shape strategizing and provides some useful insights that have helped 
shape the analytical framework for this research. 
A focus on practices means that, rather than trying to identify organizational 
characteristics or strategic formulas for success, strategy-as-practice aims to 
understand what strategists actually do when they strategize, and the flow of activity 
in which strategy is created (Jarzabkowski, 2005). The strategy-as-practice literature 
suggests that practitioner strategists may include anyone involved in strategizing, 
whether they work in the corporate office or on the periphery of an organization 
(Regner, 2003). One of the critiques of strategy-as-practice scholars has been that all 
too often the research traditionally has been limited to the role of top management 
(Golsorkhi et al., 2010). In contrast, strategy-as-practice considers, for example, top 
management (Jarzabkowski, 2002), middle management (Balogun and Johnson, 2005), 
strategy specialists (Paroutis and Pettigrew, 2007) or strategy champions (Mantere, 
2005). Despite drawing attention to a range of strategic practitioners, in many cases 
strategy is implicitly treated as something that is created by practitioners within an 
organization and then communicated to external parties. Most studies that adopt a 
strategy-as-practice perspective focus on the practices of actors internal to the 
organization. As mentioned in the review of the (dominant) design school of thought, 
that conceptualization of strategizing ‘precludes external actors from the process [of 
strategizing] altogether’ (Mintzberg et al., 1998, p.31). In contrast to some other 
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methodological approaches, relatively little practice research has been published 
about the role of external actors in shaping a firm’s strategy, causing Jarzabkowski and 
Spee (2009, p.81) to call it ‘a matter of concern’. 
Some studies do consider the role of external actors, though they may not take a 
strategy-as-practice perspective. For example, the media was seen to have played a 
central role in the legitimation (and delegitimation) of the merger of two French 
pharmaceutical companies (Vaara and Monin, 2010) and the merger of two paper and 
pulp companies from Finland and Sweden (Vaara et al., 2006). Others have looked at 
how analysts influence fund managers (Beunza and Garud, 2007; Imam et al., 2008), or 
how fund managers influence company executives (Roberts et al., 2006). These studies 
show that external actors do play a role in strategy development in organizations and 
that this is an area that we are only just beginning to understand. Accordingly, the 
current research aims to make a contribution by analyzing the role of external actors 
in shaping the pre-acquisition discourse of the case study.   
Strategy-as-practice research approaches strategy as something that managers do – 
strategizing – rather than something organizations have (Johnson et al., 2007). While 
the process school of research had already started to explore what strategists do, their 
approach has been criticized by strategy-as-practice scholars for lacking sufficient fine-
grained detail due to a focus on firm level, and ignoring the daily grind from which 
strategy emerges (Jarzabkowski, 2005; Johnson et al., 2007; Whittington, 2007). In 
contrast, strategy-as-practice research is concerned with studying micro phenomena, 
without losing sight of how they shape and are shaped by more macro phenomena 
(Jarzabkowski and Spee, 2009).  
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Examples of practices that have been the subject of empirical research to date include 
strategy meetings or episodes (Hendry and Seidl, 2003; Jarzabkowski and Seidl, 2008), 
the use of objects or tools (Spee and Jarzabkowski, 2009), talking up or down 
expectations (Sillince and Mueller, 2007), the establishment of strategy teams 
(Paroutis and Pettigrew, 2007) and decision making (Hendry, 2000). These practices 
can be grouped in different ways. For example, Johnson et al. (2007) identify norms or 
scripted behaviour, strategy episodes and routines. Jarzabkowski (2005) differentiates 
between administrative practices (planning mechanisms, control systems, 
performance indicators), episodic practices (like meetings, workshops) and discursive 
practices for interacting about strategy. In contrast to Jarzabkowski (2005), this thesis 
will argue that, to some extent, a discursive component can be found in all practices. 
For example, a CEO visit to important customers communicates to those customers 
that they are important. Therefore, although the visit is an episodic practice, it can be 
considered to also have discursive qualities, which are additional to the actual 
conversation during the visits. Finally, as the case study will demonstrate, what may 
appear as a singular attempt by companies to persuade external actors of the merits 
or drawbacks of the acquisition strategy may just be a snapshot of a pattern of 
activities over time where persuasion or influence flow in many directions. Strategy-
as-practice takes notice of such patterns across practices through its notion of praxis. 
Chia (Chia and MacKay, 2007) offers a post-processual strategy perspective that is 
helpful to understand praxis. By building on Wittgenstein’s language games, 
Bourdieu’s habitus and Giddens’ structuration, Chia proposes that the emphasis of 
strategy-as-practice should be on the practice complexes. This shifts attention away 
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from a single practice to the patterns of what strategists do, and makes actions and 
objects instantiations of practice complexes. This emphasis on patterns may go some 
way in avoiding the confusion that sometimes exists in distinguishing practice from 
praxis (Carter et al., 2008).   
Praxis can be understood as ‘a stream of activity that interconnects the micro actions 
of individuals and groups with the wider institutions in which those actions are located 
and to which they contribute’ (Jarzabkowski and Spee, 2009, p.73). Considering this 
definition in combination with Chia’s, praxis is not about one-off practices, but about 
the pattern of practice at these three levels. Jarzabkowski and Spee (2008) identify a 
range of studies at the micro or meso level, but few at the macro level, calling this gap 
in research an equal concern to the absence of studies on the practices of external 
actors. The case study of BHP’s attempted acquisition presents an analysis that 
includes the macro level: it looks at individual practices at all three levels and connects 
these in a pattern of influencing activities that actors bring to bear on other actors 
during the acquisition attempt to either further or hinder the attempted acquisition. 
For example, the case identified a pattern of cues from BHP that the acquisition 
constitutes good strategy. On a micro level this may include the presentation of 
synergies for one particular site; on a meso level it may be the combination of analyst 
briefings, press statements and customer visits; and on a macro level it may be about 
the connection of the merger to industry-wide consolidation trends. The pattern of 
practices within and across these levels can be seen as the praxis of building support 
for major acquisitions.  
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The concept of patterns in strategy formation, or the emergence of strategy from what 
happens in an organization, is not new (Mintzberg, 1978), and has contributed to the 
process perspective of strategy. The distancing of practice from process is not 
unproblematic: one can always see a practice as a bundle of smaller practices, or a 
process as a bundle of smaller processes. This raises the issue of determining the 
appropriate level of aggregation or disaggregation of practices, which needs to be 
resolved for each research project and research question. The Methods and Approach 
chapter in this thesis (stage 4) discusses how this issue was resolved for this research. 
SOCIAL SEMIOTICS: MULTI-MODALITY 
As noted, this study acknowledges that what internal and external actors do in terms 
of ‘discursive practice’ includes, but is not limited to, linguistic activity. Scholars of 
semiotics have developed our understanding of other, non-linguistic modes of 
communication that may play a role in discourse (Constantinou, 2005; Cooren et al., 
2011; Iedema, 2003, 2007; Kress, 2010; Kress and Van Leeuwen, 2001). These can be 
embodied in a wide variety of visual representations, cultural artefacts and other 
modes of meaning making that are used in the realization of social goals and purposes 
(Grant et al., 2004; Iedema, 2007; Jacobs and Heracleous, 2007; Kress and Van 
Leeuwen, 2001; Royce and Bowcher, 2006). Indeed, Roberts et al. (2006) suggest that 
even the tone, gestures or mood of a messenger are in themselves modes of 
discursive practice that can convey meaning. This study not only examines speech and 
writing, but also other modes like imagery, financial and numerical indicators, and the 
use of location, and in this respect answers calls by Kress (2010), Iedema (2003, 2007) 
and Fairhurst and Grant (2010) to consider the broad range of modalities that form 
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part of discursive practice. One challenge of multi-modal research is that it may not 
always be evident what constitutes a distinct mode. Stage 3 of the ‘Methods and 
Approach’ discusses why this may be a challenge and how different modes were 
identified in the case study. 
The displacement of language as the sole or primary focus of study ‘amounts to a 
profound reorientation’ (Kress, 2010, p.79) of our understanding of what discourse is, 
how it is used to express, negotiate and influence meaning and how we should 
approach its study. It means that under this definition of discourse, no mode is 
excluded a priori from research into strategy and discourse, since all modes have the 
potential to influence the meanings attached to strategy and thus how it is practiced.  
Drawing on the social semiotic framework developed by Kress and van Leeuwen 
(2001) and Kress (2010), mode is seen as a technology of transcription. Each mode has 
a different set of features that determines how it configures the world and creates 
meaning. Social semiotics approaches this process of configuration and meaning 
making by asking ‘Whose interest and agency is at work here in the making of 
meaning?’ (Kress, 2010, p.57). According to Kress, who builds on the semiotic 
approach of Michael Halliday, what may count as a mode is influenced by the 
‘affordances’, that is, the potentials and limitations of the mode. These affordances 
differentiate it from other modes and impact the media that can be used to express 
the mode (see Table 2-5).  
As a result language should not be treated as a singular mode, but creates meaning 
through modes such as speech and writing. These need to be treated as distinct (Kress, 
2010) because they have different affordances like intonation and durability. 
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Table 2-5: Examples of Modes, Affordances and Media 
Mode Affordances of mode 
(based on Kress, 2010) 
Associated media 
(examples) 
Speech Rhythm, pace, volume, intonation, accent, 
silence 
Sound, digital recording 
Writing Permanence, blank space, punctuation 
marks, bolding, font (type, size, colour) 
Paper, light (e.g. data 
projector), screen 
Imagery Positioning of elements, depictions/icons, 
framed space 
Paper, light, screen 
Gesture Ephemeral (temporary, imprecise), 
generally carries less weight than, e.g. 
writing or speech 
Body  
Object  Hardness, size, placement, shape, colour Wood, rock, plastic, etc. 
 
Whether something actually counts as a mode also depends on social and formal 
criteria. Socially, what counts as a separate mode for influencing meaning in one 
community may not matter in another community. Related to this, communities have 
modal preferences. For example, while imagery (e.g. graphs, schemata) is used 
extensively by natural scientists, it is used much less by lawyers. This implies that to 
shape meaning, actors need to adjust the modes of their discursive practices to the 
modes that shape meaning in the community they try to influence (Kress, 2010). 
Further, following Halliday’s formal criteria, Kress defines (2010, p.87) something as a 
distinct mode based on whether it has an ideational function (‘to represent meanings 
about actions, states, events in the world’), textual function (‘have the capacity to 
form texts, that is, complex semiotic entities which can project a complete (social) 
world, which can function as complete message-entities which cohere internally and 
with their environment’), and an interpersonal function (‘to represent meanings about 
the social relations of those engaged in communication’). Table 2-6 shows how these 
formal criteria can be applied to determine whether a particular semiotic constitutes a 
distinct mode, or whether it is just an affordance of another mode. This is critical in 
PhD Thesis Maurizio Floris 
 Page 69 
order to critically analyze the acquisition discourse through the modes in which the 
discourse is enacted. 
The table below suggests that while font can be a distinct mode for one community it 
plays an insignificant role for another. For example, font types, sizes or colours largely 
do not impact the meaning of a legal text, but they are critical in a marketing context. 
This means that a mode is a heuristic concept (Constantinou, 2005) and that there is 
no given or straightforward taxonomy of modes that the analysis can fall back on. 
Instead, as applied in this research, the identification of modes in the context of an 
acquisition attempt needs to follow from the analysis itself through a continuous 
awareness of what actors do and how that contributes to meaning making in the 
particular community an actor tries to influence.  
Table 2-6: Is ‘Font’ a Mode? 
Formal 
criteria  
(based on 
Halliday) 
Evaluation of a marketing brochure Evaluation of a legal text 
Does it have a 
textual 
function? 
The choice of font provides a message 
that is internally coherent and coheres 
with the environment (e.g. font is 
expected to follow coherent 
conventions that may follow from its use 
in the internal or external environment 
of the brochure) 
The choice of font is largely 
irrelevant, that is, it does not 
typically impact significantly on 
the meaning of the text 
(consistent font use does not 
impact the meaning of 
legislation) 
Does it have an 
interpersonal 
function? 
The choice of font can represent 
meanings about the social relations of 
those engaging in communication (e.g. a 
vendor must make it easy and pleasant 
to read the brochure, as a potential 
customer has the ability to reject the 
relationship) 
The choice of font does not 
necessarily reflect the social 
relationship (i.e. the receiver of 
the communication must accept 
legislation, and the author does 
not choose a font based on this) 
Does it have an 
ideational 
function? 
The choice of font can provide a 
particular representation of selected 
aspects of the world (e.g. the 
combination of font type, size, colour 
can express importance, conservatism, 
etc.) 
The choice of font is not 
intended to express ideas about 
states, actions and events in the 
world (e.g. font can be changed 
without changing the ideas the 
text communicates) 
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Source: Based on Kress (2010). 
The awareness of the semiotics used by actors should not just be limited to those that 
are used consciously or foregrounded purposefully by actors. For example, a range of 
semiotics that play a role in an analyst briefing may never be consciously noted: the 
venue, dress code, adherence to particular protocols, use of particular props (e.g. data 
projector) and the layout of the room. These semiotics may all convey an underlying 
message of professionalism, adherence to expectations, a ‘we are like you’ message 
from management to analysts. Their contribution operates in the background (Iedema, 
2003) and would likely only be noted if they deviate significantly from expectations.   
Based on this review of the literature on social semiotics and multi-modality, this 
thesis will consider how actors draw on linguistic and non-linguistic modes during the 
pre-acquisition discourse.  
Whereas some modalities may not be noted consciously, others cannot be missed. As 
this research will argue, calculative devices are some of the most important modalities 
for meaning making in this case study. Such devices have, to date, not received 
extensive attention in social semiotics or the organizational discourse literature. 
However, useful insights were drawn from another complementary body of literature, 
that is, critical research in accounting and finance, and particularly the sociology of 
finance.  
SOCIOLOGY OF FINANCE: CALCULATIVE DEVICES 
Extant relevant literature in critical accounting and the sociology of finance contains a 
number of related concepts that are relevant for our purposes here, for example, 
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calculative frame (Beunza and Garud, 2007), accounting sign (Macintosh et al., 2000), 
financial statement elements (Rutherford, 2003), accounting numbers (Robson, 1992) 
and financial models (MacKenzie, 2006). In the absence of a broadly accepted 
definition, this paper uses the term ‘calculative device’ to denote a set of practices, 
texts and artefacts that enable and apply mathematical operations as part of meaning 
making in a discourse, and bring a construct or object into being. This enablement 
involves bringing them into a single space (Callon and Muniesa, 2005, p.1231) – a 
piece of paper, spreadsheet or someone’s mind – as a necessary precursor to 
counting. Under this definition calculative devices can include financial and other 
numerical indicators, spreadsheet models, heuristics, calculative protocols (e.g. 
accounting standards), etc. The different concepts, while related, have been described 
from a range of theoretical perspectives. For example, drawing on Baudrillard, 
accounting signs have been described as simulacrum or hyperreality (Macintosh et al., 
2000); echoing Bourdieu’s theory of habitus, financial statements are seen as 
constructions of the rites and rituals of the profession (Hamilton and Hogartaigh, 
2009); and, more broadly, accounting has been described as fabrication (Chua, 1995; 
Preston, 1992) and as a codified discourse (Llewellyn and Milne, 2007).  
What is particularly relevant for this case study is how this applies to establishing the 
value of a company. Sociological studies of calculative devices or systems often ignore 
the actual calculative aspect or lose it in the detail of ethnographic description (Callon 
and Muniesa, 2005). Part of this omission, at least in the literature on analysts, is the 
result of looking at analysts as ‘lemmings’ who follow each other in their valuations, 
rendering the actual calculation largely irrelevant (Beunza and Garud, 2007). In 
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contrast, the current study explicitly pays attention to the calculative aspect to better 
understand how the social construction of a company’s value is played out through 
calculative devices. Analysts and funds managers must express their judgment of an 
organization in a share price, and do this based on an in-depth understanding of a 
broad range of metrics, and how these metrics are created and interpreted. For 
example, analysts prefer discounted cash flow metrics over profit-based models as 
these rely less on accounting profit metrics, which are seen as easier to manipulate by 
actors within a company (Imam et al., 2008). In addition, they also derive assumptions 
from reference points of other similar companies as the company to be modelled 
(Beunza and Garud, 2007). Beunza and Garud (2007) show how securities analysts 
value internet companies with new business models, unclear information and a broad 
range of available interpretations. However, others had already demonstrated that 
ambiguity does not disappear as a new industry becomes more familiar and its 
evaluation more codified. Even in that situation the calculations are still based on 
concepts of financial accounting that are socially constructed and, as a result, 
construct what is perceived as financial reality (Hines, 1988; Morgan, 1988). Further, 
while sophisticated discounted cash flow calculations are used to convey a market 
price, in practice analysts still rely on unsophisticated models and subjective, intuitive 
judgment of the markets. Indeed, how an analyst ‘feels’ about the price appears to be 
the primary step, and the price is then reverse engineered through a valuation model 
(Imam et al., 2008). 
This suggests that the role of financial calculative devices is to triangulate or window 
dress a valuation to give it the appearance of objectivity and inoculate the valuation 
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against criticism of a lack of rigour. This seems far removed from any claims about 
accurate estimations of fundamental value. Issues of accuracy and uncertainty of a 
calculative device for company valuation could be interpreted as an epistemological 
issue, that is, ‘a partial and incomplete representation of the reality’ (Morgan, 1988, 
p.480) due to complications that stand in the way of accurate calculations of the real, 
fundamental value of a company. Others argue that it is an ontological issue and that 
there is no such thing as fundamental value because ‘there is no such thing as 
fundamental’ (McGoun, 1997 in Macintosh 2003, p.462). In either case, disagreements 
about value between different groups of actors may need to be bridged in order to 
progress a merger or acquisition transaction.  
This research will explore the use of calculative devices as boundary objects. As 
discussed earlier, two criteria are generally acknowledged as essential for boundary 
objects: they must be ‘plastic enough to adapt to local needs …  yet robust enough to 
maintain a common identity across sites’. (Star et al., 1989, p.393). Robustness and 
commonality are key concerns for accounting and finance to enable a comparison of 
different organizations, and have created a highly codified discourse that relies 
primarily on numerical representations. Previous research has shown how 
codification, including for finance and accounting professionals, influences what 
professionals learn, how they calculate, and through what filters or paradigms they 
look at the world (e.g. Ferguson et al., 2009; Fox, 2000; Imam et al., 2008; Llewellyn 
and Milne, 2007; Morgan, 1988; Roberts et al., 2006). Previous research has shown 
that a high level of codification makes discourse highly technical and obscures to a lay 
public the exercise of power that is played out in accounting and finance numbers. 
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This thesis will show how this codification can be seen as broader discourses for 
accounting and finance professionals, which provide robustness and a common 
identity, and enable the role of calculative devices as boundary objects. The concept of 
plasticity also applies to calculative devices. For example, management accounting and 
(balanced) scorecards (Briers and Chua, 2001; Kaplan and Norton, 1992; Power, 2004) 
are useful because they can change shape and localize company-wide performance 
measures for different groups.  
A small but growing number of case studies drawing on concepts derived from ANT 
shows how powerful actors use management accounting numbers to translate their 
interests into ‘facts’ by integrating actors in a network of support and thus stabilize 
their dominant position while using the perceived objectivity of such models to 
legitimize the decision (e.g. Baxter and Chua, 2003; Briers and Chua, 2001; Callon and 
Muniesa, 2005; Denis et al., 2006; Miller, 1991; Skærbæk and Tryggestad, 2010). 
Indeed, alternative management accounting research suggests that accounting and 
financial calculations ‘cannot be separated from the formation and exercise of power’ 
(Baxter and Chua, 2003, p.104). This makes calculative devices (e.g. metrics, models, 
calculations and accounting standards) prominent vehicles that align with dominant 
interests and exercise power.  
The ambiguity of a calculation of value does not mean that dominant actors have 
unfettered discretion in selecting or constructing calculative devices and the resulting 
financial ‘reality’, as previous calculative practices have established patterns that have 
gained their own agency and resist change. For example, extant research on 
professionals, including financial professionals, shows how such patterns influence 
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what professionals learn, how they calculate and how they look at the world (Ferguson 
et al., 2009; Imam et al., 2008; Llewellyn and Milne, 2007; Morgan, 1988; Roberts et 
al., 2006). Professionals must calculate a value as codified by the rules of their 
profession, which creates a web of power based on discipline and domination (see 
Table 2-4: Conceptions of Power, p.54). This dependency on highly codified accounting 
standards means that only those actors who can draw on recognized expertise are 
likely to be able to influence these valuations. Non-professional actors who stray from 
that codification are likely to be ignored (Llewellyn and Milne, 2007).   
According to Tienari et al. (2003) the media often presents calculations as factual 
future projections, which are rarely contested. Other researchers have noticed similar 
processes in detailed case studies where the perceived objectivity of calculative 
devices is used to legitimize strategic decisions (Denis et al., 2006; Skærbæk and 
Tryggestad, 2010). That this is not a new phenomenon and not limited to financial 
analysis per se is illustrated by Devons’ experience of wartime aircraft production 
planning in Britain: ‘once a figure was put forward … it soon became accepted as the 
“agreed figure”, since no one was able by rational argument to demonstrate that it 
was wrong … And once the figures were called “statistics”, they acquire the authority 
and sanctity of Holy Writ’ (p.155) (Devons, 1950, in Mintzberg et al. 1998, p.71).This 
raises questions about the role of calculative devices in negotiating value as perceived 
by disparate groups. This thesis combines insights from critical research in accounting 
and finance with other bodies of literature and analyzes how actors construct and 
draw on calculative devices during the pre-acquisition case study.  
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This chapter on strategizing as multi-modal discursive practice has reviewed a number 
of perspectives from the literature on how actors draw on a wide range of modalities 
(including text, practices, non-linguistic modalities and calculative devices) when 
strategizing. Next, rhetorical theory will be reviewed to identify ways to analyze how 
actors have used discursive practices and different modalities to bring power to bear 
on the acquisition discourse.  
RHETORIC 
Aristotle (1991) defines rhetoric as the ability to discern the available means of 
persuasion in every given situation. The sorts (species) of situations included in his 
theory refer to public speech in an assembly (‘deliberative’), before a court (‘judicial’), 
or when describing a person’s actions as honourable or shameful (‘epideictic’). One 
characteristic these situations have in common is that speech is a matter of persuasion 
regarding a particular instance, not about the development of exact or generalized 
knowledge. In the past this may have contributed to rhetoric’s reputation of being 
merely decorative or, worse, manipulative and concealing the truth.  
‘In management studies, this position is found in work that portrays rhetoric 
versus reality (e.g., Zbaracki, 1998). Here, rhetoric is allocated a peripheral 
and/or superficial role—as suggested by the phrase “mere rhetoric”—and it is 
assumed to be inherently empty, artificial, and ephemeral. (In contrast, we 
follow Burke and Billig and the social constructionist tradition more generally 
by questioning this dualism between talk and action. ‘ (Whittle et al., 2008, 
p.2) 
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From a discourse perspective, rhetoric is part and parcel of the social negotiation and 
construction of meaning and cannot be separated from an ‘objective fact’. Rhetorical 
strategies are part of the construction of both ‘identities and the world’ (Green, 2004, 
p.654). For example, meaning in a discourse results partly from our emotional 
response to a discursive practice or from the perceived authority of the rhetor. As long 
as actors participate in discourse deliberately, they will use discursive practices to 
persuade others. Rhetoric permeates discourse, not as something that is separate to 
discourse, but as a particular form of discourse.  
Developments in the humanities, social sciences and business studies, which have 
increasingly questioned the possibility of exact or objective knowledge, offer fertile 
ground and likely have contributed to a resurgence of interest in rhetoric in recent 
decades in, for example, philosophy, jurisprudence, communication studies and, more 
recently, organizational studies (Frank, 2008).  
This resurgence of interest was accompanied by the emergence of a manifesto, a ‘New 
Rhetoric’, provided by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca in 1958 in their Traité de 
l’argumentation: la nouvelle rhétorique, which was translated in 1969 into English 
(Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969). Although Perelman and Tyteca explicitly limit 
their analysis to persuasion techniques based on language, this ‘by no means implies 
that the technique in question is the most efficacious way of affecting minds’. (1969, 
p.8). While they acknowledge the existence of ‘numerous and varied techniques that 
utilize anything capable of influencing behavior’ (1969, p.8), these are outside the 
scope of their New Rhetoric although they do recognize the role that social semiotics 
can play.  
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In a number of areas Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s New Rhetoric went well beyond 
classical rhetoric theory. First, they did not limit their analysis to oratory but were 
more broadly interested in mechanisms of thought, rather than eloquence. Further, 
the audience of New Rhetoric was no longer perceived as a fairly unsophisticated 
‘crowd gathered in a square’ (p.6) but could include ‘ignoramuses’ and ‘philosophers’, 
and extended to debate from ‘the family table’ to that of a ‘highly specialized 
environment’ (p.8), and might even be limited to oneself.  
This broadening of the possible range of the audience meant that adjusting to an 
audience became much more critical than it was for classical rhetoric. The likelihood of 
a particular argumentation appealing to very diverse audiences is low. Necessary 
adjustments to an audience may include alignment with their preferred mode, their 
underlying belief systems and the suitable rhetorical strategy. These adjustments 
make for a much more dynamic perspective of persuasion. Persuasion is not largely a 
one-way communication from the orator to the audience, but an interactive 
negotiation over time between actors, where instances of sending out a message are 
punctuated by instances of reading the impact on the other actor, before adjusting the 
communication again. Erkama and Vaara (2010, pp. 817-8) demonstrate such patterns 
of rhetorical strategizing in the context of shutdown negotiations, where instances of 
legitimation of the shutdown by management were punctuated by delegitimation by 
employees or the media, and followed by relegitimation by managers. 
One area of such adjustment is the need to frame the argument as consistent with 
established beliefs or enthymemes (Aristotle, 1991), or taken for granted ‘truths’ of 
the audience (Cheney et al., 2004; Hartelius and Browning, 2008; Perelman and 
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Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969), which are often reflected in, and the result of, the broader 
discourses discussed earlier. As these beliefs are taken for granted, they may be 
unconscious, and people may not necessarily understand why an argument, which 
aligns with these often unconscious beliefs, appeals (Marshak et al., 2000).  
Jarzabkowski and Sillince (2007) talk about the need for a rhetor to anticipate and 
encompass the audience’s position, while Suddaby and Greenwood (2005) refer to this 
as making strategic use of underlying world views. Similarly, Erkama and Vaara (2010, 
p.817) state that ‘successful framing requires that the audience can link the message 
to other discourses’. This may involve weaving organizational discourses with broader 
discourses that are only just emerging for audiences in a particular industry. For 
example, Vaara et al.  (2004) describe how a judicious drawing on more general 
societal discourses by an early protagonist positioned them as visionaries as these 
discourses came to dominate and were taken for granted industry-wide. Others have 
shown how media texts typically confirm rather than surprise the beliefs of their 
readers, and how this recursively constructs and legitimizes world views (Herman and 
Chomski, 2002; Kuronen et al., 2005; Vaara and Monin, 2010). 
Of course, these broader discourses and dominant perspectives did not simply appear 
from one day to the next. They were the cumulative outcome of many particular 
instances where actions were legitimated by actors who argued their case and both 
drew on and reiterated these perspectives.  
The adjustment by a rhetor to the belief systems of the audience is linked to 
legitimacy. Suchman (1995, p.574) defines legitimacy as ‘a generalized perception or 
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within 
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some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions’. This 
definition links legitimation to the rhetoric used to defend the particular actions of an 
entity, as well as links to socially constructed broader discourses. Organizational 
actions, like acquisitions, require legitimation (Erkama and Vaara, 2010), and 
organizational legitimacy depends on successfully arguing the actions in the context of 
established beliefs and broader discourses (Tienari et al., 2003).  
Success also depends on the power of the different actors (Rojo and Van Dijk, 1997; 
Van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999), though power is restricted by a number of practical 
limitations. Vaara and Monin identify three such limitations, what they call 
legitimation dynamics in mergers or acquisitions (Vaara and Monin, 2010, p.6). First, 
justifications to merge two organisations will feed into integration efforts, which are 
expected to follow the same logic laid out during the acquisition or merger process. 
Second, if and when these justifications become institutionalized, they affect the 
identity and the success or failure evaluations of the organization. And third, the 
power of different actors can particularly be reinforced or weakened by these 
evaluations of success or failure, and the role of the actor in the merger.  
Actors have used many different strategies to persuade others and legitimate their 
actions. Table 2-7 offers an overview of studies of major organizational restructures, 
mergers or acquisitions of a wide range of different frameworks used to categorize 
these rhetorical strategies. As the table illustrates, there is a bewildering array of 
possible frameworks associated with rhetoric available from this literature. This is in 
part illustrated by the sheer variability of the collective nouns used to describe the 
different categories of rhetorical activities: impression management techniques, 
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rhetorical legitimation strategies, discursive (de)legitimation strategies, discursive 
devices, persuasive appeals, theorizations of change, rhetorical processes, 
justifications, discursive practices, discourse types, categories of legitimation, 
techniques of argumentation, means of persuasion. Even if studies use the same 
collective noun, they may refer to completely different activities. For example, the 
collective noun ‘rhetorical strategies’ appears to have very different meanings for 
different authors (Cheney et al., 2004; Erkama and Vaara, 2010; Tienari et al., 2003; 
Vaara and Monin, 2010; Vaara and Tienari, 2008; Vaara et al., 2006). This is further 
confused by inconsistent use and ambiguity in the combination of the terms 
‘discursive’, ‘rhetorical’ or ‘legitimation’ and ‘strategy’.  
Of these frameworks for rhetorical analysis, most attention has focused on Aristotle’s 
(1991) classification of rhetorical strategies: logos, pathos and ethos (Erkama and 
Vaara, 2010; Green, 2004; Hartelius and Browning, 2008; Nohria and Haarington, 
1994; Sillince and Suddaby, 2008). Following Green (2004) logos appeals are defined as 
emphasizing logic and associated with rational and methodical calculations of means 
and ends. Such appeals also address the audience’s desires for effective and efficient 
action. Further, they may confer pragmatic and cognitive legitimacy by playing to the 
audience’s self-interests and by providing them with plausible explanations and 
arguments based on evidence and fact. Appeals based on pathos work to construct 
pragmatic legitimacy by prompting emotional responses. They excite the imagination 
and grab the audience’s attention. Ethos appeals connect actions and institutions to 
cultural norms and expectations and encourage judgments regarding ‘character’, that 
is, on the basis of whether someone or something is ‘right’, ‘proper’ or ‘appropriate’.   
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Table 2-7: Rhetorical Frameworks in Organization Studies 
Article Subject Framework 
(Brown et 
al., 2012) 
Aust. Senate committee report 
argued that young disabled 
should be cared for separately 
from the elderly 
Rhetorical justification: logos, pathos, ethos 
(Brennan 
et al., 
2010) 
Content 
analysis 
Rhetoric, argument and 
impression management in 
formal defence documents of 10 
hostile take-overs on LSX 
Impression management techniques: thematic 
manipulation (i.e. attack, defence or neutral), visual 
emphasis (e.g. headline, subheading, etc.) and rhetorical 
manipulation (using rhetorical devices: repetition, 
reinforcement, engagement) 
 
(Erkama 
and Vaara, 
2010) 
Discourse 
analysis? 
Rhetorical strategies to legitimate 
globalization-driven 
organizational restructuring 
decisions (case of shutdown of 
the bus body unit of Volvo) 
Rhetorical legitimation strategies: Logos, pathos 
(emotional moral arguments), ethos, autopoiesis and 
cosmos 
 
(Vaara and 
Monin, 
2010) 
Critical multi-
method 
approach 
 
Postmerger discursive 
legitimation and org. action, and 
risks of legitimation in 
pharmaceutical companies 
BioMérieux & Pierre Fabre. 
Discursive (de)legitimation strategies (started with Vaara 
et al 2006  categories, but then modified them): 
(de)naturalization, rationalization, exemplification, 
authorization, moralization. 
(Whittle et 
al., 2008) 
Training session to drive quality 
improvement initiative in the UK  
Discursive devices (seems conflated with ‘rhetorical 
moves’): empathy, disclaimer, corroboration, script 
formulations, stake inoculation, hedging, stake 
confession, bracketing, frame transformation, 
justification, excusing, reassuring 
(Green et 
al., 2008) 
Shift of corporate control rhetoric 
1978–1996 of corporate board 
members during corporate 
takeovers and takeover defences 
Persuasive appeals: logos, pathos, ethos 
 
Corporate control preference: pro-managerial capitalism, 
pro-investor capitalism 
(Vaara and 
Tienari, 
2008) 
Critical 
discourse 
analysis 
Legitimation of a shutdown of a 
marine-engine factory is 
legitimated in the media … 
Discursive legitimation strategies/ semantic-functional 
strategies: normalization, authorization, rationalization, 
moralization and narrativization  
(Hirsch 
and De 
Soucey, 
2006) 
Legitimation of causes and 
consequences of restructuring 
over time (1970s–2000s) 
Does not offer a categorization of the examples of 
‘rhetorical descriptives’ identified for the period of 1970s 
– 2000s 
(Vaara et 
al., 2006) 
Discursive legitimation of global 
restructuring in pulp and paper 
industry 
Legitimation strategies: normalization, authorization, 
rationalization, moralization and narrativization 
(Suddaby 
and 
Greenwoo
d, 2005) 
Institutional 
theory 
Discursive struggle between 
proponents and opponents of 
multidisciplinary firms (i.e. 
combine legal and audit firms) 
2nd stage analysis – ‘persuasive appeals’: logos, ethos, 
pathos  
2nd stage analysis – ‘encompassing terms’ or ‘branches’ of 
rhetoric: kairos (timing), audience/context, decorum (i.e. 
kairos and audience) 
3rd stage (subcategories of kairos) – Theorizations of 
change: ontological, historical, teleological, cosmological, 
and value-based theorizations 
(Cheney et 
al., 2004) 
Overview of how rhetoric is 
deployed in organizations and the 
Categories of rhetorical and discursive strategies: 
responding, anticipating, shaping or framing of rhetorical 
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Article Subject Framework 
reasons behind its use  situations, shaping of organizational images and identities
Specific rhetorical and discursive strategies: 
identification, differentiation, juxtapositioning, strategic 
ambiguity, denial, containment, reification, enhancement, 
substitution or diversion, bolstering or self-promotion, 
dismissal, partial reporting, totalizing, apology, 
misrepresentation, concealment of identity, self-
expansion, reframing and reversal, non-response, 
propaganda 
(Mueller 
et al., 
2004) 
Rhetorical strategies used during 
the introduction of New Public 
Management within a UK 
Hospital Trust 
Rhetorical strategies: national comparisons, political 
context, improving the clinical process as a whole 
(Sillince, 
2005) 
The need for rhetorical 
congruence with org. structure 
(‘structural contingency theory’) 
Rhetorical process: emphasizing context (differentiate), 
switching perspective (differentiate), creating consistency, 
(integrate), creating purpose (integrate) 
(for each process Sillince identifies, amongst others, a range of practices) 
(Green, 
2004) 
The role of rhetoric in the 
diffusion of managerial practices 
Appeals or justifications: logos, pathos, ethos 
(Tienari et 
al., 2003) 
Foreign acquisition of state-
owned Norwegian bank 
Discursive strategies: rationalistic discourse, nationalistic 
discourse 
 
(also labelled as e.g. ‘rationalistic arguments’ or 
‘argument within the rationalistic discursive framework’ 
 
(Risberg et 
al., 2003) 
CDA 
(Re)construction of national 
identities in Swedish–Finnish 
merger of banks 
Commonplace/stereotypes of discursive constructs/ 
frames of national identities 
(Hellgren 
et al., 
2002) 
Reconstruction of issues related 
to the AstraZeneca merger in the 
media 
Discursive practices in the media: factualizing, 
rationalizing and emotionalizing 
Discourse types: Discourse based on economic and 
financial rationale; discourse promoting nationalistic 
sentiments 
(Vaara and 
Tienari, 
2002) 
CDA 
Discursive construction of 
mergers and acquisitions in the 
Finnish media 
Discourse types: `rationalistic’, `cultural’, `societal’ and 
`individualistic’  
(Van 
Leeuwen 
and 
Wodak, 
1999) 
Discourse – 
historical & 
systemic –
functional 
methods 
Strategies of legitimation and 
justification of immigration 
rejection letters in Austria 
Categories of legitimation: authorization (reference to 
authority), rationalization (utility of action), moral 
evaluation (value systems) and mythopoesis (legitimation 
conveyed through narratives)  
(Perelman 
and 
Olbrechts-
Tyteca, 
1969) 
The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on 
Argumentation 
Starting point: agreement, choice and adaptation of data, 
presentation of data and form of discourse 
Techniques of argumentation: quasi-logical arguments, 
arguments based on the structure of reality, arguments 
establishing the structure of reality, dissociation of 
concepts 
Aristotle On rhetoric Means of persuasion (‘pisteis’): logos, pathos, ethos 
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Such appeals build moral legitimacy by bringing attention to supportive sources that 
carry authority and are respected by the audience. 
The frameworks in the table cannot be easily integrated, even if the categories appear 
to be the same. For example, both Erkama and Vaara (2010) and Suddaby and 
Greenwood (2005) talk about ‘cosmological’ arguments to indicate arguments that 
refer to an inevitability of the change that is the subject of their respective case 
studies. However, in Erkama and Vaara’s framework cosmological arguments 
complement logos, pathos, ethos and autopoiesis, while in Suddaby and Greenwood’s 
framework cosmological arguments are one of five ‘theorizations of change’, which 
are distinct from the classical logos, pathos and ethos means of persuasion. As 
Suddaby and Greenwood identify that 81% of their initially coded text segments are 
coded ‘logos’, it is reasonable to assume that all five theorizations of change occur 
within the category of logos, making ‘cosmos’ a subcategorization of logos rather than 
a complementary category as it is for Erkama and Vaara. Further, Erkama and Vaara 
(2010) indicate that autopoiesis is, amongst others, ‘linked with’ (p.829) Suddaby and 
Greenwood’s (2005) notion of a historical reconstruction. Whether this is meant to 
suggest a full or partial overlap of these categories, or altogether something different, 
is not clear. Similar complexities and ambiguities exist when trying to integrate other 
frameworks mentioned in Table 2-7.  
There is too much variability in terminology and too much ambiguity in how these 
different rhetorical frameworks complement or contradict each other to confidently 
combine them in a way that does justice to their individual merits. Each framework 
might provide somewhat different insights. Further, the primary purpose of the 
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analysis here is not to extend our understanding of different rhetorical categorizations 
as such, but to identify how rhetoric is connected to the multi-modal discursive 
practices of actors. While all of the frameworks in the table have been successfully 
applied in the analysis of linguistic data sources, not all are equally suited to categorize 
multi-modal discursive practices. As will be argued in the methods section of this 
thesis, while different frameworks were trialed, in the end this determined how 
rhetorical strategies were analyzed in this research.  
The review of the literature on rhetoric identified a number of the key issues that 
theories of rhetoric are trying to address. These include the variation in audiences (for 
example sophisticated or non-sophisticated; varying interests; different belief 
systems), the purpose of persuasion (gain strategic support for an initiative; 
impression management), the means of persuasion (techniques; practices; strategies; 
appeals), or the particular situation it is aimed at (oratory; mechanisms of thought; a 
single event or protracted negotiations). This study emphasizes an analytical rhetorical 
framework that draws on Aristotle’s classical theory, New Rhetoric, and recent studies 
of legitimation and includes: Aristotle’s means of persuasion, that is, logos, ethos and 
pathos; appreciation of heterogeneous audiences; the alignment of the argument with 
accepted broader beliefs of the audience; and a more sophisticated rhetorical dynamic 
of negotiation over time, where rhetor and audience exchange roles, instead of 
oratory being one-way. This enables the framework to address the key specifics as 
they apply to the case study, i.e. the actors (shareholders, regulators, company 
leadership, and others), purpose (the proposed acquisition), the means (multi-modal 
discursive practices), and the particular situation (i.e. a 12 month episode). 
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MATERIAL OUTCOMES 
In this thesis, the outcomes of discursive practice include not only   meaning making, 
but also material effects (Ashcraft et al., 2009; Iedema, 2007). In short, the thesis 
seeks to demonstrate how multi-modal discursive practice and rhetorical style that are 
in use during strategizing impact on organizational behaviour and performance in 
tangible ways. This relationship has not, however, received a great deal of attention in 
the strategy- and discourse-related literature. Indeed, as Suddaby and Greenwood 
(2005, p.62) observe, ‘there are few empirical studies that examine the causal 
relationship between symbolic action (speeches, public appearances, responses to 
media questions) and material outcomes (currency values, stock prices, labor 
disputes)’. Green calls this a ‘a critical area for future research’ (2004, p.663). 
However, studies of how the practices of actors in a network cause an outcome are 
problematic. According to Öberg:  
‘the very concept includes that several companies are involved and ongoing 
business activities between them mean that they affect one another in a 
complex pattern of cause and effect (Gadde & Mattsson, 1987); accordingly 
the contextual embeddedness of companies and activities makes it difficult 
to actually predict reactions.’  (Öberg, 2012, p.138) 
A rhetorical analysis of the multi-modal discursive practices that constitute the 
acquisition discourse does not aspire to provide evidence of causality, or what and 
how particular practices unavoidably cause an outcome to eventuate. Such lofty 
ambitions are the domain of research that is founded on objectivistic foundations. 
From a constructionist perspective such ambitions are illusory, and not just practically 
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but fundamentally unachievable. This study accepts that the ‘domain of 
argumentation is that of the credible, the plausible, the probable, to the degree that 
the latter eludes the certainty of calculations’ (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, 
p.1). Therefore, the more modest ambition here is to identify the discursive practices 
and dynamics of the acquisition that, through their influence on particular audiences, 
‘credibly, plausibly and probably’ contributed to material outcomes.  
 
2.5 ANALYTICAL FRAME AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The literature review and the positions taken above form a particular social 
constructionist and discursive perspective on strategizing that will function as the 
theoretical framework for this research. It is also appropriate to integrate it with a 
definition of strategizing. Following this definition, the opportunities for theoretical 
contributions raised throughout the literature review are brought together and 
combined into two research questions. 
According to Chia et al., ‘strategy-making must be construed as a collective, culturally 
shaped accomplishment attained through historically and culturally transmitted social 
practices and involving dispositions, propensities and tendencies’ (Chia and MacKay, 
2007, p.236). Although this fits with the constructionist perspectives of strategy 
discussed above, it does not identify what is specific to strategizing, and ‘strategy-
making’ in this definition could be replaced with ‘cooking’, ‘driving’ or ‘parenting’. As 
discussed earlier, Mintzberg et al. (1998) offer five definitions of strategy: strategy is a 
plan; a pattern of consistent organizational behaviour over time; a (market) position; a 
perspective on how to do things in a fundamental way; and a ploy or manoeuver to 
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outwit a competitor. Taking an overarching discursive approach, and integrating 
elements of both of these definitions together with other insights that emerged from 
the literature review led to the following definition, which opened this chapter: 
Strategizing is a multi-modal discourse in which internal and external 
actors of an organization socially construct and negotiate options for a 
preferred future and a set of actions to bring about that future, while 
looking further ahead in time and considering a broader context. 
This definition summarizes the theoretical framework that guides this research. In 
summary, strategizing in this thesis is not just about what is said or written but may 
include any mode that contributes to meaning making. Further, both internal and 
external actors are presumed to engage in strategizing. External actors may actively 
and visibly engage in the discourse or they may be part of it indirectly, in that internal 
actors expect certain responses by external actors and adapt their practices and 
decisions in anticipation of such responses. The framework also sees strategizing as a 
creative, constructionist practice that involves interests and the exercise of power and, 
as such, requires negotiation of meaning rather than the identification of objective 
facts. As was argued in the literature review, strategizing is about increasing options, 
that is, alternatives to a future that would otherwise unfold. In order to change an 
unfolding future, it is necessary to bring about a change in the patterns of actions from 
which this future will emerge. From a discourse perspective we can change patterns of 
actions by changing the discourse. The analytical framework that emerged from the 
review suggests two distinct ways of changing how we construct and negotiate 
meaning that are specific and essential to strategy discourse. Attempting to look 
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further ahead in time is about trying to increase the perceived time available to create 
a preferred future or set of responses to bring it about. Similarly, considering a 
broader context is to try and extend the visibility of opportunities or threats in the 
creation of a preferred future or set of responses. Lastly, what is ‘seen’ is the outcome 
of habituated practices and frames that are used to construct the world in which we 
live: by deconstructing that world and reconstructing alternative futures and contexts, 
new options may emerge to guide the actions of organizational actors. In varying ways, 
actors already look ahead and consider context as part of their daily organizational 
practices, and this thesis will look at what is specific to strategizing practices.  
This analytical framework is solidly grounded in theory, and the literature review 
identified a range of opportunities to make further contributions to theory. These 
opportunities are combined below in two integrated research questions that guide the 
research. 
The first question raises issues about the structure and dynamics of a pre-acquisition 
discourse. The literature review identified that, while there is a fairly limited body of 
research that has looked at M&A discourse, there are few studies that have taken a 
discursive approach to look at what happens during the lead up to an intended 
acquisition. The specific issues that this research will look at during the pre-acquisition 
stage include broader discourses, external actors, multi-modal discursive practices, 
calculative devices and rhetorical strategies. The literature review identified that, in 
these issues, this research would be able to develop a number of theoretical 
contributions. For instance, while there is extensive attention in current research given 
to the role of internal actors in strategy discourse, not much is known about the role of 
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Table 2-8: Research Questions 
Research 
questions 
Review of the literature 
In the structure and 
dynamics of a pre-
acquisition strategy 
discourse, what is 
the role of:  
- external actors;  
- multi-modal 
discursive 
practices, in 
particular 
calculative 
devices; and  
- rhetorical 
strategies? 
Research into acquisition discourse routinely ignores the structure 
and dynamics of pre-acquisition discourse (Teerikangas and Joseph, 
2012; Vaara, 2002). 
Previous research has focused on internal instead of external actors 
in strategy discourse (Hellgren et al., 2002; Kuronen et al., 2005; 
Teerikangas et al., 2012).  
Empirical studies of discourse should consider multi-modal 
discursive practices (Grant et al., 2004b; Iedema, 2007; Jacobs & 
Heracleous, 2007; Royce et al., 2006).  
Previous research of organizational discourse has focused on 
rhetorical strategies of language (Erkama and Vaara, 2010; Sillince, 
2005; Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005).   
While previous studies show how actors use calculative devices to 
legitimize decisions (e.g. Baxter et al., 2003; Briers et al. 2001; 
Denis, Langley, & Rouleau, 2006), most ignore the calculative aspect 
(Callon et al., 2005), and do not pertain to pre-acquisition discourse. 
Research has shown how boundary objects build bridges between 
groups because they are adaptable to and robust across groups 
(Bechky, 2003; Spee and Jarzabkowski, 2009; Star and Griesemer, 
1989), but few studies show how they may reinforce existing power 
structures (Oswick and Robertson, 2009). 
What is the role of 
time and context in 
the social 
construction of 
meaning in 
strategizing? 
 
Temporal work (Kaplan et al., 2013; Keenoy et al., 2004) and 
contextual work (Grant et al., 2005; Hardy et al., 1999b; Keenoy et 
al., 2004; Riad et al., 2012) must construct coherent, plausible, and 
acceptable connections between local and broader discourses, as 
well as discourses of the past, present, and (particularly) future to 
enable agreement on strategic choices (Kaplan and Orlikowski, 
2013) 
Few studies explore how local and broader discourses interact 
(Erkama et al., 2010; Hardy, 2004). Also, previous studies on time 
and local discourse focus on how they change over time (Bushe & 
Marshak, 2009; Ford & Ford, 2008; Grant et al., 2011; Huy, 2001), 
instead of how they draw on texts about (mainly) the future. 
Further, while the importance of time and context are 
acknowledged in organizational discourse, it remains unclear what 
is specific to strategizing. 
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external actors. Further, the review also showed that, while most discourse research 
acknowledges that discourse goes beyond speech and writing, there are few studies 
that have empirically analyzed the role of other modalities in strategizing. In contrast, 
this research will look at a broad range of discursive practices and the modes used in 
the enactment of these practices. In particular, it takes a discursive approach to the 
use of calculative devices as a distinct mode. In doing so, this research is able to 
analyze rhetorical strategies brought to bear by actors during the pre-acquisition 
discourse, not only through speech and writing, but also through other modes.  
The second research question takes a discourse approach to how we construct and 
negotiate meaning when strategizing. Much of that may be similar to other 
organizational activities, but the emphasis is on what is particular and fundamental to 
strategizing. The theoretical framework for strategizing above encapsulates how actors 
consider time and context, and how this shapes their perspectives when strategizing. It 
could be argued that, to varying degrees, all organizational discourse includes these 
dimensions. However, while the theory review provides a solid foundation for each of 
these dimensions, there appears to be a limited understanding as to their particular 
role in strategizing as discourse as opposed to organizational discourse in general.  
The insights that emerge in this research extend our understanding of how meaning is 
socially constructed as part of a strategy discourse, as well as what is particular and 
fundamental to strategizing discourse. In this way it makes a contribution towards the 
development of a discursive and constructionist epistemology of strategizing.  
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2.6 SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 
The purpose of strategizing is to develop better options for success, and different 
schools of strategy approach this in different ways. Schools that assume a higher 
predictability and controllability of the external environment are more likely to 
emphasize a longer term planning focus. Others emphasize the ability of an 
organization to continuously adapt and craft new strategies. Previous and current 
dominant schools largely assume that the external environment can be known, and 
pay less attention to the internal processes of an organization, which are presumed to 
be rational. This establishes an ordered universe with simple or complicated problems 
that can fundamentally be resolved by professional and capable managers. Other 
schools of strategy are more likely to ask critical questions about the complex internal 
dynamics of organizations, or the status and creation of knowledge when strategizing. 
As a result, managers may see themselves more as operating in an unordered universe 
that presents them with complex problems, which cannot be resolved by more 
information or better analysis.  
In order to understand the opportunities and limitations offered by differing 
perspectives of strategizing, this thesis explores the philosophical foundations on 
which they are based. A challenge in doing this is that the debate on the philosophical 
foundations of strategizing is based on inconsistent and ambiguous use of some key 
terminology. To prevent that confusion in this thesis, critical terms are defined and the 
philosophical position for this research is made explicit. This research remains 
‘ontologically mute’ but is focused on developing contributions to an epistemology of 
strategy by taking a constructionist, discursive perspective to strategizing. In doing this, 
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the research also draws on literatures of strategy-as-practice, social semiotics and 
multi-modality, the sociology of finance, rhetoric during major organizational 
restructures and M&As.  
Taken together the literature provides a framework that enables the analysis of 
strategizing as a multi-modal discourse, in which the internal and external actors of an 
organization socially construct and negotiate options for a preferred future (including 
plans, positions and perspectives) and a set of actions (including patterns and ploys) to 
bring about that future, while looking further ahead in time and considering a broader 
context. 
This research is guided by two core research questions: 
- In the structure and dynamics of a pre-acquisition strategy discourse, what is 
the role of: external actors; multi-modal discursive practices, in particular 
calculative devices; and rhetorical strategies? 
- What is the role of time and context in the social construction of meaning in 
strategizing?  
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3 METHODS AND APPROACH 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This study aims to show how the meaning of key constructs, which structure the world 
that emerges from the pre-acquisition discourse, is negotiated. In doing this, it shows 
that the world we see is not inevitable but a particular combination of texts and 
practices. Discourse analysis is considered a highly suitable methodology as its 
interpretive and reflexive stance questions taken for granted concepts. While other 
social constructionist methodologies were also considered, including a practice 
perspective and Actor Network Theory, the thesis takes a discursive perspective to 
practices and to the role of actors. Discourse analysis offers a number of advantages, 
for example: it takes note of the “Linguistic Turn”; it considers the connection between 
power and meaning; it enables the study of more ephemeral aspects of organisations; 
and it can flexibly draw on a range of qualitative techniques like narrative analysis and 
content analysis {Phillips, 2002 #138}.  This study is exploratory and aims to build theory 
(e.g. Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003) in relation to discourse, M&A strategy, and a 
discursive epistemology of strategizing. To meet these objectives the study involved a 
detailed investigation of a case study acquisition strategy. The discourse analytic 
approach is well suited to examining and improving our understanding of the complex 
dynamics surrounding such an event (Gibbert et al., 2008), including the discursive 
conduct of a range of actors involved in the acquisition discourse.  
The selection of this particular case was influenced by a number of factors. First, the 
organizations that are central in the case are global companies that are listed not just 
at the Australian Stock Exchange, but also the London Stock Exchange. This brings the 
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combined benefit of good local information and a potential broader appeal of the case 
study. Second, the case was attractive because it provided the opportunity to 
determine to what extent a discursive approach, with its historic focus on language, 
remains useful and effective in an area that appears dominated by financials and 
economic rationalism. Third, during 2007 and 2008 I spent some 80% of my time 
setting up and running a global Graduate Development Program for BHP Billiton as 
Program Director for Melbourne Business School. While this provided no inside 
information, it sensitised me to the dynamics of the proposed transaction. 
This chapter begins by providing a brief overview of the case study, namely BHP’s 
attempt to acquire and merge with Rio. This is followed by an overview of the data 
collection and the units of analysis that the research focused on. Finally, the six stages 
of analysis are described that provided the basis for this thesis. 
 
3.2 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
This section provides a brief historic overview of BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto, the two 
companies at the center of the acquisition attempt. This is followed by an overview of 
previous occasions when they strategized options for bringer the organizations closer 
together. The final part of this section frames BHP’s intended acquisition strategy 
during 2007-08 in a temporal and discursive context. 
HISTORY OF BHP BILLITON 
Throughout this manuscript ‘BHP’ commonly refers to ‘BHP Billiton’. However, until 
2001 BHP and Billiton had been separate companies. BHP’s history began when, 
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according to BHP’s own chronicles (BHP Billiton, n.d.-a, sighted February 2012), 
Charles Rasp in 1883, believing that he had found black oxide of tin on the ‘broken hill’ 
in Western New South Wales (Australia), established the Broken Hill Mining Company 
with a syndicate of 6 others from the Mt Gipps sheep station.  Two years later, The 
Broken Hill Proprietary Company Limited was established and the company listed on 
the stock exchange. By 1891 the company started to export, selling lead to Fuzhou in 
China. In addition to mining itself, BHP - throughout most of the 20th century - also 
operated further downstream in processing some of the commodities it mined, for 
example, through the establishment of steelworks in Newcastle in 1915 and Port 
Kembla from 1935, and manufacturing products like nails and wire (BHP Billiton, n.d.-
a, sighted February 2012).  
From the early sixties, when corporate diversification was popular, BHP got involved in 
the exploration and production of oil and gas in the Bass Strait, that is, the waters that 
separate Tasmania from the mainland of Australia. Ian McLennan, BHP’s CEO through 
the sixties who became BHP Chairman in 1971, stated in an interview in 1978-79 that 
the decision to become  involved in oil was one of the three major dates of the 
company’s history as it enabled BHP’s development in all sorts of ways and kept it as 
the largest company in Australia (Thompson and Macklin, 2009). During the eighties, 
BHP further commissioned the exploration of gas on the North West Shelf of Australia. 
Its interests in oil and gas were expanded internationally with the acquisition of a 
number of US and Canadian oil companies (or substantial interests in these 
companies) during that period (BHP Billiton, n.d.-a).  By now the popularity of 
diversification had waned somewhat, and the leadership of companies was urged by 
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financial markets to stick to its knitting and limit the number of markets they tried to 
operate in. If investors wanted to diversify, they could do so by buying shares in two 
separate companies, one in oil and the other in mining, which were increasingly seen 
as very different businesses. BHP had considered floating its oil business as a separate 
entity in 1996 (Thompson and Macklin, 2009), but continued its involvement in oil and 
gas production and invested in gas production in Argentina and oil in the Irish Sea (BHP 
Billiton, n.d.-a, sighted February 2012).   
During the 1990s BHP came into significant problems. Its strategy had created what 
was perceived as an overly complex company structure and myopic culture. This was 
exacerbated when many of its markets went through a slump simultaneously. To 
resolve this, in 1998 a new external (and non-Australian) CEO was brought in to 
reorganize the company, simplify its structure, and open up its culture. Although the 
company maintained its diversification across mining and oil and gas, it substantially 
limited how far downstream it would get involved in processing and manufacturing. In 
particular, the production of steel and steel-based products, which had been an 
integral part of the organization throughout much of its history, had fallen behind 
technically, despite extensive investment and numerous reorganizations. According to 
Lance Hockridge, one of the executives tasked with the exit, ‘More than anything else, 
the closure was technology-driven’(Thompson and Macklin, 2009, p.190), and between 
1999 and 2002, BHP exited the steel-production industry by shutting down part of the 
operations and spinning out other parts. By this time, and in spite of its exit from steel 
production, BHP’s role in the Australian psyche was reflected in the nickname it had 
developed over the preceding decades as ‘the Big Australian’, or sometimes more 
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colloquially ‘the Big Fella’ (Thompson and Macklin, 2009). The company was one of the 
few truly globally operating Australian companies and became the first Australian 
company, in 1986, to declare a A$1 billion profit (BHP Billiton, n.d.-a, sighted February 
2012).  
The history of Billiton has some parallels with BHP’s history. Here also the company 
started with the find of tin in a colony of a European country. According to BHP 
Billiton’s chronicles, in 1851 Vincent Gildemeester Baron van Tuyll van Serooskerken 
and John Francis discovered tin on Billiton Island in the Netherlands Indies (BHP 
Billiton, n.d.-b, sighted February 2012), now Indonesia. The NV Billiton Maatschappij 
was subsequently established in 1860 in The Hague, the Netherlands (Gruythuysen 
and Kramer, 1990). According to the Dutch National Archives, Billiton’s initial activities 
were limited to the exploitation of tin on the island of Billiton, but during the 1920-30s 
Billiton expanded beyond the Netherlands Indies into Africa, Suriname and the United 
States, and into other commodities like bauxite, iron ore, nickel, gold and silver 
(Gruythuysen and Kramer, 1990).  Its expansion temporarily stagnated when Japan 
invaded the Netherlands Indies, followed by the end of Dutch colonial rule and 
subsequent nationalization of Dutch companies in Indonesia. However, by the 1960s 
the company had expanded into mining, metallurgy, chemicals, and a number of other 
downstream businesses (Gruythuysen and Kramer, 1990) across a broad geographical 
area.  
In 1970 Shell acquired Billiton, according to Shell, as part of its strategy to diversify the 
company into other natural resources following increasing instability in oil producing 
countries ( Shell, sighted February 2012: Shell, n.d.; Thompson and Macklin, 2009).  By 
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1994 Shell, following a broader industry trend, retreated to its core business of oil and 
accepted a bid for Billiton from Gencor, a South African precious metals company. 
According to the New York Times, at the time of the sale Billiton’s mining and mineral 
business operated in 15 countries across bauxite, alumina, aluminium, nickel, zinc, 
copper and gold (27 July, 1994). To improve access to capital, Gencor ‘cleaved off’ 
Billiton three years later, based the company’s headoffice in London, and listed Billiton 
Plc on the London Stock Exchange (BHP Billiton, n.d.-b; Walker, 1997).  
A close relationship between BHP and Billiton can be traced back to a joint venture in 
1985 in a new zinc/ lead mine at Cadjebut in Western Australia (Thompson and 
Macklin, 2009). A first attempt to merge BHP and Billiton occurred in 1998, when 
Billiton approached BHP. Although BHP had world-class assets, it had been struggling 
for some years due to some poor investment decisions and falling prices in key 
commodities. According to then Billiton Finance Director Mick Davis, they could bring 
world-class management to a merged company (Thompson and Macklin, 2009). 
However, the approach occurred just as the BHP board had decided that it needed a 
new Chairman and new CEO to bring its house back in order. Initially the CEO position 
was offered to Brian Gilbertson, at that time CEO of Billiton, but he rejected the offer 
when the BHP Board did not accept that it would be the precursor to a merger of the 
two companies (Thompson and Macklin, 2009). It took less than three years for BHP to 
recover sufficiently and be willing to seriously consider a merger with Billiton. 
In 2001 BHP and Billiton agreed to merge. Following approval by their respective 
shareholders, the Australian Foreign Investment Review Board, and the European 
Commission, BHP Billiton was dual listed on the London Stock Exchange and the 
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Australian Stock Exchange on 29 June 2001 (BHP Billiton, n.d.-a, sighted February 
2012). At the time of the announcement, the aggregate market capitalization was 
approximately US$28 billion (GBP20 billion; A$57 billion), according to a statement by 
BHP to the ASX on March 19, 2001. Further, the combined company had 58,000 
employees; operated in more than 30 countries; and had interests across aluminium, 
energy coal and metallurgical coal, copper, manganese, iron ore, uranium, nickel, 
silver and titanium minerals, and substantial interests in oil, gas, liquefied natural gas 
and diamonds.  
HISTORY OF RIO TINTO 
Like BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto was a company that emerged from a string of mergers, 
acquisitions, and joint ventures with other companies. A main one that Rio Tinto saw 
as fundamental to its history, was the 1962 merger of the parents of the Rio Tinto 
Company and the Consolidated Zinc Corporation to form Rio Tinto Zinc, or RTZ 
Corporation as it was known for many years; the combined Australian interests of the 
two companies operated under the name of Conzinc Riotinto of Australia, better 
known as CRA Limited (Rio Tinto, n.d., sighted February 2012). The Rio Tinto Company 
had been registered as a public company since 1873, when the Spanish government 
accepted an offer from a British-European syndicate for the Rio Tinto mines. The 
company began expanding its geographic reach after an initial focus on the original 
mines in Spain, which had been the world’s leading source of copper, with investments 
in copper mines in Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe. The Consolidated Zinc Corporation itself 
had been the product of a major merger between two mining companies in 1949. 
After this merger, the company developed interests in mining other commodities in 
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Australia, including bauxite in 1956, and iron ore in the Pilbarra region of Western 
Australia in 1966.  
On a global level the company acquired borates mines in 1968 in the US, and all the 
mining assets of BP Minerals when the oil company exited the mining industry in 1989, 
as Shell would do a few years later when it sold of Billiton. Billiton itself also reduced 
its diversification and exited a string of non-mining related businesses between 1987 
and 1993, which it had build up over the years, including cement, chemicals, industrial 
products, and its own oil and gas business. In 1995, to simplify some of the 
complicated structures and crossholdings that had proliferated over the years, RTZ and 
CRA reorganized their ownership structures and established a dual listed company 
RTZ-CRA with listings at the London Stock Exchange and the Australian Stock 
Exchange. In 1997 the company was renamed Rio Tinto Group, simplifying the ‘Rio 
Tinto Zinc - Conzinc Riotinto of Australia’ that was encapsulated in its name, and 
reflecting its mining interests beyond zinc.  
Further expansions and acquisitions occurred since then, in particular the $38Bn 
acquisition of Alcan Inc., an aluminium powerhouse, to form Rio Tinto Alcan in 2007. 
The acquisition was ill-timed at the peak of the cycle and, less than five years later, 
lead to a US$8.9Bn write-down and the foregoing of bonuses by the CEO and CFO of 
Rio Tinto Alcan, who had played major roles in the acquisition decision (AAP, 2012). 
The resulting debt level contributed to Rio’s vulnerability to an acquisition by another 
mining major, and BHP Billiton decided to try and capitalize on what it saw as an 
attractive opportunity. 
  
PhD Thesis Maurizio Floris 
 Page 102 
BRINGING TOGETHER BHP BILLITON AND RIO TINTO 
The background of both companies showed that mergers, acquisitions, and their 
inverse, that is, demergers and divestments, have been a common part of strategizing 
throughout the history of BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto. This research focuses on the 
acquisition discourse between November 2007 and November 2008 when BHP Billiton 
attempted to bring together the two companies. However, the acquisition discourse 
needs to be put in the context of strategizing about this over at least some ten years 
prior to the very public acquisition attempt. Rio had been considered a potential 
acquisition (or merger) target on a number of prior occasions. Thomson and Macklin 
tracked this in their history of BHP Billiton, which was based in part on interviews with 
‘dozens of past and present BHP Billiton staffers, including three BHP chairmen and six 
chief executives’ (2009, p.4). One staffer stated that BHP always thought about Rio, but 
could never work out how to make it happen (p.297). Specific occasions of strategizing 
about a potential merger or acquisition of Rio by BHP that Thomson and Macklin 
identified included:  
Table 3-1: Prior Approaches between BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto 
Year Approach Details 
1998 (3 years before the merger between BHP and Billiton): Billiton CEO 
Gilbertson envisioned that Billiton will merge with BHP, and once that is 
sorted, take over Rio Tinto (p.265). 
2000 BHP and Rio had conversations to merge their iron ore divisions, but BHP’s 
steel divisions and petroleum business were some of the key stumbling 
blocks (p.303). 
2002 Gilbertson, now CEO of BHP Billiton, commenced discussions with Rio 
Tinto, although these did not lead to a merger. Key concerns raised by Rio 
during these initial approaches, which came back in the 2007-08 attempt, 
included petroleum, anti-trust, synergies, and people. (p.346-352). 
2006 BHP Billiton’s Chairman has an ‘informal chat’ with Rio Tinto’s Chairman, 
which was followed up in early 2007 by a written merger proposal (p.434). 
This also went nowhere. 
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Source: (Thompson and Macklin, 2009). 
Rio’s Board rejected the 2006 approach, supposedly believing that the company would 
be better off on its own. At that point BHP decided not to proceed with a potentially 
hostile acquisition, which would involve bypassing Rio’s Board and seeking approval 
directly from Rio’s shareholders.  
An opportunity presented itself when in the middle of 2007 Rio acquired Alcan for 
$38Bn. The market had been fairly critical of the price paid for the acquisition of Alcan, 
exposing the leadership of Rio to criticism. The acquisition was financed in part by 
raising debt, resulting in a high debt level and made Rio more vulnerable to the 
aspirations of BHP, which had a much lower debt ratio and extensive cash reserves to 
draw on and manage such a debt if it acquired Rio. 
The strategic episode that is the focus of the analysis here was initiated on November 
12th, 2007, when BHP announced that it had approached Rio with a proposal to 
acquire it. Both companies had a dual listing at the London and Sydney stock 
exchanges with a combined market capitalization in excess of US$350Bn. At the time 
of the announcement, this would have created the world’s largest mining company. As 
before, Rio’s Board did not agree to engage in discussions regarding a combination, 
and Rio’s leadership argued extensively and publicly that it considered the ‘all share 
proposal’ of three BHP shares for every Rio share too low.  
On February 6th, 2008 BHP formalized its proposal and made an offer of 3.4 BHP shares 
for every Rio share. The offer was conditional on the acceptance of the acquisition by 
relevant competition regulators in its major markets. From the initial announcement 
and throughout 2008, Rio’s Board rejected the valuation and refused to engage with 
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BHP. Undeterred, BHP made its submissions to regulators and appealed directly to 
Rio’s shareholders, who frequently were also BHP shareholders. Rio’s refusal forced 
BHP to conduct the acquisition attempt in the public domain and brought in a range of 
other actors.  
BHP successfully obtained clearance from US and Australian competition regulators, 
and was engaging with the European regulator when, on November 25, 2008, it 
suddenly abandoned its pursuit of Rio. BHP purported that the undertakings sought by 
the European regulator were unacceptable in the context of a rapid deterioration of 
near term global economic conditions, and the associated fall in commodity prices. 
These undertakings included the sale of some of the assets of the combined company 
to satisfy the concern of the European regulator that its combined market share would 
be excessive. The combination of a forced sale of assets against a timeline set by the 
regulator, and the difficulty for potential acquirers to raise the necessary capital during 
a global financial crisis, presented an unacceptable risk to BHP’s leadership. 
As the detailed analysis of the focal period shows, BHP had been successful in arguing 
that the combination of BHP and Rio would generate substantial additional value, in 
large part through combining iron ore mines and infrastructure in West Australia’s 
Pilbarra region. BHP continued to strategize how it could unlock this additional value 
without acquiring Rio. Now with the support of Rio’s leadership, BHP developed a joint 
venture strategy that sought to combine their mining and transport assets in the 
Pilbarra region, but not the marketing of the iron ore. This strategy had the advantage 
that it would still unlock much of the additional value pursued during the acquisition, 
that it was supported by the leadership of both organizations, and that it might be 
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more palatable to the European competition regulator who had been unconvinced by 
BHP’s initial attempt.  
TEMPORAL AND DISCURSIVE CONTEXT 
The brief review of BHP Billiton’s and Rio Tinto’s histories and some of the aftermath 
enabled to put some context around the acquisition of Rio Tinto by BHP Billiton during 
2007-08. The intent was not to be comprehensive but to provide enough examples to 
avoid framing the case study as an episode isolated from its temporal and discursive 
context.  
Table 3-2 summarizes that context. Vertically - by column - the table shows how, 
during any period, the discourse regarding Rio sat within the context of an overall BHP 
strategy, as well as a context of a range of broader discourses. These broader 
discourses are discussed in detail in the next chapter, which will show how these 
broader discourses shaped the acquisition discourse in 2007-08.  
Horizontally the first row shows how strategizing in relation to BHP joining forces with 
Rio developed over time. As described earlier, it included possible joint ventures (J.V.), 
a take-over, and a merger of equals. The temporal context in the table demonstrates 
that the acquisition attempt needs to be interpreted as just one snapshot of many 
years of strategizing during which actors tried to bring these organizations closer. The 
negotiation of BHP with external actors becomes particularly evident when seeing how 
BHP is trying to address market share concerns of the European competition regulator 
that were raised during the acquisition discourse (see chapter 4 for details) in its next 
iteration of trying to bring BHP and Rio together. The joint venture in the Pilbarra 
region that was proposed following the failed acquisition would only combine the 
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production assets, not the marketing of iron ore! This was interpreted by analysts and 
the media as a direct concession by BHP and Rio leadership to the European 
competition regulator. This temporal context also enables to position the attempted 
acquisition of Rio Tinto appropriately: each approach can be seen as a next step in 
ongoing negotiations between a number of internal and external actors in regards to 
bringing BHP and Rio together. The acquisition attempt in 2007-08 should not be seen 
as failed strategizing by the leadership of BHP; the episode and all that occurred within 
it, is part and parcel of a long-term and ongoing strategizing process during which 
different actors negotiated a range of options. 
Table 3-2: Examples of Discursive and Temporal Context  
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The table illustrates how BHP’s overall strategy was shaped over time by a number of 
broader discourses. As will be shown in the findings, the broader discourses listed in 
the table could be seen to form part of the fabric of the acquisition discourse under 
study here. Most of these discourses were long running and commenced well before 
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2007-08 and continued beyond. One exception discussed earlier in this chapter is the 
broader discourse around the superiority of diversification or specialization as a 
corporate strategy. In line with this discourse, BHP was already a downstream 
producer of steel and steel products for most of the 20th century. The company 
diversified further into oil and gas during the early sixties, as did many resources 
companies. However, as that broader discourse changed since the eighties, resources 
companies specialized back to either mining or oil & gas. BHP resisted pressure to spin 
off oil and gas in spite of major problems in the nineties, when BHP was considered 
too complex to manage and forced to simplify its business. It did this by spinning off a 
number of other activities, particularly its downstream activities - most notably the 
production of steel and steel products.  
As the analysis in the next chapters will show, this historic background found its way 
into the acquisition discourse in at least two ways. First, throughout the acquisition 
discourse BHP CEO Kloppers repeatedly assured other actors that the acquisition 
would not recreate the overly complicated and unprofitable BHP of the nineties, but 
that the company would maintain a focus on simplicity. 
“… Our strategy has been to own upstream, long-life, low-cost, 
expandable, export-oriented assets … The recurring themes are about 
simplicity and scale .. This strategy reduces risk and increases speed. It 
also gives us a more manageable business. BHP Billiton is a simpler, more 
upstream, yet much larger and more valuable company than Rio Tinto.”  
Source: Kloppers, December12, 2007. 
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Second, the ongoing diversification of BHP in oil & gas and mining assets was 
presented as a risk by Rio’s leadership by drawing on the broader discourse that 
rejected diversification. In contrast, it was presented as a strength by BHP’s leadership, 
by pointing to rising oil prices.  
At the tail end of the acquisition discourse the global financial crisis struck, which 
provided a new broader discourse that dramatically changed the context for the 
acquisition discourse. 
A long-term perspective of strategy is, of course, nothing new. However, such a long-
term perspective seems much less common when a practice approach is taken to 
strategy. The analysis of micro practices in strategizing may be necessary to do justice 
to the richness of what occurs in a particular interaction, but it may crowd out a long-
term perspective of what happens during strategizing activities that take many years. 
Similarly, the analysis of micro practices may crowd out a bigger picture context that 
considers all strategizing in relation to an acquisition attempt as a single practice in the 
context of a company’s overall strategy or – an even broader context – that of a 
consolidating industry. 
This overview frames the case study of the 2007-08 attempted acquisition in its 
temporal and discursive context. This framing showed that this historic background is 
relevant for a number of reasons. First, the 12 month strategic episode that is analyzed 
in detail contains many references to the history of the companies that would 
otherwise be difficult to interpret.  Secondly, the description framed the acquisition 
attempt as merely one snapshot during many years of strategizing during which actors 
tried to bring these organizations closer. Further, the description also positions the 
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acquisition attempt as merely one practice in the broader context of other strategizing 
activities by BHP during the same period. Lastly, past connections between the 
strategy of both these companies and broader contextual discourses support the 
detailed analysis in the next chapter that will demonstrate the influence of such 
broader discourses and external actors on strategizing. However, before proceeding to 
this detailed analysis, the research methods will be discussed next.  
 
3.3 RESEARCH METHOD 
DATA COLLECTION 
The process was started by a familiarization with the background to the case study. 
This involved assembling and reviewing a range of information about both BHP and 
Rio. Some of this information dated back as far as the formation of both companies, 
but was mostly focused on about one year prior to the acquisition announcement. 
Having reviewed this information, further data collection was started to collect data 
spanning the 12 month period (November 2007 to November 2008) during which the 
acquisition attempt took place.  
The sources of data from the organizations included annual reports, company 
newsletters, corporate videos, press releases and communications to shareholders. 
The data also included slides and full transcripts of key presentations to analysts and 
the media (including transcripts of ‘question and answer’ sessions following the formal 
presentations) throughout the 12 months that were the subject of this study. Other 
non-organizational sources include a wide range of journalists’ accounts, stock 
analysts’ comments, and statements by regulators.  The approach to analysing these 
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sources of data was consistent with interpretive methods that have been established 
by other studies of M&A (See for example: Maguire and Phillips, 2008; Vaara et al., 
2005).  
Table 3-3: Data Set 
Sources 
 
Type 
 
Text 
(pages) 
Transcripts
(pages) 
Slides 
(#) 
Video 
(minutes) 
BHP Briefings 22 125 918 6 
Press releases/briefings 82 31
Letters to shareholders 12
Rio Briefings 65 389
Press releases 77
Letters to shareholders 34
Analysts Analyst reports 44
Regulators Statements/ rulings 32
Media Articles  4,980 31 
Other Historical/ background 444
TOTAL 5,724 221 1,307 37 
 
UNITS OF ANALYSIS 
The key units of analysis for the case study follow from the research question 
regarding the role of (multi-modal) discursive practices, external actors, broader 
discourse in the structure and dynamics of the pre-acquisition discourse. Further, the 
structure and dynamics of the acquisition discourse are shaped by the key constructs 
that emerged in the discourse, and rhetorical strategies that were used by actors to 
negotiate the meaning of these constructs. 
Discursive practices are what actors do that shapes the discourse. A discursive practice 
is not necessarily intentional, conscious, or skillful, that is, the outcome may be the 
opposite of what an actor may want. A number of characteristics of a discursive 
practice are particularly relevant to the questions that guide this research. These 
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include its modality (or modalities); the magnitude and direction of power it brings to 
bear on a discourse (e.g. by bringing rhetorical strategies to bear on particular 
constructs); and the actor who enacts the practice.A complication of a discursive 
practice as a unit of analysis is that the practice can typically be disaggregated into 
sub-practices while also being part of another more aggregated practice. As discussed 
later, discursive practices were disaggregated into sub-practices and modalities as 
much as required by the analysis, but no further (for example see ‘Data analysis, stage 
4). 
A discursive practice can be seen as an instantiation of a pattern of practices (Chia and 
MacKay, 2007). It may require a pattern of practices, rather than an individual 
instance, to bring sufficient power to bear on a meaning-making process, shape a 
discourse and bring about material outcomes. Such a pattern may not consist of 
similar discursive practices, but instead consist of a similar direction of power across 
very different discursive practices. A pattern may only be accessible by analyzing 
particular instantiations of practices and a ‘sympathetic grasping of the internal logic 
of this practice’ (Chia and MacKay, 2007, p.234). Also, what may appear as a singular 
attempt by companies to persuade external actors of the merits or drawbacks of a 
particular strategy may just be a snapshot of a pattern of activities over time where 
persuasion or influence, in fact, flow in many directions. This adds up to the need for 
an interpretative approach that does not presume simple cause-effect relations 
between a single discursive practice and particular outcomes, but sees a particular 
discursive practice as part of a pattern that credibly, plausibly and probably 
contributed to such outcomes (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p.1). 
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The research also specifically aims to analyze who acts. Where individuals are 
identified, they will generally be analyzed as a member of a – for the purposes here – 
fairly homogenous group like BHP leadership, analysts, customers, regulators. Such 
grouping is accepted practice in organization studies (Jarzabkowski and Spee, 2009). 
Where such grouping is inappropriate, the actors will be considered separately. For 
example, for parts of the case study the analysis distinguished between the European 
and Australian competition regulator (already groupings of employees). However, in 
some instances their interests and discursive practices differ significantly and they 
have been discussed separately.  
The data analysis identified a few groups of themes. These themes are recurring in the 
discourse and form key concepts around which the discourse was structured. The term 
‘construct’ is used to emphasize the negotiations and social construction of specific 
meanings for particular concepts. The discussion of stage 2 in the Data Analysis section 
discusses this unit of analysis further 
The data analysis also identified some groups of themes in the acquisition discourse 
that were manifestations of broader discourses. Whereas the meaning of the 
constructs is negotiated by actors engaged in the acquisition discourse, the broader 
discourses are largely shaped by actors who have no particular interest in the 
acquisition discourse. Nevertheless, a constructionist epistemology does not, of 
course, grant broader discourse any objectivity. The research here does not analyze 
these broader discourses separately, but is only interested in on how key actors of the 
acquisition discourse are limited by or draw on the broader discourses in the 
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negotiation of meaning of the key constructs. The discussion of stage 2 in the Data 
Analysis section will also discuss this unit of analysis further. 
DATA ANALYSIS 
Data analysis comprised five main stages. Ambiguity during the coding that took place 
over these five stages was resolved through discussion with supervisors (Ezzamel and 
Willmot, 2008; Fendt and Sachs, 2008).  
STAGE 1: EVENT HISTORY 
At the first stage of analysis, and in line with the approach taken by Maguire and Hardy 
(2009) and Maguire and Phillips (2008), an ‘event history database’ (Ven and Poole, 
1990) was constructed. This involved reviewing all data in order to establish a 
chronological order of the key practices of actors throughout the attempted 
acquisition. The review did not just include language used by actors, but also other 
modes, activities and the physical context that contributed to how actors sought to 
give meaning to the attempted acquisition (e.g. site visits, analyst briefings, customer 
meetings, press releases and share purchases). From this process it was possible to 
develop an account of how the attempted acquisition played out (Eisenhardt and 
Bourgeois III, 1988; Langley, 1999).  
STAGE 2: KEY CONSTRUCTS AND BROADER DISCOURSES 
Second, coded themes were identified that recurred throughout the data. In first 
instance the data was scanned, and recurring issues or issues that were identified by 
actors as significant were extracted (Hellgren et al., 2002), for example as quotes, 
indicators, imagery, etc.. These were then grouped in first order themes and analysed 
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in more depth. The main themes that emerged from this process were explored 
further and either discarded or refined (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Miles and 
Huberman, 1994). Those that remained were then aggregated into a small number of 
categories  (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Miles and Huberman, 1994; Yin, 2003). These 
aggregated second order themes emerged over a number of iterations. Any process of 
interpretation of the data and identification of themes is unavoidably influenced by 
the preconceptions of the researcher (Vaara and Tienari, 2011). Further, different 
strategy theories that were brought to bear on this study may also privilege somewhat 
different thematic groupings of the data. However, a conscious effort was made to 
remain faithful to the way that actors typically appeared to conceptualise the 
acquisition discourse (Hellgren et al., 2002). As part of this analysis second order 
themes were differentiated in themes that pertained either more narrowly to actors 
involved in the acquisition discourse, or to its broader context. The former themes 
were grouped into three third order themes and called key constructs, while the latter 
were grouped in third order themes that were considered broader discourses. First, 
second and third order themes were subsequently refined throughout the research 
process and writing process, as new insights emerged from either analysis, feedback or 
discussions. These themes were consistently used by actors to frame the pre-
acquisition discourse in ways that represented their particular interests. Salient 
examples of themes were included in tables or selected imagery, and are shown and 
discussed throughout the findings. 
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KEY CONSTRUCTS  
As the attempts at acquisition proceeded, the meaning of three key constructs was the 
subject of continued negotiation. Key constructs through which meaning was 
negotiated in this case concerned the additional value pool, the fair share exchange 
ratio, and the proposed acquisition’s impact on competition.  
Figure 3-1: Coding of Key Constructs 
 
The additional value pool refers to the shareholder value that would result from the 
creation of a mining giant that could capitalise on the demand growth of China and 
India and reduce costs through operational synergies. The fair share exchange ratio 
refers to the number of BHP shares that would be paid in exchange for each Rio share. 
This needed to be seen as ‘fair’ to gain acceptance from both BHP and Rio 
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shareholders. The impact on competition is about whether the combined entity would 
gain excessive market power, and depended on two key factors: the market share of 
the combined organization and how the proposed acquisition served customer 
interests by bringing more product to market faster, as opposed to pushing prices up.  
BROADER DISCOURSES 
Other categories of themes constituted broader discourses that were woven into the 
acquisition discourse by actors. Some of the more obvious broader discourses that 
shaped the acquisition discourse included the primacy of shareholder value, long-term 
demand from China and India, the emergence of mining super-majors, and the 
importance of competition in markets.  
Figure 3-2: Coding of Broader Discourses 
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The primacy of shareholder value referred to the requirement imposed on the 
leadership of commercial companies to prioritise the creation of value for 
shareholders over other stakeholders. The long-term demand from China and India 
reflected an expected multi-decade growth cycle for the two main export destinations 
for BHP and Rio product, hence underpinning their profit potential. The broader 
discourse related to the emergence of super-majors in the mining industry suggests 
that there are significant scale advantages to very large resources companies, and that 
this was driving industry consolidation in the resources industry. Finally, the broader 
discourse on the importance of competition in markets has shaped economic 
discourse at least since Adam Smith’s invisible hand and David Ricardo’s theory on 
comparative advantage. While these broader discourses were fundamental to the 
acquisition discourse, key actors of the acquisition discourse could draw on selected 
parts of these broader discourses, but were not able to significantly alter them.  
Stage 1 and 2 of the analysis provided a partial response to research question 2, in that 
these stages provided a way to represent an initial structure for the pre-acquisition 
discourse through the differentiation and identification of actors, key constructs and 
broader discourses. The next stages of the analysis aimed to determine the role of 
these broader discourses, external actors, as well as multi-modal discursive practices, 
calculative devices, and rhetorical strategies in the negotiation of meaning of the key 
constructs.  
STAGE 3: ACTORS AND MULTI-MODAL DISCURSIVE PRACTICES 
For the third stage of analysis coded instances were identified where discursive 
practices were brought to bear by BHP and its senior leadership on the three key 
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constructs as part of this negotiation. From this, two primary external actors were 
identified or the acquisition discourse who were central to deciding the outcome of 
the attempted acquisition, in addition to BHP leadership itself. These were 
shareholders and competition regulators, and BHP therefore sought to obtain support 
for its acquisition strategy from both these groups. Shareholders included both Rio and 
BHP shareholders: 60% owned shares in both organizations. The key constructs of the 
acquisition discourse pertaining to shareholders were additional value pool, and fair 
share exchange ratio. For competition regulators the key construct of the acquisition 
discourse was impact on competition. In addition, there were a number of other actors 
who could potentially influence the decision-makers, including Rio’s leadership, mining 
analysts, BHP and Rio customers and suppliers, and journalists. For each of the 
different actors a variety of multi-modal discursive practices were identified and coded 
that were used to contest or support the interpretation of the key constructs 
associated with the acquisition discourse. The purpose of this stage was to develop an 
appreciation of the breadth of discursive practices (e.g. holding seminars; visits to 
shareholders; submissions to regulators; interviews with media; site visits of analysts 
and/or media; buying/ selling of shares) and associated modes (e.g. speech, writing, 
imagery, location) that different actors brought to bear on particular constructs.  
During this stage the prevalence and importance particularly of indicators or 
calculative devices in the acquisition discourse emerged, and lead to an in-depth 
analysis of these in the subsequent stages.  
As discussed in the literature review, what constitutes a mode in one context may not 
function as such in a different context (Constantinou, 2005; Kress, 2010). Indicators 
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have not been identified as a separate mode in the literature on social semiotics 
before. However, Table 3-4 shows how indicators, which were used by actors in the 
case study, meet the criteria suggested by Kress (2010) and discussed in the literature 
review, and were therefore treated as a distinct mode to appreciate their semiotic 
function more fully. 
Table 3-4: Indicators as a Distinct Mode 
Criteria Criteria for financial/ numerical indicator  
Affordances 
Are affordances 
distinct, that is, do 
they enable 
something that other 
modes do not? 
Indicators/ calculative devices give an impression of potential 
precision and objectivity; enables symbolic numerical manipulation;  
Social 
Does it meet a need 
of the community in 
this case study, that 
is, is it used with 
relative regularity, 
consistency and with 
shared assumptions? 
The indicators in the case study are constructed around the needs of 
the community of financial professionals and shareholders who form 
a ‘financial community’. The main indicators are used frequently, and 
their consistency and underlying assumptions are often governed by a 
high level of standardization, which may be codified in compulsory 
accounting standards.  
Formal 
Has ‘ textual 
function’, that is, can 
indicators form 
message-entities 
which are internally 
coherent and which 
cohere with their 
environment?  
• Indicators (eg share exchange ratio) cohere with their external 
environment as presented in broader contextual discourse (e.g. 
indicators for Additional Value Pool and Fair Share Exchange Ratio 
fit within an acquisition discourse)  
• An indicator must also be internally coherent, that is, the 
calculation follows a strict logic, typically following explicit 
conventions (e.g. accounting standards) and elements of an 
indicator cannot be modified without changing its meaning. 
Has ‘interpersonal 
function’, that is, can 
indicators represent 
meanings about the 
social relations of 
those engaged in 
communication? 
• Indicators can and do imply social relations between the user of 
the indicator and the audience. For example, the Fair Share 
Exchange Ratio implies that BHP management must add share 
value for current BHP shareholders and create an attractive offer 
for current Rio shareholders. Therefore it reflects a 
communicational relationship and as well as a social relationship 
between ‘maker and receiver of the message’ (Kress, 2010, p.92) 
Has ‘ideational 
function’, that is, Can 
indicators represent 
meanings about the 
world of states, 
actions and events? 
• Indicators have strong ideational aspects as they represent or 
construct aspects of the world as seen by the user of the 
indicator. It suggests an epistemological commitment to how the 
world appears to the user of an indicator. A rearrangement is 
likely to lead to incoherence for the audience. 
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STAGE 4: RHETORICAL STRATEGIES 
The fourth stage of analysis involved identifying and coding the rhetorical strategies 
that were connected to actors’ particular practices and associated modes. These 
rhetorical strategies were coded as appeals to logos, ethos, and pathos (Aristotle, 
1991). The decision to do so followed an analysis of some 20 recent articles (see Table 
2-7, p.82), which specifically look at rhetoric or legitimation during M&A or major 
organizational restructures (e.g. Brennan et al., 2010; Brown et al., 2012; Cheney et al., 
2004; Erkama and Vaara, 2010; Green et al., 2008; Hellgren et al., 2002; Suddaby and 
Greenwood, 2005; Vaara and Monin, 2010; Vaara and Tienari, 2008; Vaara et al., 
2006). As discussed in the literature review, nearly every article used a different 
categorization to group rhetorical strategies.  However, several acknowledged or drew 
on the logos, pathos, ethos categorization (Erkama and Vaara, 2010; Suddaby and 
Greenwood, 2005) or used this categorization exclusively (Brown et al., 2012; Green et 
al., 2008; Green, 2004), making it the most common categorization across relevant 
studies. Alternative and more recently developed ways to categorize rhetorical 
strategies were also explored. Specifically, this included ‘theorizations of change’ from 
Suddaby and Greenwood (2005), ‘discursive strategies’ (Tienari et al 2003), and the 
‘legitimation strategies’ developed by Erkama and Vaara (2010), Vaara and Monin 
(2010), Vaara and Tienari (2008), and Vaara et al (2006). While examples were found 
of rhetorical strategies that could be said to fit each of these categories in the data, 
they were only found in linguistic modes (speech and writing) and not in non-linguistic 
modes.The classical categories of logos, ethos and pathos were the only strategies that 
could consistently be connected to non-linguistic modes and were coded accordingly. 
Indeed, confining coding of rhetorical strategies to these categories was both 
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necessary and appropriate since the aim of this study was to identify the significance 
of non-linguistic modes of discourse to rhetoric rather than to specifically test an 
existing categorization of rhetoric or to create any new categorizations.   
In some cases coding into logos, ethos and pathos initially required a disaggregation of 
a practice into ‘sub’-practices or into separate modes that made up the initially 
identified and coded practice. For example, BHP released short videos to seek support 
for the acquisition. By disaggregating the modes used in this practice into speech, 
moving image and music prevalent rhetorical strategies were then identified and 
coded, which were embedded in each of the modes, for example, pathos in music, 
speech and moving images; ethos in moving images, indicators and speech; logos in 
speech and moving images (detailed disaggregation is provided in Table 4-13 and 
Table 4-14). This disaggregation also involved separating out the use of the modes of 
indicators and location in order to be able to connect these modes with particular 
rhetorical strategies. 
In this stage of analysis instances where ‘transgression markers’ came into play were 
identified and analyzed. These instances could be seen as a collision of alternative 
interpretations of the same events by different actors. Here multi-modal cues from 
key actors were identified and listed, which indicated that they did not accept an 
interpretation that was offered by another actor, but expressed that the other actor 
had overstepped a limit of acceptable meaning.    
STAGE 5: AXIAL CODING 
During stage 5 of the analysis involved a process of axial coding (Maguire and Phillips, 
(2008) for each of the three key constructs of the acquisition discourse. Specifically, it 
PhD Thesis Maurizio Floris 
 Page 122 
involved a systematic and iterative process in which the analysis moved among the 
already chronologically ordered and coded data seeking to identify relationships and 
emerging patterns between the actors, key constructs, broader discourses, the multi-
modal discursive practices, and the rhetorical strategies used to support or challenge 
these. These relationships and patterns were then refined in ways that created 
adequate conceptual categories, which allowed to provide an analysis that was 
grounded both empirically in the data and theoretically in the literature (Eisenhardt, 
1989). The process identified and showed the variety of modes used under each 
construct, the combinations of rhetorical strategies used under each mode, and the 
significance and impact of modes and rhetorical strategies. For example, the analysis 
showed the role that calculative devices played as boundary objects in the negotiation 
of meaning in the acquisition discourse: actors organised field visits and analyst 
briefings to shape the narrative of an organisation’s capability to bring products to 
particular commodity markets. Calculative devices rendered this narrative of capability 
calculable, which enabled its summation with other narratives that had also been 
rendered calculable and construct a single number for the relative value of both 
companies. Mining the data in this way allowed seeing how the use of calculative 
devices in the acquisition discourse was connected to the development of both local 
narratives (e.g. BHP’s ability to export iron ore from the Pilbarra region to China) and 
broader discourses (e.g. economic development in China, global demand for iron ore, 
and currency exchange rates).  
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STAGE 6: TIME AND CONTEXT HORIZONS 
The final stage involved analyzing what the insights from the analysis during the 
previous stages might contribute to a discursive epistemology of strategizing. From the 
literature review two key dimensions had emerged as fundamental to how meaning is 
created when strategizing, that is, looking ahead and scanning the environment. 
During stage 6 these dimensions were conceptualized as a time and context horizon. 
The previous stages had provided detailed insights into the context horizon (in the 
form of broader discourses) in the negotiation of key constructs. Further analysis of 
the case study was conducted to better understand how as part of the pre-acquisition 
discourse actors also drew on time and temporal variables while strategizing. In order 
to do this, the negotiation of meaning of the three key constructs was reviewed 
specifically for the use of discursive practices that either implicitly or explicitly drew on 
time in the negotiation of meaning. For each construct a number of these were 
identified and analyzed. For example, the additional value pool was calculated based 
on future cost savings and future revenue increases; the fair share exchange ratio was 
determined, in part, by project pipelines, future demand, and the calculation of the 
net present value of future profits of BHP and Rio; and the impact on competition was 
influenced by expectations regarding an acceleration of getting products to market in 
the future, the emergence of new iron ore producers, and a 15 year supply contract 
between BHP and its major iron ore customer in Australia. 
The findings demonstrated that each of these horizons could be seen to be thoroughly 
anchored in the case data. Together these horizons enabled this thesis to differentiate 
strategizing discourse from other managerial activities as they highlight what is specific 
about strategy as discourse. This differentiation of how we create meaning when 
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strategizing, therefore answers the second research question regarding fundamental 
dimensions of a discursive epistemology of strategizing.  
 
3.4 SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 
The case study is of BHP Billiton’s (BHP) attempt to acquire and merge its operations 
with Rio Tinto (Rio), which would have created a company with a combined market 
capitalization of US$350Bn at the time of the announcement. In spite of the refusal of 
Rio’s leadership to support it, BHP pursued the proposed transaction from its 
announcement in November 2007 until its abandonment in November 2008.  
A multi-modal discourse analytic framework (Iedema, 2007; Kress, 2010; Kress and 
Van Leeuwen, 2001) was adopted. Extensive data was collected pertaining to the 
period between November 2007 and 2008, including annual reports, newsletters, 
corporate videos, press releases and communications to shareholders, as well as slides 
and full transcripts of key presentations.  
The data collected enabled the identification of a broad range of discursive practices, 
actors, constructs and broader discourses that were apparent during the acquisition 
attempt. Patterns and relationships among these units of analysis were analyzed over 
six stages. This allowed the identification of the variety of modes used under each 
construct, the combinations of rhetorical strategies used under each mode, and the 
significance and impact of modes and rhetorical strategies. It also enabled the 
identification of the role of external actors and broader discourses in the acquisition 
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discourse. Lastly, the insights of the case were used to develop a discursive 
perspective on the epistemology of strategizing. 
The next chapter shows the findings from the case study. It commences with 
developing a structure of the pre-acquisition discourse based on the actors, key 
constructs and discursive practices. This is followed by showing how actors 
constructed discourses of the future and the context in the pre-acquisition discourse. 
It then proceeds with a detailed analysis of the negotiation of meaning of the key 
constructs.  
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4 ANALYSIS OF THE ACQUISITION DISCOURSE  
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the findings of pre-acquisition discourse analysis. As Table 4.1 
suggests, the pre-acquisition discourse can be subdivided in two distinct but 
connected parts. The first part centers on the interests of shareholders and BHP 
leadership, which are reflected in the constructs of additional value pool and fair share 
exchange ratio. The second part centers on competition regulators and their role of 
managing the impact on competition.  
Table 4-1: Structure of the Acquisition Discourse 
Actors Key constructs 
• Decision makers:  
Shareholders  
BHP leadership 
 
• Main influencers: 
o Rio leadership 
o Mining analysts 
o Media 
• Additional value pool  
(resulting from formation of a super-major that can 
capitalize on demand trends) 
• Fair share exchange ratio  
(to distribute the additional value pool).  
• Decision makers:  
Competition regulators 
 
• Main influencers: 
o Customers  
o Media 
• Impact on competition  
(based on market share,  and the ability to get 
more product to market more quickly)  
 
First, the findings will identify and discuss the key actors and discursive practices they 
brought to bear as they enacted the acquisition discourse. Then the chapter provides 
an overview of how actors discursively constructed the future and key broader 
discourses as part of the pre-acquisition discourse. This is followed by a detailed 
analysis of how actors negotiated meaning for each of three key constructs, and shows 
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how actors drew on multi-modal discursive practices, rhetorical strategies, and 
transgression markers in order to shape outcomes that aligned with their own 
interests. 
 
4.2  KEY ACTORS  
The key actors and their interests emerged from stage 2 and 3 of the analysis of the 
acquisition discourse as it became clear how actors engaged in and influenced the 
structure of the discourse. The most powerful groups of actors enacting the 
acquisition discourse included BHP’s leadership, BHP and Rio shareholders (including 
holders of both Rio and BHP stock:  60% owned shares in both organizations), and 
competition regulators in, for example, the European Community, the US, and 
Australia (see Table 4-1). They derived their power from their ability to decide on the 
proposed acquisition. Although individual shareholders had no such power, a 
sufficiently large group could enable or block the proposed acquisition from 
proceeding. If regulators in important domiciles felt that competition would be 
undermined by the transaction, they  could block the proposed combination or impose 
such onerous conditions that BHP would have to withdraw from the intended 
acquisition.  
Other actors may be able to influence the decision, but could not decide the 
transaction. For example, as many Rio shareholders could be expected to consider the 
recommendation of Rio’s leadership, they were an important influencer. However, Rio 
Tinto’s leadership did not support the proposed acquisition and refused to engage 
with BHP’s leadership. Consequently BHP approached Rio’s shareholders directly, 
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many of whom were also shareholder of BHP itself, and sought their support for the 
proposed transaction. Similarly, suppliers and customers had no direct decision power 
over the potential acquisition but could (and some did) seek to influence the 
competition regulators to avoid excessive influence of the combined organization in 
markets that supply goods or services to the mining industry, or in markets where the 
combined organization would sell its product. Other actors, like analysts and 
journalists, could also impact the discourse and influence decision makers, particularly 
retail investors who sourced much of their information about BHP or Rio from analyst 
or media reports.  
The most important interests of the decision makers (shareholders, BHP leadership, 
and competition regulators) included the impact of the transaction on shareholder 
value, and the impact on competition. In the public acquisition discourse BHP’s 
leadership needed to be seen to act in the interests of BHP shareholders. At the same 
time, they could not be seen to act against the interests of Rio shareholders as these 
could stop the transaction, and because many shareholders held shares in both 
companies. The importance of the interests of all shareholders was reflected in and 
reiterated by the titles of press releases and briefings early in the process. BHP and 
Rio’s main announcements and briefings had titles like ‘Unlocking Value’ (BHP Analyst 
Briefing 12th Nov 2007); ‘BHP Billiton’s Proposed Combination With Rio Tinto To Unlock 
Value’ (BHP Press release 12th Nov 2007); ‘A Matter of Value (Analyst Briefing 12th Dec 
2007); and ‘Delivering Exceptional Growth’ (Rio Investor Seminar 26th Nov 2007). 
These themes were consistently reiterated in public communications. However, while 
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BHP’s leadership emphasized the shareholder value that the acquisition could deliver, 
Rio emphasized that it could deliver similar value without being taken over by BHP.   
The importance of shareholders was further reflected in and reiterated by a slew of 
authorities and rules that shaped how the discourse took place. Some of these had 
formal authority and could enforce adherence to their rules. For example, Rio applied 
to the UK Takeover Panel to impose a ‘put up or shut up’ clause on BHP. This imposed 
a deadline on BHP to progress their intention to acquire Rio to a formal offer within 
two months, or abandon its pursuit of Rio for at least six months. This clause protected 
Rio shareholders from being under a cloud of a potential acquisition for an extended 
period. Other examples included the disclosure rules that were imposed on leadership 
of BHP and Rio, to prevent (or at least minimise) disparate levels of access to 
knowledge. This translated in BHP CEO Kloppers being accompanied by a legal advisor 
when visiting major institutional investors to discuss the acquisition of Rio. 
Stakeholders who played no obvious role in this particular acquisition discourse 
included employees, politicians, and community or environmental groups. This was 
likely due to the absence of nationalistic concerns as both companies were dual listed 
in the UK and in Australia. Also, no significant operational changes were identified 
publicly by these stakeholder groups that would negatively impact employment or the 
environment. 
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4.3 DISCURSIVE PRACTICES OF KEY ACTORS  
The analysis identified a range of discursive practices that these external actors 
brought to bear on the shareholder and regulatory constructs within the acquisition 
discourse as they sought to express support or disagreement with what BHP was 
proposing. These discursive practices acted as cues from the audience to BHP 
indicating whether its presentation of the acquisition discourse had struck a chord or 
would require adaptation. In this way external actors played an active role in 
constructing the acquisition discourse.  
This section identifies the main discursive practices of the decision makers and the 
influencers that were observed in the public acquisition discourse.  The next chapter 
will analyze the different modalities and show in great detail how these discursive 
practices were actually brought to bear on the different constructs that formed the 
structure of the public acquisition discourse, and to what effect. 
DECISION-MAKERS: BHP BILLITON LEADERSHIP 
BHP leadership, as the instigators of the acquisition discourse, had many discursive 
practices they could bring to bear. The list (see table 4.2) illustrates that the choice of 
what constitutes a discursive practice is to some extent arbitrary. As discussed in the 
methodology (see stage 4), what is identified as a practice can be disaggregated into 
sub-practices, or aggregated into a larger practice.  Also, the level of (dis-) aggregation 
into practices is based on a combination of how practices were identified in the raw 
data set and how much aggregation or disaggregation was required for a detailed 
analysis. 
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Table 4-2: Discursive Practices of BHP Leadership 
BHP leadership 
 
• Approach Rio Leadership 
• Announce intent to acquire publicly to stock exchanges 
• Issue press releases 
• Make formal offer 
• Hold analyst briefings 
• Hold briefings for retail stockbrokers 
• Educate analysts 
• Answer or decline questions 
• Reframe issues (e.g. oil valuation) 
• Publish slides and transcripts of briefings 
• Build credibility with presence and/or credentials of 
Board and executives 
• Draw on track record 
• Give/ deny presence to selected information 
• Use slide presentations 
• Create promotional videos 
• Talk up own relative value 
• Meet customers, major shareholders, and regulators 
• Draw on independent experts’ legitimacy 
• Draw on share price history  
• Offer premium 
• Write to shareholders 
• Brief journalists 
• Silence analysts 
• Put share buy-back in place 
• Seek shareholder vote 
 
 
Chapter 6 will explore how these discursive practices were brought to bear on the 
negotiation of meaning in the acquisition discourse.  
DECISION-MAKERS: SHAREHOLDERS 
Share ownership of both Rio and BHP was widely distributed amongst many 
institutional and retail shareholders. The discursive practices they could employ 
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appeared fairly limited in number: the analysis only identified requesting meetings and 
trading shares as discursive practices of shareholders in the public acquisition 
discourse. Large shareholders might have been able to request meetings with BHP or 
other actors, but for the vast majority this was not an option. Nevertheless, the 
analysis showed that the buying or selling of shares at a particular price was one 
discursive practice that was brought to bear by shareholders on the acquisition 
discourse. Within the context of the primacy of shareholder value, the resulting Rio 
and BHP share prices during the episode became a powerful symbol for the 
acceptance or rejection of the proposed acquisition strategy by shareholders.  
DECISION-MAKERS: REGULATORS 
After BHP had made a formal offer to Rio shareholders, the regulatory processes got 
underway and at this point the discursive practices of regulators took on added 
significance. These practices included: the publication of selected information on their 
websites; issuing press releases; requesting submissions on the perceived impact of 
the proposed acquisition on competition in relevant markets; the publication of 
statements of the key issues based on analysis of submissions and a regulators’ own 
inquiries; the publication of their conclusions and reasoning; and the imposition of 
undertakings on the combined organization.  
Moreover, the role of competition regulators was different to that of any of the other 
actors, in that an individual regulator could prevent the acquisition. Not even the 
largest institutional shareholder wielded this sort of influence. Nevertheless, 
regulatory power was constrained by the need to deliver a credible construction of the 
likely impact of the acquisition on competition. This required a regulator to speak to 
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the submissions from actors and weave these into their own analysis of the impact of 
the acquisition on competition in key markets. These submissions from other actors 
therefore shaped the regulators’ discursive practices.  
Table 4-3: Discursive Practices of Regulators 
Regulators 
• Seek submissions 
• Conduct own analysis and investigation 
• Release statement of issues 
• Publish findings and reasoning 
• Seek undertakings 
• Set timeline 
 
INFLUENCERS: RIO TINTO LEADERSHIP 
Rio’s most obvious discursive activity was to develop a rhetorical strategy to support 
its assertion that BHP’s offer significantly undervalued its own assets and prospects. 
According to Rio’s leadership, BHP overestimated its own market opportunities and 
capabilities, while underestimating the opportunities and capabilities of Rio. Rio CEO 
Albanese emphasized its market opportunities predominantly as opportunities in 
aluminium, copper and iron ore where it had an advantage over BHP. Like BHP, Rio 
held analyst seminars, journalist briefings, and organized meetings with major 
shareholders throughout the episode. 
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Table 4-4: Discursive Practices of Rio Tinto Leadership 
Rio leadership 
• Do not endorse BHP offer 
• Refuse to engage  
• Issue press releases 
• Request ‘put up or shut up’ 
• Hold investor seminar 
• Publish slides and transcripts of briefings 
• Brief journalists 
• Build credibility with presence and/or credentials of 
Board and executives 
• Meet major shareholders 
• Draw on track record 
• Draw on independent experts’ legitimacy 
• Give/ deny presence to selected information 
• Use suggestive visuals 
• Talk up own relative value 
• Collaborate with competing capital providers  
• Contest/ support key constructs 
• Organize site visits for journalists 
• Helicopter flight over BHP port with former BHP 
shipping manager 
• Answer or decline questions 
• Reframe issues (e.g. weak balance sheet as bigger 
opportunity to improve) 
 
 
INFLUENCERS: ANALYSTS 
Analysis of analyst seminars and briefings during the episode showed that assertions 
from BHP about both its own and Rio’s opportunities and capabilities, and how these 
were of significance to the proposed acquisition, had to be carefully presented. To 
deviate from analysts’ existing understandings about either company’s opportunities 
or capabilities resulted in an immediate question or rebuke. These took the shape of 
subtle questions seeking more information about an assertion that the analyst was not 
yet willing to accept, or they could be explicit and blunt disagreement. Ongoing 
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disagreement could have resulted in a loss of interpretative legitimacy or credibility of 
BHP leadership and had to be avoided. In addition, analysts also frequently 
commented to journalists, sometimes anonymously.  
Over the course of the first few weeks after the initial announcement by BHP, and 
reflecting the size and complexity of the possible transaction, the top 15 or so major 
global investment banks were hired as advisors to either BHP or Rio. As a consequence 
the discursive practices of analysts working for these banks were significantly 
restricted. They could no longer express any opinions about the proposed acquisition 
due to the potential for a conflict of interest. This removed many highly regarded 
mining analysts from an active role in the acquisition discourse and would have 
reduced the influence that analysts in general would have had on the discourse.  
Table 4-5: Discursive Practices of Analysts 
Mining Analysts 
 
• Publish research (limited by potential conflict of 
interest) 
• Criticize Rio’s refusal to engage in media 
• Brief journalists 
• Report that BHP could increase bid 
• Comment on fairness of bid 
• Confirm or contest key constructs 
• Ask questions to BHP or Rio 
• Suggest relative values 
• Meet fund managers 
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INFLUENCERS: CUSTOMERS 
The analysis identified a number of discursive practices of customers. The obvious 
ones included press statements and submissions to regulators, either individually or 
collectively. Some of the largest customers had meetings with BHP, during which they 
expressed their concerns. To journalists, customers indicated that they might nurture 
their relationships with smaller or new miners to increase their future options.  
By far the strongest symbolic action was the ‘dawn raid’ of 12% of Rio’s London-listed 
shares lead by Chinese government-owned company Chinalco (discussed in some 
more detail later on). Although this would not necessarily prevent the acquisition of 
Rio by BHP altogether, it was generally interpreted as a strong signal that steel 
customers did not accept BHP’s assertion that the acquisition of Rio would benefit 
customers.  
Table 4-6: Discursive Practices of Customers 
Customers 
• Make submissions to regulators 
• Brief journalists 
• Threaten support of smaller miners 
• Buy block of shares to vote against bid 
• Boycott BHP iron ore on spot market 
• Delay issuing import permit for iron ore  
 
 
INFLUENCERS: MEDIA 
The media offered a shared stage for all main actors. Examples include the publication 
by the media of comments from other actors, the attendance at briefings or site visits 
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organized by other actors, or the use of press statements or reports. These practices 
are not a neutral reflection of ‘the acquisition discourse’ but involved selecting, 
evaluating, commenting, and positioning of actors and data. There was no obvious 
attempt by the media to either persuade a particular audience or convince a universal 
audience. Nonetheless, by extensively drawing on a range of widely recognized and 
accepted key actors, the media’s reporting on the acquisition sought to assume a 
sense of authority. 
Table 4-7: Discursive Practices of Media 
Media 
• Select information to publish or ignore
• Confirm or contest key constructs 
• Publish profiles of BHP and Rio CEOs 
 
 
This overview of discursive practices demonstrates that actors do more than simply 
use language when they enacted the pre-acquisition discourse. Later the findings will 
show in great detail how these discursive practices were used in the negotiation of 
meaning of the three key constructs, and what modalities and rhetorical strategies 
were brought to bear through them. However, before doing so the findings will 
provide an overview of how actors discursively constructed the future and the broader 
discourses in the pre-acquisition discourse.  
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4.4 TIME  
As argued in the literature review, strategizing is often identified as a fundamentally 
future oriented activity. The implication of the theoretical framework developed for 
this research is that the meaning of the three key constructs is, amongst others, 
dependent on how the future is discursively constructed in the pre-acquisition 
discourse. Some key examples of how this future-orientation was enacted will be 
discussed here in some detail. This section is therefore structured to provide examples 
for each of the three key constructs. Additional examples can be found later in the 
detailed discussion of how meaning was negotiated for each of the three key 
constructs. 
Table 4-8: Key Constructs and Time 
Key constructs Discursive construction of the future 
Additional value pool Future cost savings (synergies) 
Future revenue increase (synergies) 
Fair share exchange ratio Comparative pipelines 
Future demand in own markets  
Net Present Value 
Impact on competition Vision of more product to market quicker 
Emergence of new iron ore producers 
15 year supply contract with BlueScope 
 
TIME AND THE MEANING OF ADDITIONAL VALUE POOL 
The analysis found that time could not be separated from the negotiation of meaning 
of the additional value pool. The discursive construction of the future cost and 
revenue synergies targeted by the acquisition attempt permeated the calculations of 
the additional value pool. The role of time was straightforward in that it was about 
future savings and revenue increases (see figures below). 
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Figure 4-1: Additional Value from Cost Savings 
 
Source: BHP Billiton, ‘BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto: Unlocking Value’, 12th Nov. 2007 
Figure 4-2: Additional Value from Revenue Enhancement 
 
Source: BHP Billiton, ‘BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto: Unlocking Value’, 12th Nov. 2007 
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The figures explicitly talked about time horizons and indicate actual years when these 
savings and revenue increases are expected. Figure 4-1 summarizes the targeted 
annual cost savings of $1.7B as they build up from year 1 to 3, and continue beyond 
year 3 at the same level. Figure 4-2 summarizes the annual revenue enhancements of 
$2.0B, which would build up from year 4 to year 7. The construct of the additional 
value pool resulted from calculating these cost and revenue synergies and discounting 
their future value in order to determine their present value. The valuation of this pool 
depended not only on the size of cost savings and additional revenues, but also on 
how much these synergies could be brought forward in the discursive construction of 
the future.   
TIME AND THE MEANING OF FAIR SHARE EXCHANGE RATIO  
Time also permeated the construction and negotiation of meaning of the fair share 
exchange ratio. An example during the acquisition discourse was based on their 
project pipelines, which influenced what was seen as the relative value of each 
company. BHP Billiton presented an iconic image of this pipeline (see Fig. 4-3). Each 
bubble represented a separate project in their pipeline, where the size reflected the 
value and the colour the division (which were structured around commodities) that 
owned the project.  
The pipeline is in the shape of a funnel where projects enter on the left and then move 
to the right from future options, to feasibility stage, to execution. These future 
projects of both companies were of critical value to the discursive construction of 
relative value of each company, as they represented an indication of future profit 
streams.  
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Figure 4-3: BHP Project Pipeline 
 
Source: BHP Billiton briefing, 12th December 2007 
Of further importance in the acquisition discourse were the risks involved in the 
realization of these projects. A proximate of this risk was whether it was a greenfield 
(i.e. new) site or a brownfield expansion of an existing asset. The latter was seen to 
present far less risk of delays in delivering the project. 
The importance of pipeline was also emphasized by Rio’s CEO Albanese:  
‘ At a time of strong, sustained demand, the quality of a company's resource 
is critically important, and there has never been a time when a development 
pipeline like ours has been so important to the valuation of a company. So 
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we believe the value of Rio Tinto is not reflected in our share price, nor in BHP 
Billiton's proposal’ 
Rio CEO Albanese, Investment Seminar, 26 November 2007 
 A second example of how time played a major role in the negotiation of meaning of 
the fair share exchange ratio was through expectations of demand and price trends in 
commodity markets of each company. Due to Rio’s purchase of Alcan earlier in 2007, it 
was now the global leader in aluminium, and was much more sensitive to the 
discursive construction of future trends in that market than BHP. This provided Rio the 
opportunity to influence the negotiation of what was consider a fair exchange ratio by 
emphasising positive trends in that market:  
‘ In summary, I'm very excited by the prospects and opportunities for Rio 
Tinto Alcan. Global aluminium demand is growing strongly, currently 
about 7% per year and forecast to remain so, given the expected double-
digit growth rate in China. The price outlook, as I outlined, is structurally 
favourable and supported by fundamentals’ 
Source: Dick Evans - Rio Tinto - Chief Executive Rio Tinto Alcan, Investment Seminar, 
26 November 2007 
The third example relates to the calculation of the net present values. These sorts of 
calculations can be seen to apply to all discussions of monetary value, including that of 
the additional value pool. Such calculations translated expected future value into 
today’s dollars and, as such, enabled to compare not just today’s profits of each 
company, but all expected future profit streams. This connects with, for example, the 
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issue of BHP’s bottleneck in Port Hedland, and the time required to expand its 
infrastructure. Every year longer that this would be perceived to take would impact 
today’s valuation of BHP, and hence what would be seen as a fair share exchange ratio.  
TIME AND THE MEANING OF IMPACT ON COMPETITION 
Time also impacted the meaning of the third key construct, that is, the impact on 
competition. Much of the additional value pool depended on an acceleration of 
tonnage by optimising key mineral basins, assets and infrastructure in the discursive 
construction of the future. Importantly, an accelerated tonnage suggested that the 
acquisition would have a positive effect on supply and hence the future competition in, 
for example, iron ore, coal and diamond markets. 
In addition, the emergence of new iron ore producers also played a role in the 
discursive construction of the future. BHP had argued that emerging iron ore 
producers would erode its future market share and therefore provided a further 
argument that the impact on competition of the acquisition was acceptable. The 
Australian competition regulator acknowledged that demand trends of China and India 
had triggered investment by new iron ore suppliers. However, it was questioned 
whether ‘alternative suppliers would have the ability and incentive to counteract any 
attempt by the merged firm to achieve higher prices’:  
‘it is uncertain whether the threat of new entry is an enduring and effective 
competitive constraint .. few alternative suppliers capable of supplying 
significant quantities of iron ore lump and iron ore fines at a cost that 
would be likely to impose an effective competitive constraint on the merged 
firm’ 
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Source: ACCC, Statement of Issues — BHP Billiton Ltd’s proposed acquisition of Rio 
Tinto Ltd and Rio Tinto plc, 22nd August 2007 
This conclusion signalled that the ACCC was hesitant to allow the acquisition to 
proceed. About a month later BHP committed to a 15 year supply contract with 
BlueScope Steel, the only major steel-maker in the Australian market who did not have 
its own iron ore supply. In doing this BHP removed the risk of a negative impact on 
competition in the Australian iron ore market for the next 15 years, and paved the way 
for the ACCC to accept the proposed acquisition. 
The findings above demonstrated that the discursive construction of the future in the 
pre-acquisition discourse was a critical element in the meaning of each of the three 
key constructs of the acquisition discourse. So much so, that the attempted acquisition 
could not realistically be conceived as a strategic option without this temporal 
dimension.  
TIME HORIZON 
The examples that related to the additional value pool and the fair share exchange 
ratio show how strategizing in regards to combining both companies created more and 
better opportunities. In the first 1-3 years the combined organization was expected to 
achieve a number of annual cost savings. This would be followed by revenue 
enhancements from year 4-7. After that benefits would continue to result from 
combining the project pipelines of the two companies, and optimising the allocation 
resources across the combined pipeline. A time horizon that would only have included 
the immediate cost and revenue synergies, or even the synergies over the initial three 
years, may not have offered adequate additional value to justify the upfront cost of 
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the transaction. Similarly, a more limited time horizon could influence the perceived 
fair share exchange ratio, if the expected future profits of both companies would 
develop at a different pace. Lastly, the examples above also show how the time 
horizon had an impact on the pre-acquisition discourse. In the case of Australia the 
competition regulator signalled that they were hesitant to allow the transaction to 
proceed. However, once BHP signed a supply contract that would ensure competitive 
prices were guaranteed for the next 15 years, the regulator acquiesced and approved 
the transaction. In doing this, the extension of the time horizon made the acquisition a 
strategic option.  
The next section will show how actors discursively constructed and drew on broader 
discourses that provided a context for the acquisition discourse.  
 
4.5 BROADER DISCOURSES 
When BHP CEO Kloppers first presented the case for acquiring Rio Tinto in November 
2007, a number of broader discourses (see Table 4-9) appeared woven into his 
statement. In order to persuade both shareholders and regulators of the merits of the 
acquisition BHP had to present its acquisition discourse in ways that did not contradict 
with its audiences’ ‘world-views’ (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005). Thus, none of these 
broader discourses was controversial with BHP’s key audiences. They included the 
primacy of shareholder value; the strategic drivers of organizational value; long-term 
demand from China and India; the emergence of mining super-majors; and the 
importance of competition in markets.  
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The first four discourses were of particular importance to the negotiation of meaning 
of the additional value pool and the fair share exchange ratio. A variation on the 
broader strategic drivers discourse, and the broader discourse on the importance of 
competition were of particular interest to the meaning of the impact on competition.  
Table 4-9: Key Constructs and Broader Discourses 
Key constructs Broader discourses 
Additional value pool  
Fair share exchange ratio  
 
• Primacy of shareholder value  
• Strategic drivers of organizational value  
(design/ positioning /power schools) 
• Long-term demand from China and India 
• Emergence of mining super-majors 
Impact on competition  
 
• Importance of competition in markets 
• Strategic drivers of organizational value  
(power school)
 
PRIMACY OF SHAREHOLDER VALUE  
The ‘primacy of shareholder value’ discourse implies that managers are agents of 
shareholders, and that a company’s strategy - above all else – must maximize value to 
shareholders (Green et al., 2008; Lok, 2010). 
This perspective was deeply embedded in the communications of BHP’s leadership 
related to the proposed acquisition of Rio. For example, the title of BHP’s press release 
was ‘BHP Billiton’s proposed combination with Rio Tinto to unlock value’ (BHP Billiton, 
2007d). This document, and the subsequent analyst presentations (BHP Billiton, c) 
made it clear that value in this context means shareholder value, and suggests that the 
driver behind the acquisition was the creation of such value. The title page of the 
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presentation and the first page of the transcript (see Figure 4-4) illustrate the primacy 
of this broader discourse.  
Figure 4-4: Primacy of Shareholder Value 
 
Source: BHP Billiton, Analyst Presentation 12th Dec 2007 
Similarly, Rio Tinto’s leadership had to appeal to the same audience and weave in the 
same broader contextual discourses. Its response to BHP came in the form of an 
investor seminar entitled ‘Delivering Exceptional Growth’ (Rio Tinto, 2007). The title of 
the first slide, which had an overview of the presentation, stated that for Rio’s 
leadership ‘It is all about value’.  
Both the arguments in favor and against the proposed acquisition were cast 
consistently by BHP’s and Rio’s leadership (and others who aimed to influence 
shareholders) in terms of superiority in shareholder value delivery.  
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STRATEGIC DRIVERS OF ORGANIZATIONAL VALUE  
The broader discourse on strategic drivers of organizational value relates to what is 
seen to constitute an effective strategy for companies. As the literature review of 
strategy theory showed, the ‘Classic’ (Whittington, 2001) or dominant design and 
positioning schools of strategy see strategizing as creating a fit or alignment between 
(external) market opportunities, and an organization’s (internal) capabilities 
(Mintzberg et al., 1998). To maximize the perception of value, both BHP and Rio had to 
argue that their strategies are ‘better’ than those of the other company. This meant 
that they argued that their organizational capabilities were stronger, and the market 
opportunities more attractive. Hence, Kloppers asserted that BHP was more capable 
than Rio in exploiting such market opportunities. In addition, the perception of the 
relative opportunities available to BHP versus Rio, or their relative organizational 
capability, was important as these influenced the perception of how much potential 
future value each would bring to a combined organization. This in turn impacted what 
was perceived as a fair value. Therefore, to create a perception of superiority during 
the attempted acquisition, BHP leadership would benefit from emphasizing 
opportunities in those markets where BHP was perceived to have an advantage over 
Rio. The detailed analysis of the negotiation of meaning later in the chapter includes a 
number of specific examples of how actors tried to influence the perception of the 
relative market opportunities and organizational capabilities. 
From the perspective of the power school of strategy, the key strategic driver of 
organizational value is the result of accumulating and using power (Mintzberg et al., 
1998), including pricing power. This part of the broader discourse of drivers of 
organizational value was brought up by customers and analysts, but was denied by 
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BHP CEO Kloppers, as it would create a conflict with the discourse on the importance 
of competition (discussed later).   
Another part of the broader discourse of what drives strategic value includes the 
debate on diversification versus specialization. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
this played out in the acquisition discourse through different perceptions of the 
suitability of combining mining and oil & gas resources assets in one company. Actors 
drew on this particular broader discourse when negotiating the meaning of key 
constructs as BHP did while Rio did not have oil & gas assets.  
LONG-TERM DEMAND FROM CHINA AND INDIA  
At the time of the announcement, there was a general expectation and consensus that 
there would be a multi-decade high economic growth of two of the largest countries in 
the world, China and India, which would generate a strong demand for mining 
products. BHP CEO Kloppers emphasized that ‘In order to understand the most 
fundamental reason why we are interested in this combination [of BHP and Rio] we 
have to start with the demand for our products.’ (BHP Billiton, 2007b). Other actors 
throughout the episode corroborate that they also accepted the broader discourse of 
extensive future economic growth in China and India.  
EMERGENCE OF MINING SUPER-MAJORS  
A fourth broader discourse that was woven into the acquisition discourse was the 
emergence of mining super majors. This emergence would be the result of a mining 
industry consolidation and lead to fewer, larger and more influential mining 
companies. According to PriceWaterhouseCoopers: 
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‘The mining industry is experiencing an unprecedented period of change 
driven by M&A activity that is running at record highs at all levels of the 
sector. The very biggest companies are positioning themselves to achieve 
superconsolidated global scale.’ (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2008, p.3). 
This perception was echoed by BHP’s Kloppers. The fourth section of his presentation 
to explain BHP’s pursuit of Rio was labeled ‘Creating a minerals industry ‘super-major’. 
In it Kloppers described what a combined BHP-Rio would look like, how this would 
make the company stronger, how it would rank in the top five in the world in terms of 
market value, and how it would become the largest metals and mining company (BHP 
Billiton, 2007b, see figure below). 
Figure 4-5: Becoming a Mining-Super-Major 
 
Source: BHP Billiton, Analyst Presentation 12th Nov 2007 
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IMPORTANCE OF COMPETITION  
The importance of competition has been the bedrock principle of western free market 
economies since Adam Smith (Smith, 1776). His metaphor of the invisible hand 
provided the central device that enabled bridging the gap from individuals pursuing 
their self interest to achieving societal benefits. This, so the theory goes, is due to 
competition. The institutionalization of the importance of competition in, amongst 
others, powerful competition regulators, reflects the ongoing currency and 
importance of this broader contextual discourse.  
From the initial announcement of its intent to acquire Rio, BHP’s leadership 
acknowledged the need to satisfy key competition regulators by referring to its 
‘thorough analysis of the anti-trust implications of this combination and [BHP] is 
confident that anti-trust issues present no significant barriers to completing the 
proposed transaction, and that any possible regulatory concerns can be readily 
addressed’ (BHP Billiton, 2007c) .  
BHP wove the importance of competition and the other broader discourses into the 
fabric of the acquisition discourse. They had a direct impact in that they provided the 
basis for the key constructs that were specifically used to persuade shareholders and 
regulators that BHP’s acquisition of Rio should go ahead (see Table 4-9).  
CONTEXT HORIZONS 
The broader discourses that were identified above show how the pre-acquisition 
discourse was extensively shaped by discourses that also existed beyond BHP, Rio or 
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their proposed combination. Some of these broader discourses permeated societal 
discourse extensively. In particular, discourses of shareholder value and the 
importance of competition are broader societal discourses that have been 
institutionalised and are enacted in many different ways. Actors discursively 
constructed these broader discourses in the pre-acquisition discourse in a way that 
aligned with their interest. However, as these discourses are institutionalised and 
enacted extensively,their construction within the pre-acquisition discourse had to 
cohere with the world view of important actors in order to be accepted. This reduced 
the ability of actors in the pre-acquisition discourse to deviate significantly from 
established patterns of enactments. Some of the other broader discourses identified 
above are not as broad. For example, the discourse on the emergence of mining super-
majors pertains more narrowly to mining, rather than society at large. This created 
fewer restrictions for actors to discursively construct that broader discourse in novel 
ways in the pre-acquisition discourse. Also, as the acquisition of Rio by BHP would 
have created the largest mining company in the world, it would have had a significant 
influence on how that broader discourse is enacted and constructed beyond the limits 
of this particular pre-acquisition discourse. 
In addition to the examples above, other actors at lower levels in BHP and Rio, were 
also brought into the pre-acquisition discourse, but only drew on narrower contextual 
discourses. For example, Mike Yeager, BHP’s Chief Executive Petroleum, presented on 
the market opportunities in petroleum (BHP Billiton, 2008), while Sam Walsh, Chief 
Executive Rio Tinto Iron Ore, drew on iron ore market discourses (Rio Tinto, 2007). Rio 
also brought in Mike Spreadborough, its General Manager for Coastal Operations in its 
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main iron ore production region in Western Australia. Spreadborough presented on 
expected iron ore production growth in that region (Rio Tinto, 2008). These examples 
illustrate that lower level managers drew on narrower contexts and assessed whether 
the acquisition appeared to make sense in that narrow context or not. The narrower 
contexts could only partially evaluate the merit of the proposed acquisition. In 
contrast, CEOs discursively constructed the broadest contexts and drew on those 
contexts to argue whether the acquisition would make sense or not. Combining BHP 
and Rio in full could only emerge as a strategic option if the context was extended 
enough to include the broader discourses described earlier.  
How actors argued the merit (or lack thereof) of the acquisition is shown in the next 
section. That section will show in detail how the meaning of the three key constructs 
was negotiated, with an emphasis on the use of multimodal discursive practices and 
rhetorical strategies by the different actors.  
 
4.6 CONSTRUCTS 
The three constructs that emerged from the analysis foregrounded the interests of 
decision makers, and formed the structure of the pre-acquisition discourse. This next 
part of the findings will show how meaning across the three constructs of the pre-
acquisition discourse was negotiated by showing how actors drew on linguistic and 
non-linguistic modes in order to bring to bear rhetorical strategies and exert influence. 
In doing so, the analysis illustrates how the meaning of the three key constructs either 
converged or diverged over the twelve month period. This involves showing how, in 
the case of the additional value pool, external actors accepted from the beginning of 
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the attempted acquisition the assertions made in regards to the creation of value, and 
converged with internal actors. The analysis then shows how in the case of the fair 
share exchange ratio it took some time before the internal actors converged with the 
external actors, by increasing the offer for Rio shares. Finally the analysis outlines how 
internal and external actors continued to diverge on the acquisition’s likely impact on 
competition.  
ADDITIONAL VALUE POOL: EXTERNAL ACTORS ACCEPT PROPOSED MEANING  
An initial construct to persuade shareholders that the acquisition should proceed was 
the construct of an additional value pool and reflected the interests of shareholders. 
On November 12, 2007 BHP leadership issued an 18 page statement, which explained 
their intent to acquire Rio (Table 4-10). This practice combined the mode of writing 
and non-linguistic mode of financial and numeric indicators. Specifically, the statement 
included a financial indicator for the additional value pool that would result from 
bringing the organizations together, estimated to be US$3.7 billion per annum. 
Rhetorically, the document went into great detail to explain the logic of the 
transaction (logos) and invoked the authority (ethos) of independent financial 
advisers, that is, KPMG and Goldman Sachs, who wrote that the statement by BHP was 
made with due care and consideration.  
BHP leadership held an initial analyst briefing straight after issuing its written 
statement. The briefing encapsulated a large number of practices including conducting 
a presentation, distributing slides, using teleconference technology, and inviting and 
responding to questions. These practices drew on a range of modes, in particular 
writing, speech, imagery, location, and financial and numerical indicators. BHP 
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leadership had titled the presentation ‘BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto: Unlocking Value’. 
This title captured the key point of the briefing accurately, that is, a combination of the 
two organizations would create substantial synergies and hence ‘unlock’ an additional 
value pool for shareholders. BHP leadership continuously reinforced this construct and 
the underlying logic of the acquisition throughout the presentation (logos): 15 of the 
31 content slides used in the briefing referred back to the construct of additional value 
pool. Figure 4-6 showed an example where the proximity of BHP and Rio mining or 
infrastructure assets was visually represented using a map to suggest potential 
synergies across assets. This visual representation also drew on ethos: what the map  
Table 4-10: Influencing the Meaning of Additional Value Pool 
Timing Actor Examples of discursive 
practices (in approximate 
temporal order)  
Modes  Convergence/ 
divergence of 
meaning  
Nov 07 BHP leaders Announce intent to acquire 
Rio to stock exchange 
Writing, indicators Significant additional 
value pool expected  
(US$3.7 billion per 
annum in quantified 
synergies) 
Nov 07 BHP leaders Draw on report of 
independent advisors who 
estimated additional value 
pool  
Speech, writing, indicators 
Nov 07 BHP leaders Hold  initial analyst briefing 
entitled ‘BHP Billiton and Rio 
Tinto: Unlocking Value’
Speech, writing, 
indicators, imagery, 
location
Nov 07 Analysts Ask questions at BHP’s 
briefing 
Speech, indicators, Value pool larger 
than BHP indicated
Nov 07  BHP leaders Release short videos with 
BHP leaders  
Speech, moving imagery, 
music 
Significant additional 
value pool from 
‘exciting’ 
combination of 
companies 
Nov07-
Nov08 
Media Select information to publish 
or ignore 
Writing, imagery, speech, 
indicators, video 
Significant additional 
value pool confirmed 
by reliable sources
Nov 07 Rio leaders Hold an investor seminar (i.e. 
analyst briefing) 
Speech, writing, 
indicators, imagery, 
location 
Most of claimed 
value not additional, 
but already present 
in Rio 
Nov-
Dec 07 
BHP leaders Visit major shareholders Location, speech; (other 
modes unknown)
Acceptance of 
additional value pool
Nov07-
Feb08 
Shareholders Buy/ sell shares at higher 
absolute value 
Indicator Significant additional 
value pool likely
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Figure 4-6: Additional Value from Combining Assets 
 
Source: BHP Billiton, Analyst Presentation 12th Nov 2007 
with small circles implied was that the audience did not have to rely on the authority 
of BHP (or even KPMG or Goldman Sachs), but could ‘see’ the potential for synergies 
with their own eyes.  
The presentation by the then CEO of BHP, Marius Kloppers, during the analyst briefing 
included a range of other authorities in footnotes as sources for data that underpinned 
assumptions like market growth, including the IMF, World Bank, and the OECD. This 
suggested that BHP’s underlying analysis was trustworthy (ethos) and supported 
claims of future demand levels. On occasion, Kloppers did refer verbally to BHP’s own 
authority. For example, he mentioned BHP’s success with the integration of a previous 
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acquisition and claimed authority (ethos) for BHP’s ability to manage large, complex 
acquisitions. Further, in his opening remarks for the analyst briefing, BHP’s Chairman 
made a point of expressing the highest regard for Rio and its people, describing it as a 
‘fine organisation with excellent assets’.  BHP CEO Kloppers equally praised Rio in his 
presentation. These compliments were more effusive in speech than in writing. The 
compliments used the rhetorical strategy of pathos, in that they acknowledged people 
associated with Rio, and as a consequence might make them more accepting of a 
potentially hostile acquisition. Overall however, the most prevalent rhetorical strategy 
for this initial presentation was logos, stemming from the modes of speech, writing, 
imagery, and indicators.  
Other discursive practices that were brought to bear on the construct of additional 
value pool included questions from analysts at the end of the initial analyst briefing. 
For example, one unidentified analyst commenced his question by stating: ‘I certainly 
agree with you about the uplift to shareholder value for both sets of shareholders. I 
would probably describe it as obscene’. The comment illustrated an immediate 
acceptance by the analyst of the proclaimed additional value pool, and used pathos. 
The analyst’s position of authority (ethos) derived from his connection with a 
reputable investment bank or share broking firm (a condition of entry to the briefing).  
As mentioned earlier, the meaning of constructs resulted from the discursive practices 
brought to bear by all key actors, not just BHP leadership. For example, Rio’s 
leadership held an investor seminar, using the same modes as BHP had used in its 
analyst briefing. The then CEO of Rio, Tom Albanese, argued that the supposed 
additional value pool was value that was already present within Rio, and would be 
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delivered regardless of an acquisition. This value, according to Albanese, had not been 
reflected fairly in Rio’s share price before. As evidence, he presented slides (using 
speech, writing, imagery and indicators) that employed logos and ethos to argue his 
point.  
Like BHP’s briefing, Rio’s seminar also included the practice of analysts asking 
questions. At the seminar a UBS mining analyst prefaced his question on synergies 
stating; ‘Just wondering, clearly, if you put BHP and Rio side by side, which you've 
done and they have, it looks like they understate the cost savings and the benefits of 
bringing [BHP and Rio] together’. Albanese responded that, ‘prior experiences of 
putting together these types of businesses .. [showed] that as you get into it more, you 
can find more opportunities. And I wouldn't doubt that that's the case’. In contrast to 
the writing and speech of Albanese’s carefully scripted (formal) presentation, the 
response showed that he, like the analyst, agreed that further opportunities for 
synergies existed.  
Location also featured as a mode in the acquisition discourse. For example, after the 
initial announcement, BHP CEO Kloppers visited a number of major shareholders. 
These people were in a range of different geographic locations, and making the effort 
to afford them a face-to-face meeting communicated that they were important to BHP 
(pathos), and that their opinion was highly regarded and worth significant effort on 
behalf of Kloppers. According to Kloppers, confirmed by statements in the media, 
these shareholders agreed that a combined organization could unlock significant 
additional value. In an illustrative statement in the Australian BT Financial Group’s 
resources portfolio manager said, 'there are clearly synergies involved, not the least of 
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which are two companies trying to expand as quickly as possible in a market without 
enough engineers and everything else' (the Australian Financial Review, 10th 
November 2007).  
Evidenced by the London and Sydney stock exchanges, shareholders expressed their 
acceptance of the construct of additional value pool through the trading that occurred. 
Additional value was obvious and immediate for Rio shareholders, as they would 
receive a premium for their shares if the transaction were to proceed, and pricing shot 
up after BHP’s announcement. Just how much BHP shareholders would receive of this 
additional value, depended on the price paid for Rio shares. Consequently, the second 
key construct that shaped the acquisition discourse related to the issue of price.  
FAIR SHARE EXCHANGE RATIO: INTERNAL ACTORS CONVERGE WITH EXTERNAL 
ACTORS  
A second construct aimed at shareholders was that of a fair share exchange ratio. This 
construct determined how the anticipated additional value pool would be divided 
between BHP and Rio shareholders. The idea of fairness did not mean to suggest that, 
for example, a holder of BHP shares would have any concern for a Rio shareholder 
getting a fair share, or vice versa. It only referred to the balance that needed to be 
achieved to be able to gain the support of each set of shareholders. For example, BHP 
leadership could not publicly tell its own shareholders that they made a ‘low ball’ offer 
for Rio, as Rio shareholder would then know they should hold out for more. Also, BHP 
leadership could not tell Rio shareholders that they were getting all the additional 
value generated by the transaction, as BHP shareholders would then reject the 
transaction. Shareholders who held a comparable volume of share of both companies 
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would be less sensitive to any agreed price: what they would lose as a vendor of 
shares, they would gain as a buyer, or vice versa. 
For this particular acquisition BHP only proposed to exchange BHP shares for the Rio 
shares, and not pay cash. What was considered a fair share exchange ratio depended 
on how shareholders perceived the relative market value of each of the two 
companies. Stage 2 of the data analysis identified how the construct resulted from 
each company’s opportunities and ability to exploit those opportunities (second order 
themes). No single actor could dictate how a company needed to be valued, and 
actors had to align their arguments with the broader discourse on strategic drivers of 
organizational value.  Consequently the acquisition discourse was permeated by 
references to market opportunities and organizational capabilities. As Rio and BHP had 
a significant overlap of markets that they served, the emphasis of the acquisition 
discourse was not on their absolute exposure to different market opportunities but on 
where their exposure differed.  
Whereas other external actors agreed with BHP leaders on the meaning of the 
additional value pool, they did not do so regarding fair share exchange ratio. BHP 
leaders accepted that if the M&A was to move forward it would have to meet the 
expectations of these other actors – particularly shareholders – regarding what they 
saw as a fair price. Three months into the period covered by this study, they therefore 
raised the offer price.  
To appreciate those parts of the acquisition discourse that relate to the acquisition 
price, it is important to note that BHP proposed an all-scrip transaction. This meant 
that no cash was to change hands and only shares were to be exchanged. If BHP 
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leaders could lift the perceived value of BHP compared to the perceived value of Rio, 
then BHP would have to offer less BHP shares for each Rio share. Both BHP and Rio 
operated in many of the same commodity markets. If these markets were expected to 
go up or down, this would impact on the perceived value of both organizations. The 
extent to which the relative value would be impacted depended on the relative 
exposure of the companies to the different markets, and their perceived ability to 
exploit these markets. Therefore, to create a perception of superiority during the 
attempted acquisition, BHP leadership would benefit from giving most presence to the 
discussion of opportunities where BHP had an advantage.  
A broad range of discursive practices shaped the acquisition discourse where it 
pertained to the exchange ratio of BHP and Rio shares (see Table 4-11). One key 
discursive practice that influenced the share exchange ratio offered by BHP was the 
buying and selling of shares by shareholders. In the months prior to the acquisition 
announcement in November 2007, share prices fluctuated around a relative value of 
about 2.4 BHP shares for each Rio share. Using the mode of indicator, BHP’s leadership 
referred to this baseline when they announced BHP’s intent to acquire Rio: ‘based on 
the 30-day figures prior to when the approach was made, [our proposed ratio of 3.0] 
values Rio Tinto at $153 billion; that is a 28% uplift to the volume weighted average 
closing price.’ (Kloppers, Analyst Briefing12th November 2007). From a rhetorical 
perspective this means that Kloppers drew on the authority (ethos) of the share 
market, which set the ratio at 2.4, to provide evidence that an offer of 3.0 provided a 
significant premium to Rio shareholders.  
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A further discursive practice pertains to an analyst briefing organized by BHP in 
December, 2007.  Here BHP’s leadership argued its case by pointing out the relative 
opportunities of BHP and Rio, and their respective track records in delivering 
shareholder value. For example, when discussing the relative value of BHP versus Rio, 
Kloppers used speech to communicate sarcastically that, ‘the way that Rio Tinto 
presented the results counts all of the joint venture tonnage, ignoring ownership. We 
prefer, conventionally, to count only the things we own’ (Analyst Briefing 12th 
December 2007). The implication was that Rio had exaggerated its own value and the 
market should recognize that in the relative valuation of both companies. In this 
instance then, Kloppers was drawing on the apparent logic of only counting what you 
own (logos), while using sarcastic speech that undermined the authority (ethos) of 
Rio’s leadership.  
The practices that were brought to bear on the discourse by Rio’s leadership included 
a refusal to engage with BHP, and an investor seminar in which they rejected a share 
exchange ratio of 3.0. This refusal to engage with BHP drew its authority (ethos) and 
thus influence from Rio leadership as the major protector of the value of Rio’s shares. 
In the seminar Rio’s leadership argued that its market opportunities and capabilities 
justified a more advantageous ratio for Rio shareholders. For example, using the mode 
of speech while avoiding a precise indicator, Rio CEO Albanese stated that the offer 
from BHP was ‘two ballparks down the road’, suggesting that he felt that the offer was 
highly inadequate. This may well have been a deliberate attempt to appear ‘genuinely’ 
offended by the offer, but even if this were the case, it reflected the use of pathos 
(manufactured or not) by Albanese.  
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Table 4-11: Influencing the Meaning of Fair Share Exchange Ratio 
Timing Actor Examples of discursive 
practices 
(in approximate temporal 
order)  
Modes  Convergence/ 
divergence of meaning
Nov 07 BHP leaders Announce intent to acquire Rio 
at 3.0 BHP shares per Rio share 
(based on 2.4 pre-approach 
ratio) 
Writing, indicators Suggest ratio of 3.0 
BHP shares per Rio 
share present a 
premium  
Nov-
Dec 07 
BHP leaders Hold  initial analyst briefings Speech, writing, indicators, 
imagery, location
Nov07-
Nov08 
Rio leaders Refuse to engage directly with 
BHP leaders 
No modes used in direct 
engagement
Ratio of 3.0 is not in 
the ‘ballpark’ 
Nov 07 Rio leaders Hold an investor seminar (i.e. 
analyst briefing) 
Speech, writing, indicators, 
imagery, location
Nov-
Dec 07 
Analysts Ask questions at briefings Speech, indicators Ratio should be around 
3.4 - 3.5 
Nov07 Analysts Suggest fair share exchange 
ratio through media
Indicators, speech
Nov07-
Nov08 
Media Select information to publish or 
ignore 
Writing, imagery, speech, 
indicators
Nov07-
Feb08 
Shareholders Buy/ sell shares of BHP and Rio
at particular ratio 
Indicator Shares traded at about 
3.4 
Nov-
Dec 07 
BHP leaders Visit major shareholders Speech, location 
(other modes unknown)
Still suggesting ratio of 
3.0 
Dec07-
July08 
BHP and Rio 
leaders 
Letters to shareholders Writing, indicators BHP suggests 3.4 is 
generous; Rio suggests 
3.4 is inadequate
Jan08-
Nov08 
BHP and Rio 
leaders 
Organise site visits Speech, writing, indicators, 
imagery, location
BHP pushes ratio down
Rio pushes ratio up
Jan08 Rio leaders Fly journalists over BHP port 
with former BHP shipping 
manager who points out BHP 
bottleneck 
Location, imagery, speech, 
indicators 
Ratio should be above 
3.4, at which the 
shares are currently 
traded 
Feb08 BHP leaders Make formal offer of 3.4 Speech, writing, indicators, 
imagery
Align with ratio of  3.4 
May08 BHP leaders Hold oil education seminar Speech, writing, indicators, 
imagery, location 
BHP suggests 3.4 is 
generous as its oil 
business is 
undervalued by market
 
Analysts and journalists had no obvious shared interest in persuading actors one way 
or another in the outcome of the acquisition discourse. Questions from analysts at the 
briefings of both BHP and Rio indicated that they agreed that a share exchange ratio of 
3.0 might not be adequate and would need to be revised upwards. This is confirmed 
afterwards by comments from analysts and selected by the media that indicated that a 
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fair exchange could be around the 3.4 or 3.5 of BHP shares for each Rio share. For 
example, according to Stock Resource mining analyst Steve Bartrop: 
There is an expectation that [BHP] will have to lift it ... and 3.5 looks a reasonable limit, 
but above that and [they] give away too much to Rio (Dow Jones Chinese Financial 
Wire, 15th January 2008). 
For both analysts and journalists the potential influence of comments like these 
resulted foremost from the level of authority (ethos) that their audiences assigned to 
them. 
Other discursive practices included letters to shareholders from the respective 
Chairmen of BHP and Rio. From a content perspective these letters contained no new 
information beyond what was publicly already available. Also, the letters were fairly 
short and did not repeat the argument for (in the case of BHP’s letters) or against 
(Rio’s letters) in great detail. The purpose of the letters therefore seemed to be, at 
least in part, to pay attention to the individual relationship with all shareholders by 
providing a personalised communication, rather than only speaking through mass 
media. Writing the letters can be seen as attempts by both BHP and Rio leadership to 
draw on the rhetorical strategy of pathos and nurture their relationship with 
shareholders, as only the largest shareholders could be visited in person.  
Also in evidence were discursive practices that used location as a mode, notably site 
visits that allowed either journalists or analysts to learn more about company 
operations, while offering the company an opportunity to espouse its own views and 
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perspectives to a captive audience, demonstrate some of its capabilities in situ, and 
develop relationships.  
Overall, what shareholders had been communicating since BHP’s announcement in 
November 2007 through share transactions was that the initial offer of 3 BHP shares 
for each Rio share was too low. BHP leadership clearly took note of this response. For 
example, BHP’s CEO Kloppers interpreted the resulting share price ratio explicitly as a 
judgment of the success or failure of discursive practices to persuade investors. He 
repeatedly used a graph that plotted the share price ratio over time, a combination of 
the modes of imagery and indicators, to explain shifts in the ratio (see Figure 4-7). As 
the share price was, in effect, a proxy for shareholder views, and these actors would, 
in the end, decide on the proposed transaction, it can be seen as embodying an 
ultimate authority (ethos) whose signals could not be ignored. Once it became clear 
that the market was unlikely to accept the proposed 3.0 BHP shares per Rio share, BHP 
leadership could either choose to increase its offer or abandon the acquisition 
attempt, and in February 2008 Kloppers announced BHP’s formal offer of 3.4 shares 
for every Rio share.  
Following this formal offer, BHP kept up the pressure on the share exchange ratio by 
reinforcing its alleged superior exposure to opportunities and capabilities through 
various discursive practices. This included a briefing on its oil business in May 2008. 
During the briefing BHP tried to reframe how its oil business should be valued. 
Specifically, BHP’s CEO Kloppers argued that current reporting practices undervalued 
the reserves of his petroleum business, and tried to change how analysts valued BHP 
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Petroleum (this will be discussed in detail later on when discussing the use of 
calculative devices).  
Figure 4-7: Discursive Practices and Share Price Development 
 
Note: this image has been adapted to enable (black and white) print 
The formal offer in February 2008 appears to have brought BHP close to, or within the 
range of, the share exchange ratio needed to reach support from shareholders. In 
contrast to the initial construct, where actors had accepted BHP’s reasoning on what 
the acquisition would mean for an additional value pool, now BHP leadership had 
aligned itself with the share exchange ratio that shareholders had communicated as 
fair. The meaning of what constitutes a fair share exchange ratio appeared quite fixed, 
and discursive practices after February 2008 did not appear to shift this significantly. 
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Although there was a slow drift downwards of the ratio after April, rather than signify 
change in the perceived fair share exchange ratio, this drift was interpreted by actors 
quoted in the media to signify increasing concern that the regulators may stop the 
acquisition based on concerns of its impact on competition.  
IMPACT ON COMPETITION: INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL ACTORS’ MEANINGS 
DIVERGE   
The second group of actors with decision making powers that had to be persuaded 
that the acquisition should go ahead was competition regulators. For these regulators 
the key construct that reflected their interests was the acquisition’s potential impact 
on competition in the markets that BHP and Rio operated in, within their regulatory 
area of responsibility. These regulators derived their existence and authority in free 
market economies from a broad contextual discourse that accepts the importance of 
competition as a main requirement for a thriving economy. In line with their objective 
to ensure that an acquisition would not significantly reduce competition, they had the 
authority to either reject or impose conditions on proposed mergers or acquisitions. 
The main regulators that BHP had to persuade were the Australian Consumer and 
Competition Commissioner (ACCC), and the European Competition Regulator. China, 
one of the main countries that would be affected by the acquisition, did not have a 
competition regulator at the time of the announcement in November 2007.  
In the case of BHP’s proposed acquisition of Rio, the impact on competition depended 
on two key factors, which emerged as second order themes from the analysis (see 
stage 2, Chapter 2): first, the market share of the combined organization (particularly 
in iron ore), and second, how the proposed acquisition served customer interests by 
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bringing more product to market faster, as opposed to pushing prices up. As both BHP 
and Rio had substantial iron ore operations, much of the discourse on competition 
focused on their combined market strength in iron ore.  
BHP and the regulators failed to reach agreement on what the acquisition would mean 
for competition, leading the European competition regulator to seek undertakings that 
were, in the end, unacceptable to BHP. The analysis showed significant concerns about 
competition related to the iron ore market that were framed by two factors. These 
factors were, first, the iron ore market share that the combined organization would 
have, and second, the assertion that the combined organization would bring more iron 
ore to market faster. In this section the study will describe how BHP’s leadership, 
analysts, media, regulators and customers brought a range of discursive practices to 
bear to define the market share of the merged entity. The study also shows how these 
actors supported or contested the claim that the acquisition would lead to an increase 
and acceleration of the iron ore supply, rather than price gauging. 
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Table 4-12: Influencing the Meaning of Impact on Competition 
Timing Actor Examples of discursive practices
(in approximate temporal order) 
Modes Convergence/ 
divergence of meaning  
Nov07 BHP leaders Announce intent to acquire Rio 
through statement that defines 
iron ore market widely 
Writing, indicators Market share in iron ore 
27%, ie too small to 
impact competition 
More product to market 
faster 
Nov 07 BHP leaders Hold  initial analyst briefings Speech, writing, 
indicators, imagery, 
location 
Nov-Dec 
07 
Analysts Ask questions at briefings Speech, indicators Acquisition will reduce 
competition 
Nov07 Analysts Suggest different ways to define 
the iron ore market through the 
media 
Speech, indicators BHP market share in iron 
ore 39.5% of seaborne 
trade 
Nov07-
Nov08 
Media Select information to publish or 
ignore 
Writing, imagery, 
speech, indicators 
Acquisition likely to 
reduce competition 
Nov07-
Nov08 
Customers 
Suppliers 
Make public statements through 
the media 
Speech
Acquisition would 
definitely reduce 
competition 
Jan08 Customers 
(China) 
Buy Rio shares to influence 
acquisition outcome 
Writing, indicators
Mar-
Jun08 
Customers Make confidential submissions to 
the regulators  
Writing, indicators, 
images, speech 
Acquisition would 
definitely reduce 
competition 
Aug08 BHP leaders Provide independent analysis as 
evidence that price gouging 
would not advantage BHP 
Writing, indicators, 
images 
More product to market 
faster 
Nov07-
Nov08 
Customers Support emerging miners with 
contracts 
Writing, indicators
Confirms that acquisition 
would reduce 
competition 
March08 
onwards 
Customers 
(China) 
Avoid buying iron ore from BHP 
on spot market 
Writing, indicators
After 
March08  
Customers 
(China) 
Delay issuing customs papers to 
hinder BHP export to China 
Location, writing
Jun-Jul08 Regulator Issue statement of facts Writing Acquisition would reduce 
competition 
Sep08 BHP leaders Secure long-term iron ore supply 
for key customer in Australia 
Writing, indicators Competition in 
Australian iron ore 
market secure 
Oct08 Regulator 
(Australia) 
Accept request for acquisition Writing, indicators Competition sufficiently 
secure 
Jul-Nov08 Regulator 
(EU) 
Seek undertakings to safeguard 
competition 
Writing, indicators Competition sufficiently 
secure only if 
undertakings are 
accepted 
 
In the written announcement and the initial analyst briefing, BHP was very precise in 
its wording and relied on indicators to convey the possible impact on competition that 
the acquisition would have. Iron ore was immediately identified as the likely focus of 
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regulatory concerns. BHP asserted that the combined organization would have a 
market share of contestable iron ore sales of approximately 27%, which would decline 
as new players entered the market. A footnote stated that this included domestic 
production in China, which was also contestable. The implication of this number was 
that the market share would be too small for the combined company to have a 
negative impact on competition. BHP implicitly asked its audience to accept the 
asserted market share on BHP’s own authority as it did not offer external confirming 
authoritative sources. An unidentified analyst questioned BHP CEO Kloppers on this, 
stating during the analyst presentation that, ‘It seems that if you control almost all the 
Western Australia iron ore production, you would have the [Chinese] steel industry 
over a barrel’. This was in effect a challenge by the analyst about the veracity of BHP’s 
claims regarding the impact of the proposed M&A on competition. Coming as it did 
from an alternative source of authority (ethos), it immediately threatened Kloppers’ 
persuasive power.  
A range of statements from analysts in the media continued to weaken the 27% 
market share asserted by BHP. For example, a Dow Jones Newswires report quoted an 
unidentified analyst from an investment bank, ‘They've included Chinese production to 
dilute their control of the market. .. It's very clever of them but I don't think it will fool 
anybody.’ (12 November 2007). The report also quoted another analyst who argued 
that the relevant market should include only iron ore that was shipped: 
‘ Using the seaborne trade as a benchmark, BHP and Rio together held a 39.5% share 
in 2006 ... Together with the other giant, Brazil's CVRD ... the three control about 85% 
of the seaborne iron ore trade ’ (Dow Jones Newswires, 12 November 2007). 
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In this instance, the implied logic (logos) was that the acquisition would reduce this to 
only two mining companies who would control nearly all iron ore in the relevant 
market, which would have a significant negative impact on competition.  
The analysis identified how actors with different interests brought to bear discursive 
practices such that the meaning attached to market share was the subject of ongoing 
negotiation. BHP’s leadership preferred a definition that was as broad as possible, as 
this would reduce its perceived market share and therefore its perceived ability to 
exploit that market. Iron ore buyers, who feared market concentration, needed to 
have a narrow definition accepted by regulators as that would increase the chance 
that these regulators would either block the acquisition or impose strict conditions on 
BHP. Mining analysts had no inherent interest in the outcome of the acquisition and 
were likely to have the knowledge and skills necessary to argue what market was 
‘relevant’ for competition. This gave them a significant position of authority (ethos) to 
influence the definition. By drawing on this authority of analysts (ethos), the media 
exerted influence to reject BHP’s attempt to calculate the relevant iron ore market as 
inclusive of Chinese domestic production. 
BHP’s second argument to persuade other actors with an interest in the proposed 
merger that it should go ahead, was that in combination BHP and Rio could bring 
‘more tonnage to customers more quickly than otherwise would have been possible.’ 
(Kloppers, 12 November 2007).  BHP elaborated on this underlying logic (logos) using 
the modes of writing, speech, images, and indicators, and Kloppers suggested it was 
the most important advantage of the acquisition.  
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Customers did not accept this logic, with European and Chinese customers actively 
expressing their rejection using a broad range of discursive practices. Statements to 
the media were frequent, and one newspaper column concluded that, ‘BHP's 
argument that a mega-miner would be beneficial to customers because of increased 
volume growth is rather laughable. This deal is about pricing power.’ (Lex Column, 
Financial Times, 12 December 2007). Rhetorically this column combined ethos derived 
from its reputation, with pathos by calling BHP’s argument laughable.  
At the time, China did not yet have an active competition regulator that its steel 
makers could apply to, but this did not render them without influence. Other 
practices, deployed on behalf of Chinese steel makers, included the support of 
alternative, emerging iron ore miners, avoiding buying from BHP on iron ore spot 
markets, and delaying paperwork required to bring iron ore into China. By far the 
strongest symbolic action was the ‘dawn raid’ of 12% of Rio’s London-listed shares 
lead by Chinese government-owned company Chinalco. Although this would not 
necessarily prevent the acquisition of Rio by BHP altogether, it was generally 
interpreted as a signal that steel customers did not accept BHP’s assertion that the 
acquisition of Rio would benefit customers.   
The most important regulators for approval were the Australian and European 
competition regulators. Both had been accepting written submissions from actors to 
determine the potential impact on competition of the acquisition. Although individual 
submissions were confidential, regulators aggregated and published written 
statements of issues that summarized the submissions. These statements provided a 
PhD Thesis Maurizio Floris 
 Page 173 
detailed account of the reasoning that was likely to underpin its final decision and 
presented a preliminary view.  
The Australian regulator (ACCC) released its written Statement of Issues in August 
2008. It did not accept the broader market definition put forward by BHP but 
emphasized the importance of the seaborne iron ore market for pricing in the 
domestic market, which reflected the reasoning (logos) of analysts in the media.  
However, the ACCC had accepted the reasoning (logos) of BHP that it would not be in 
its interest to restrict supply. Nevertheless, BHP’s market power in Australia would 
enable the company to raise iron ore prices by more than global iron ore prices. 
Although Australia only had two major steel makers, one of whom had its own iron ore 
mine, the second steel maker, BlueScope, could suffer from excessive price increases. 
Consequently the ACCC wanted to investigate some key issues before announcing its 
decision in October 2008. A few weeks after the Statement of Issues had been 
released BHP closed a new 10-year supply contract with BlueScope. The contract 
included new pricing terms that linked price increases to global iron ore prices and 
would prevent price gauging by BHP in the domestic market. In effect, drawing on the 
mode of writing and the substantial authority of a legally binding contract (ethos), BHP 
communicated that it would not be able to unfairly raise prices for BlueScope. This 
appeared to resolve the key concern of the regulator and two weeks later the ACCC 
cleared the way for BHP to acquire Rio. 
The EC Competition Commissioner had issued its written Statement of Issues in July 
2008, earlier than the Australian regulator, but its final decision was not due until 
January 2009. In contrast to the Australian regulator, the statement mirrored the logic 
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of European steel-makers that the acquisition could reduce the supply of iron ore and 
raise prices. To ease these concerns, the EC Competition Commissioner had been in 
discussions with BHP in order to secure certain undertakings, including a commitment 
to divesting itself of selected iron ore mines, should the acquisition be allowed to 
proceed. BHP was required to sign a written contract that would enable the regulator 
to enforce the undertakings through the courts (ethos) if required. Ultimately, these 
undertakings were, in the context of an emerging global financial crisis, the key reason 
offered by BHP for abandoning the acquisition in November 2008, 12 months after the 
initial announcement. 
 
4.7 MULTI-MODAL RHETORIC 
The earlier findings identified a range of discursive practices used by both internal and 
external actors as they negotiated meanings attached to the additional value pool, fair 
share exchange ratio, and impact on competition. As indicated above, evidence was 
found time and time again of how actors – both internal and external - appealed to 
logos, ethos and pathos. Here two examples are drawn from the detailed analysis of 
how these discursive practices brought to bear these rhetorical strategies through 
different modes. 
The first example is the use of short videos by BHP leadership, early on in the period 
under investigation, to promote the merits of the acquisition (see Table 4-13). In the 
videos BHP leaders argued the logic of bringing the organizations together, stating that 
synergies would create shareholder value (‘cost efficiencies could be enormous’); Rio 
shareholders would benefit (from a lift in economic asset value); BHP shareholders 
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would benefit (from cost synergies and faster revenue growth); and further that it 
would be beneficial to customers (who would receive products faster). The logic was 
also supported by showing maps that showed the proximity of sites. Throughout the 
videos it was suggested that this logic was supported by different sources of authority. 
As argued when discussing Figure 4-6, maps implied that the audience did not have to 
rely on the authority of BHP but could ‘see’ the potential for synergies with their own 
eyes, as the geographic proximity of assets was a proxy for this potential. Chairman 
Argus drew on the authority of the share market when he suggested that past share 
prices showed that the share market supported BHP’s ability to successfully integrate 
large companies.  
Further, Argus also used an indicator to draw on the authority of the share market and 
position the BHP offer as ‘a 45% premium’ for Rio shareholders, compared to the pre-
offer share price of Rio. Imagery of professional looking staff and modern mining 
technology further drew on ethos through its suggestion of strong organizational 
capability. Lastly, some of the imagery, as well as the use of music, appeared to aim for 
evoking an emotional response. The use of collaborating and handshaking staff, 
appealing sunsets, underpinned by upbeat futuristic music, suggested that BHP was 
dynamic, forward looking and cared about its people, and that bringing the 
organizations together was an exciting strategy to be part of, for shareholders, 
employees and customers. 
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Table 4-13: Multi-Modal Rhetoric - Create promotional video (BHP) 
Modes and examples Rhetoric Convergence/ 
divergence of 
meaning 
Speech:  
- ‘…[BHP and Rio] ‘… have two operations about 2,000 km from the 
North Pole [that] .. so you have .. these huge diesel inventories 
and  you have huge processing plants. Everything by duplicate 
and .. 30 minute apart. If you run together what you could safe in 
terms of cost efficiencies could be enormous …’  (Chief 
Commercial Officer Calderon) 
 
Logos - Combining the 
companies 
creates value 
from synergies 
- ‘…The Rio shareholders lift from around about 36% of the 
economic asset value to around about 44 and our own 
shareholders get the benefit from not only the synergies but also 
the upside that occurs with being able to deliver things quickly …’ 
(Chairman Argus) 
 
- It is good for 
both sets of 
shareholders 
- ‘… North East Asia needs those products and what we got to be 
able do now is to get the supply chain right so that we can get to 
their markets quickly …’ (Chairman Argus) 
 
- It is good for 
customers 
Imagery: 
- Globe and maps, illustrating close proximity of some Rio and 
BHP assets 
 - Sites are 
neighbouring 
Speech:  
- ‘… If you looked at what happened to our share price since we 
merged with Billiton in 2001, it has just gone through the roof, 
and that to me is indicative of what can happen in this sort of a 
merger …’ (Chairman Argus) 
 
Ethos - The share 
market agrees 
we deliver 
value after a 
major merger 
Indicators: 
‘… We’ve offered a 45% premium ...’ (Chairman Argus) 
 - The pre-offer 
share price 
proves our 
premium 
Imagery:  
- includes footage of modern mining operations (heavy machinery, 
laboratories), and professional looking staff (executives and 
mining site staff) 
- globe and maps, illustrating close proximity of some Rio and BHP 
assets 
 
- We are a world 
class, 
professional 
company 
- See for yourself 
Speech:  
- ‘…Both companies are very good companies, and they’ve got very 
good people and they’ve got very good Boards …’ (Chairman 
Argus) 
- ‘… These are two very good companies, and probably the best 
two mining companies …’ (Chief Commercial Officer Calderon) 
 
Pathos - Prevent 
hostility and 
perception of 
BHP arrogance 
Imagery: 
- Includes imagery of people of mixed ethnicity and gender 
shaking hands and collaborating, beautiful weather and sun sets. 
 
- This will create 
a high energy, 
great place to 
be, full of 
opportunity 
Music:  
- Upbeat,  futuristic music sets a tone of excitement and underpins 
imagery 
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The second example was the use of a helicopter by Rio to fly journalists over BHP’s 
main iron ore port in order to demonstrate that it had a bottleneck and needed Rio’s 
port infrastructure to lift exports (see Table 4-14). Rio drew on logic when describing 
the bottleneck as caused by, amongst other, ‘a tight S-bend’, which BHP could only 
overcome ‘if they had access to our ports’. They also drew on logic by using the 
imagery and location above the port to reinforce the idea of a bottleneck, which made 
‘apparent [that] Rio has the better strategic position’. This drew on this authority by 
enabling journalists to see the bottleneck ‘firsthand’, rather than rely on others. 
Further, with a neat sense of the theatrical, the journalists were accompanied by Rio’s 
Head of Shipping who used to be a BHP manager and could claim authority due to his 
inside knowledge of BHP’s ‘problems’. In addition, authority was also derived from the 
use of indicators, which provided seemingly objective measures for the capacity 
constraints. Lastly, a number of media articles published following the excursion 
contained some evidence of excitement of journalists about the flight, suggesting that 
BHP ‘may need to start booking helicopters’ to match Rio’s ‘cheeky media coup’. 
The analysis of the relationship between linguistic and non-linguistic modes and 
rhetorical strategies showed how a single mode could bring to bear a broad persuasive 
appeal by encompassing all three rhetorical strategies. This was evidenced by the use 
of speech and imagery in the first example, and the use of imagery and location in the 
second example. Conversely it was found that the use of one rhetorical strategy 
(pathos or logos or ethos) could be reinforced when brought to bear by multiple 
modes. 
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Table 4-14: Multi-Modal Rhetoric - Fly Journalists over Port (Rio) 
Modes and examples Rhetoric Convergence/ 
divergence of 
meaning 
Speech:  
- BHP’s port expansion plan ‘is going to be very expensive’ and 
`when is it going to happen?' (Rio iron ore boss Sam Walsh, in 
The Australian, in 17 /1/2008) 
 
Logos - BHP needs Rio 
and 
undervalues 
Rio’s 
contribution to 
additional value 
pool. It  should 
increase the 
offer 
- Rio Tinto's head of shipping ‘… [pointed out] the ``tight S-bend'' 
that the giant iron ore carriers have to negotiate .. the narrow 
channel .. and the lack of space .. which means a ship has to sail 
before a new one can enter the port.’ (A. Trounson, The 
Australian, in 17 /1/2008) 
 
- ‘… “If they had access to our ports, they could de-bottleneck the 
problems they have,'' says [Rio CEO] Albanese …’ ((H.Power, 
20/1/2008, The Sunday Telegraph) 
 
Location/ imagery: 
- ‘… in the helicopter .. it becomes apparent Rio has the better 
strategic position …’ (H.Power, 20/1/2008, The Sunday 
Telegraph) 
 
Speech:  
- The authority of speech of Rio Tinto's head of shipping, Ralph 
Larby, stems in part from his being a former BHP employee 
 
Ethos - We have insider 
knowledge of 
BHP 
Location/ imagery: the location above the port allowed key 
international journalists to  
- ‘… get a first-hand look at the limitations of BHP's port 
facilities ...’(The Financial Times 17/1/2008), rather than rely on 
someone else’s authority. 
 
- Trust your own 
authority (i.e. 
own eyes) 
Indicators:  
- Production capacity and  maximum expandable shipping 
capacity of the BHP’s port (in millions of tonnes) describe the 
capacity needs and port constraints  
 
- The bottleneck 
is a major 
problem for 
BHP 
Location:  The media appeared excited and impressed by the act:  
- ‘… Rio Tinto is pulling out all the stops ... BHP chief executive 
Marius Kloppers may need to start booking helicopters if he 
wants to win this one ...’ (The Financial Times 17/1/2008)  
- ‘a cheeky media coup’ by Rio (A. Trounson, The Australian, in 
17 /1/2008) 
 
Pathos - You (journalists) 
are important 
to us 
 
The examples above show how ethos was reinforced in the first example by speech, 
indicators and imagery; and in the second example how ethos was reinforced through 
the use of speech, imagery, location and indicators. Both broadening and reinforcing 
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particular rhetorical strategies through different modes were visible throughout the 
acquisition discourse. The analysis shows a rich and multi-layered acquisition discourse 
in which the meaning of the three constructs is negotiated by both internal and 
external actors through multiple, overlapping discursive practices that incorporated 
mixed modes and rhetorical strategies. 
 
4.8 CALCULATIVE DEVICES AS BOUNDARY OBJECTS 
This section presents an analysis of the use of calculative devices as boundary objects 
in the pre-acquisition discourse. Boundary objects, as discussed in the literature 
review, are objects that can help transfer, translate and transform knowledge (Carlile, 
2002) between different groups. These findings are presented as four analytical stages 
during which a calculative device emerged and functioned as boundary object 
between different groups. These stages emerged from an iterative process between 
the data and the literature. In the first stage it was analyzed how the interests of 
decision makers of the acquisition discourse determined what constructs would shape 
the acquisition discourse. In the second stage these constructs were translated into 
calculative devices. Once calculable, in the third stage, the calculative devices became 
central to the negotiation between actors. In the fourth stage, the calculative devices 
became increasingly objectified and taken for granted. 
IDENTIFICATION 
The centrality of calculative devices throughout the discourse was established from 
the outset. One of the first things that BHP did upon announcing its intent to combine 
BHP Billiton with Rio Tinto was to organize a briefing for mining analysts. The briefing 
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was structured as a presentation, using a set of slides, and followed by questions from 
analysts. During the presentation 58% of the slides or associated transcript explicitly 
referred to calculated devices, for example, share prices, sales volumes, global 
demand, production volume, cost savings etc. (‘navigational’ slides like front page, 
contents pages etc. were excluded from the analysis). The remaining slides included 
descriptions of the acquisition process, geographical maps of production sites, or 
descriptions of strategy. In the subsequent questions from analysts, 75% of the 
questions related to a calculative device, typically seeking more detail on the 
underpinning assumptions of calculative devices that were presented. Although the 
use of ‘numbers’ was no surprise, the percentages demonstrate that it was all 
encompassing and that it was a critical modality in the enactment of the acquisition 
discourse.  
The identification of calculative devices followed from the structure of the acquisition 
discourse. This structure was dictated, as discussed earlier, by the decision makers in 
the acquisition discourse and the three key constructs that reflected their interests. 
The negotiation of meaning of these constructs was therefore a negotiation about the 
interests of these decision makers. For each of these three constructs a calculative 
device could be identified that rendered the interests of decision makers calculable.  
The analysis of calculative devices showed how different actors used calculative 
devices to shape the discourse that relates to the interests of decision makers. In the 
case of the competition regulators the calculation of market share for the combined 
company was a proxy indicator for the impact that the acquisition may have on 
competition. This calculation of market share was discussed earlier (see section 4.6 
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and Table 4-12). It showed how different actors tried to influence the calculation of 
market share by shaping what was seen as the relevant market for, particularly, iron 
ore.  
The interests of shareholders were seen to be reflected by the impact of the 
acquisition on shareholder value for the different shareholder groups. As the 
acquisition discourse was enacted, the impact of the transaction on shareholder value 
depended on two constructs, that is, the additional value pool and fair share exchange 
ratio. Each of these two constructs was represented by a calculative device that 
rendered the impact of the transaction on each different shareholder group calculable.  
CALCULATION 
The first construct of additional value pool (or total additional shareholder value 
created by the acquisition) was made calculable by adding up the value that would be 
created from a reduction of costs and the value from being able to sell more product 
more quickly by focusing scarce resources on the best opportunities across the two 
organizations, minus the cost of the acquisition. In doing this, the construct became 
represented by a calculative device that quantified the additional value. In the words 
of BHP CEO Kloppers: 
“.. anticipated cost savings of $1.7 billion ... Firstly, there are operating cost 
savings, primarily from economies of scale in operations and procurement 
of goods and services. This would account for approximately half of the 
total cost savings .. Secondly and thirdly, we are combining companies with 
substantial overlap and there are substantial possibilities for ‘deduplication’ 
at the corporate and divisional levels in areas such as head office 
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administration, marketing, exploration, technology, business development, 
and so on, which at approximately one quarter each count for the other 
half of the cost synergy ..”  
Source: Kloppers, Analyst presentation, 12th Nov. 2007 
Similarly, Kloppers spelled out the revenue synergies:  
“.. When we look at the other half of the synergies of $2 billion, that is 
revenue synergies, the most important point to note is that these come from 
volume, not price. The greatest value would be the acceleration of volumes 
from the combined iron ore business made possible by the matching of 
infrastructure, described previously...” 
Source: Kloppers, Analyst presentation, 12th Nov. 2007 
By doing this, Kloppers put forward a calculative device for the construct of additional 
value pool that represented the interests of shareholders (i.e. shareholder value), and 
which could now be calculated and used in the negotiations between relevant actors.  
However, the calculation device for the additional value pool on its own did not meet 
the criteria of ‘common identity’ and ‘plasticity’ for boundary objects (Star and 
Griesemer, 1989). While the expression of the additional value in dollar terms 
provided a common identity for both BHP and Rio shareholders, the impact for each 
group of shareholders – that is, what share of the extra value they would receive – 
depended on the number of BHP shares that would be paid for each Rio share. As the 
acquisition was not predicated on an exchange of cash but an exchange of shares, the 
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construct was rendered calculable as a share exchange ratio, that is, the number of 
BHP shares that would be exchanged for each Rio share.  
The ‘fairness’ of the proposed share exchange ratio was legitimized by drawing on the 
price of Rio shares versus the price of BHP shares. According to Kloppers, the offer 
presented Rio shareholders a premium based on the relative valuation of Rio and BHP 
shares by the stock exchanges in London and Sydney, where the companies were 
listed. Specifically, an ‘[o]verall 28% premium to the combined volume-weighted 
average market capitalisation over the one month pre-approach’, and an ‘[o]verall 15% 
premium based on BHP Billiton’s closing share prices on 9-Nov-2007 and Rio Tinto’s 
combined market capitalisation immediately prior to BHP Billiton’s announcement on 
8-Nov-2007 in response to speculation of a potential offer’.  
The calculative device of share exchange ratio achieved a couple of outcomes. First, as 
before, it rendered the construct of price calculable. Second, the ratio was flexible 
(‘plastic’) enough to allowed each of the different shareholder groups to localize the 
impact of the acquisition for itself, that is, ‘what does it mean for me’. Third, by 
drawing on share prices for BHP and Rio shares (which provided a ‘common identity’ 
across the two sets of shares), it depersonalized the ratio. So instead of Kloppers 
stating that he would offer as little as possible, the ratio was disconnected from his 
personal, subjective opinion and valuation, and connected with the valuation of both 
BHP and Rio shares by ‘the market’, which was construed as objective. This enabled 
the acquisition discourse to shift from a discourse about the conflicting interests of 
BHP and Rio shareholders, to a discourse that was framed as rational and objective. In 
other words, the calculative device of share exchange ratio (through its connection 
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with ‘real’ market prices) was now a boundary object for a discourse that could be 
positioned as rational and objective.   
NEGOTIATION 
The third stage is about the negotiation of the calculative device. This negotiation took 
place on a couple of different fronts, including the different parts that made up each 
calculative device; the method of calculation of these parts; and the interpretation of 
the resulting values. Decision makers and influencers enacted the acquisition 
discourse – and hence the negotiations - through the broad array of discursive 
practices presented earlier.  
Actors had to take into account generally accepted practices or formal codifications for 
the respective calculative devices. For example, the extra value from cost and revenue 
synergies was expressed as EBITDA (Earnings Before Interest, Tax, Depreciation and 
Amortization), a common and tightly prescribed expression of profit. Also, to calculate 
the Share Exchange Ratio, BHP used the ‘volume-weighted average market 
capitalisation over the one month pre-approach’ (see earlier), equally a common and 
prescribed calculation method for the ratio. These habituations and codifications 
therefore reduced the margins of negotiation available to actors.  
Calculative devices were multi-layered in that the calculation was predicated on many 
other calculative devices that underpinned the high level device. For example, the 
calculation of additional value pool required the calculation of (amongst others) 
additional profit, which required the calculation of (amongst others) lower cost, which 
required the calculation of (amongst others) reduction of resource inputs etc. etc.. 
What could be observed in the discourse was that actors ‘dug around’ in these layers 
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and emphasized areas that best represented their interests. Proponents of a higher 
fair share exchange ratio emphasized areas where the contribution from Rio appeared 
stronger that the contribution from BHP. For example, Rio was generally seen as 
having less infrastructure constraints than BHP in one of the most important regions 
(i.e. the Pilbarra in Western Australia) for creating synergies between the two 
companies. This led one of the analysts to preface his question by suggesting BHP CEO 
Kloppers that he needed Rio more than that Rio needed him, and that consequently 
Rio shareholders should be entitled to a larger share of the additional value pool. 
Similarly, proponents of a lower fair share exchange ratio for Rio clamored for 
adequate attention to and inclusion of a penalty for the risk that Rio was exposed to 
due to much higher debt levels. These examples were attempts to change an emphasis 
in one of the layers that constituted the calculative device.  
The analysis showed that the opportunities for bringing new elements into a 
calculative device to influence calculations were restricted during this acquisition 
discourse. Both companies had been publicly listed for decades, were highly 
researched due to their size, operated in one of the most mature industries, which 
complicated attempts to significantly change perceptions of what elements should be 
included in a calculative device.  Similarly, there were restrictions on how – within the 
calculative devices – calculations were to be executed, as the devices had to adhere to 
a broader and highly codified accounting and finance discourse. References to this 
broader discourse permeated the discursive practices of actors. Often these 
references were implied in the technical terminology used, in the footnotes of slides, 
in the fine print, or in the appendices. Actors (particularly BHP leadership) referred 
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explicitly to rules and codifications that circumscribed their actions. Typically referral 
to these rules and codifications occurred without explaining what a rule or codification 
specifically contained in any detail. For example, in its initial media release, which 
contained details of the acquisition proposal, BHP explicitly referred to many different 
rules it had to adhere to, many of which would have a direct or indirect impact on the 
calculative devices in the acquisition discourse (Table 4-15):  
Table 4-15: Examples of Rules and Codifications 
 
- City Code on Takeovers and Mergers (‘the City Code’) - Note 8(b) to Rule 19.1 ;  
- Listing Rules of ASX Limited (Australian Stock Exchange) 
- Rules of the UK Listing Authority  
- Rules from the London Stock Exchange;  
- Regulatory Pre-conditions;  
- Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 - Part VI;  
- US Securities Act of 1933, as amended from time to time;  
- Securities laws of any state, district or other jurisdiction of the United States;  
- US Securities Act registration requirements - provided by Sec tion 3(a)(10); 
- Interconditional schemes of arrangement with Rio Tinto shareholders;  
- Regulatory anti-trust  regulation; 
- Tax law in the UK and Australia - capital gains tax rollover relief;  
- Rio Tinto’s funding arrangements - ‘Change of control’ clauses;  
- BHP’s dividend policy;  
- Employment rights, including pension rights;  
- Regulatory rules from the European Union, Australia, the United States, Canada and 
South Africa;  
 
Source: BHP Billiton Media release 33/07, 12th November 2007 
Table 4-15 does not include implicit references to codifications. For example, terms 
used in the same BHP media release like EBITDA (discussed earlier), EBIT, reported 
revenue, jointly controlled entities’ revenue, net profit attributable to shareholders, 
net operating cash flow, and net assets all refer implicitly to accounting standards that 
bring these calculative devices into being. Further, the media release included 
independent audit statements to communicate that the Directors had made the 
statement about expected cost and revenue synergies with due care and 
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consideration. Also, this implicitly referred to formal accounting and finance 
standards, as well as generally accepted practices that were expected to be used to 
calculate such synergies. 
Calculations were further specified by indicating the date when input variables for the 
key calculative devices were determined, often accompanied by the statement that 
this was the ‘last practicable date prior to this announcement’. This was done for 
variables like numbers of shares on issue, share prices, and exchange rates. In this, and 
in other areas, BHP leadership appeared to have had more leeway in its assumptions 
and made these assumptions visible. For example:  
“ (t)  In arriving at the estimate of cost savings and revenue benefits, 
the Board of BHP Billiton has assumed the following: 
that there will be no significant impact on the combined group arising from 
any decisions made by competition authorities; 
that there will be no material change to the market dynamics in the 
combined core markets following completion. In particular, BHP Billiton has 
based these estimates on its understanding of current and future market 
supply, demand and pricing levels; and 
there will be no material change to the relative exchange rates in the 
combined core markets and geographies following completion. 
(u)  In arriving at the estimate of cost savings and revenue benefits, 
the Board of BHP Billiton has assumed that there are comparable 
operations, processes and procedures within Rio Tinto, except where 
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publicly available information clearly indicates otherwise. BHP Billiton’s 
management, through a detailed understanding of BHP Billiton’s cost 
structure, has determined the source and scale of realisable cost savings. 
...” 
Source: ‘BHP Billiton’s proposed combination with Rio Tinto to unlock value’, News Release 33/07 
(Appendix) 11th November 2007, (p.12) 
These examples reinforce that calculative devices were calculated within restrictions 
imposed by numerous sets of rules. Each of these sets was the result of other broader 
contextual discourses beyond the acquisition discourse. These were in addition to the 
most frequently mentioned and most obvious broader contextual discourses 
mentioned in the description of the structure of the acquisition discourse. The 
calculation of petroleum reserves provided an example, as its valuation had an impact 
on BHP’s but not Rio’s valuation, because Rio did not operate in that market. During a 
briefing on its oil business in May 2008, BHP tried to influence how analysts would 
calculate oil reserves and value its oil business. Specifically, BHP’s CEO Kloppers argued 
that current reporting requirements imposed by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission undervalued the reserves of BHP’s Petroleum business:  
“…. in contrast to the Minerals business, where we often use the term 
‘resources’ to describe the potential of a project and where we can formally 
report resources, under SEC rules, oil companies can only report proven 
reserves in its annual results statements... 
... proven reserves [with] a high degree of certainty, 80-90% confidence, to 
be recoverable in the future – and here comes, come, come the next key 
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words – using existing available technology. And in addition to this, to these 
two constraints, what you report must be commercially viable .. at prices 
prevailing at the time of the evaluation.”  
Source: BHP Petroleum Briefing, May 2008, (underlining added) 
Analysts who covered BHP typically had expertise in mining, but not necessarily in oil. 
If Kloppers could make a plausible case as to why a generally accepted practice for the 
mining reserves should also be used for calculating oil reserves, analysts might tweak 
some of the variables in their spreadsheets, reconstruct the indicator for BHP’s oil 
reserves and increase BHP’s relative value: even a minor shift of 1% in the perceived 
value of BHP Petroleum would have added hundreds of millions of dollars to the 
market capitalization of BHP. BHP, of course, had to continue to report its reserves in 
line with SEC rules. However, analysts had more freedom to change their calculations 
of oil reserves based on their own interpretations. 
Other issues where actors appeared to see opportunities for differentiating and 
influencing the calculations of value included the interpretation of sovereign risk, and 
reputation for delivering shareholder value. In these instances actors expressed their 
approval or disapproval, directly or indirectly, with particular ways of calculating value. 
These instances will be analyzed in more detail in section 4.9 (‘Discursive practices as 
transgression markers’). 
OBJECTIFICATION 
The fourth stage is described here as objectification of interests. The interests that 
were initially identified, made calculable, and then negotiated were increasingly 
‘objectified’. Along this path, the ability to influence the acquisition discourse through 
PhD Thesis Maurizio Floris 
 Page 190 
a calculative device decreased steadily. Once objectified, it was exceedingly difficult 
for actors to argue against a particular calculative device. This objectification became 
visible when deconstructing (part of) the share exchange ratio in detail, which 
depended on the perceived value of both Rio and BHP. The deconstruction was based 
on an analysis of the price objective for Rio Tinto as detailed in an analyst report. The 
deconstruction provides an overview of many layers that constituted the valuation of 
Rio, some of which are described below Figure 4-8. 
The deconstructed price objective of A$90 (in the centre) was shaped by broad 
economic trends that influenced the supply, demand and resulting commodity price 
expectations in key commodity markets that Rio operated in, that is, iron ore, copper, 
aluminium, and coal (bottom of the figure). These broader economic trends were also 
expected to influence exchange rates. Further, the ongoing decrease of initially very 
high debt levels of Rio (from US$40bn in 2008 to US$12.7bn in 2010) was considered a 
positive development, which influenced its ability to pursue investment opportunities 
and hence create future growth. 
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Figure 4-8: Deconstruction of Rio Price Objective 
Source: Based on P. O’Conner, J. Fairclough and I. Ye, Company Update Rio Tinto (Merrill Lynch), 2010 
Debt level was also helped by US$1.5bn in prospective asset sales, A$4bn capital 
inflows from a BHP joint venture, and A$15Bn rights issue. Rio’s price objective was 
further influenced by a group of stock market related issues, for example, peer 
comparisons, recent market gyrations, and history. The right hand side of the figure 
identifies a number of issues that relate to the codification of accounting (e.g. iQ 
method, which is ML’s proprietary method for accounting calculations), and 
disclosures of possible conflicts of interests due to Rio being a client of Merrill Lynch 
and the analysts’ compensation being linked to Merrill Lynch profits. 
What this deconstruction of price objective demonstrates is how the value of Rio, 
which is a part of the calculative device for a share exchange ratio, was composed of 
layer upon layer of other calculative devices. Each of these calculations depended 
extensively on broader discourses in, for example, accounting, finance, economic 
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trends and currency exchange rates, including how these discursively construct future 
value in current discourse. The price objective further included a level of self-reference 
most obvious in references to its current share price and previous price objectives. 
This means that the calculative device for share exchange ratio connected, 
summarized and (as inextricable consequence of summarizing) hid this multitude of 
layers.  
Objectification in this case meant that it became exceedingly difficult for individual 
actors to influence the perceived valuation of either BHP or Rio, and hence impact the 
share price ratio. Even if an actor would have been successful in influencing one of 
these layers, it may not be sufficient to influence the price objective.  
What the findings showed is that once a calculative device reached a level of ‘solidity’ 
or convergence of meaning in the acquisition discourse, actors could move on to focus 
their efforts on other calculative devices as the key boundary objects to translate or 
transform knowledge between different groups of actors. As shown earlier, this 
happened in the case of the additional value pool.  Early on in the acquisition discourse 
it appeared that most actors accepted BHP’s claims in relation to this calculative 
device, as was illustrated by an unidentified analyst at BHP’s briefing who stated that 
“I certainly agree with the uplift to shareholder value for both sets of shareholders. I 
would probably describe it as obscene.” (12 November 2007). Such perspectives 
enabled BHP to focus on the calculative device for the fair share exchange ratio. This 
shift was evident in the relative prevalence of the devices during two separate briefing 
sessions by BHP CEO Kloppers.  
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Table 4-16: Shift of Calculative Device Focus 
Calculative device Focus of the briefings* 
Nov 07 Feb 08 
Additional value pool 47% 9% 
Share exchange ratio 19% 82% 
*The focus is calculated as the percentage of slides (or associated 
transcripts) that refers to the calculative device.  
 
In November 2007 Kloppers referred explicitly to the additional value pool during 47% 
of the slides he presented. This fell back to only 9% during a similar briefing in 
February 2008. Conversely, the prevalence of fair share exchange ratio went up from 
19% to 82% of the slides presented. This suggested that it was taken for granted by 
February 2008 that the acquisition would create shareholder value, and the focus 
could now shift to the negotiation of the distribution of that value to each group of 
shareholders.  
This transition of emphasis from one calculative device to a next device as the 
discourse progresses also highlights variations between these devices. As shown, 
different groups of actors converged early on in regards to the meaning of additional 
value pool, and there was limited subsequent interaction on how to calculate it. In this 
case the additional value pool functions as a boundary object that is in the interest of 
both groups of shareholders. In contrast, both the fair share exchange ratio and the 
market share (as proxy for the impact on competition) played a role between groups of 
actors that was seen as distributive, that is, the interests of actors were conflicting: 
different numbers implied a different distribution of the potential loss or gain for 
actors. This suggests a need to understand the interests of the groups in order to 
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understand the different roles that boundary objects may play, depending on the 
alignment or conflict of interests. The discussion will explore potential implications 
from these findings for existing theory on boundary objects. 
The next section analyzes in detail how actors used discursive practices to negotiate 
the meaning of key constructs. While this also applies to the negotiation of meaning of 
the calculative devices in their role of boundary objects, it is not necessarily limited to 
such devices. 
 
4.9 DISCURSIVE PRACTICES AS TRANSGRESSION MARKERS 
In 4.7 discursive practices were seen to exert influence on the acquisition discourse 
through rhetorical strategies that were embedded in the different modalities. Further, 
4.8  demonstrated how calculative devices played a role as boundary objects. 
However, these discursive practices also shaped the acquisition discourse through a 
role as a ‘transgression marker’. This study develops the concept of transgression 
marker as cues from actors that signal whether they accept or reject a claim by 
another actor in relation to a key construct, and consequently whether they converge 
or diverge on the meaning of that construct.  
Here key examples of discursive practices as transgression markers that helped 
develop the concept will be explored. Transgression markers did not necessarily relate 
to agreement with one of the key constructs as such, but were used during the 
negotiations of all layers or elements that made up a key construct – or its equivalent 
calculative device. For example, the fair share exchange ratio is shaped in part by the 
prices that both Rio and BHP receive for their commodities. So when one of the 
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analysts at Rio’s Investor Seminar asked Rio CEO Albanese a question that signaled 
that the analyst questioned his commodity price assumptions, and consequently that 
he did not accept Albanese’s meaning of the value of Rio compared to the value of 
BHP:  
‘… Hi, it's [Justin Baring] (sic.) from Citigroup .. with using that 
reference to the ballparks again, how much of that is the commodity 
price assumption? I mean, the stock market values Rio Tinto every day. 
It's obviously making a serious error every day to come to the price that 
it comes to today. Can you just talk about the commodity price 
assumptions that the market's missing, obviously? ...‘,  
Justin Baring, Rio Investor Seminar, 26th November, 2007 
The analyst implied that Rio’s commodity price assumptions were too high. Buyers and 
sellers on the stock markets, who value Rio every day, must have been using different 
assumptions than Rio’s CEO who claimed that BHP’s offer was too low and ‘two 
ballparks down the road’, compared to the value that Rio’s leadership assigned to the 
company.  
A different example draws on BHP customers who were not willing to accept what BHP 
argued would be the impact of the acquisition for iron ore customers.  
‘Dieter Ameling, president of the German Steel Federation, said the 
prospect of such a deal was of great concern ..  "The Big Three (BHP, Rio 
and CVRD [Vale] of Brazil) dominate three quarters of the iron ore market. 
The merger of BHP and Rio Tinto would result in a duopoly."  
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The comments were echoed by Sir Brian Moffat, the former British Steel 
chief executive and head of Eurofer, the European steelmakers 
organisation’ 
The Times, 10th November, 2007 
What was implied was that BHP additional shareholder value was likely to come from 
high level of market control (i.e. higher prices), rather than being able to ship more 
iron ore more quickly.  
The initial analyst briefings by Marius Kloppers included many examples of such 
transgression markers. An earlier mentioned example was when one of the analysts 
called Kloppers’ claim that the acquisition was advantageous for Chinese customers a 
bluff, and that BHP would have Chinese steel producers ‘over a barrel’. In doing so, the 
analyst implied that Kloppers had overstepped the boundary of what he (the analyst) 
was willing to believe would be the meaning of the acquisition for customers.  
A related example concerns the definition of markets and market share, and refers to 
BHP’s attempt to include China’s domestic production in the definition of the iron 
market, not just the seaborne market, which was discussed earlier. An article on the 
Dow Jones Newswires quoted an unidentified equity analyst from Sydney who said 
that nobody will be “fooled” by it (Dow Jones, 12/11/07). The quote signaled that BHP 
overstepped the boundary of what was an acceptable construct of the relevant 
“market for iron ore” for regulatory review of competition. This boundary was of 
critical importance to competition regulators and analysts, as it would determine the 
perceived level of market control of a merged entity.  
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Table 4-17: Examples of Transgression Markers 
What is 
implied 
Boundary marker Source 
Examples that signal divergence on ‘fair share exchange ratio’ 
BHP lacks 
infrastructure 
and needs 
Rio for 
growth 
“… Rio Tinto has two railway lines and three ports, and will 
probably add another port. It seems that the Rio infrastructure 
will provide the volume uplift [to BHP] …” 
BHP Analyst 
Briefing 
12/11/07 
Unidentified 
analyst 
Petroleum 
does not fit in 
BHP 
“… Analysts say the petroleum division has always sat 
uncomfortably in the [BHP’s] portfolio and a sale would be 
welcomed by the City. However no decision to sell BHP 
Petroleum has yet been made. 
The Sunday 
Times,  
11/11/07 
Armitstead & 
O'Connell 
BHP should 
consider 
lifting the 
ratio to 3.4  
(question 
came when it 
was still 3.0)  
“…your slide .. shows the relative share exchange rate ... 
Indeed, it was 2.4 before the announcement, then you offered 
3. Since the announcement, the ratio has been, pretty much, 
on average, 3.4 and indeed, subsequent to Rio’s presentation it 
hasn’t changed. So, 3.4 would seem the kind of ratio that the 
market was looking for. How did that factor into your thinking 
about where to go from here? …” 
BHP Analyst 
Briefing 
12/12/07 
Unidentified 
analyst 
Rio will 
provide more 
growth, so 
BHP should 
pay more  
“… Rio Tinto is quite aggressive on its volume tonnes and, 
arguably, quite some years ahead of BHP. It seems to me that 
BHP shareholders have more to gain from the Rio growth than 
vice versa. Where do you think the volume uplift can come 
from in the medium term? …” 
BHP Analyst 
Briefing 
12/11/07 
Unidentified 
analyst 
BHP should 
pay less 
“… You have mentioned that you are offering a significant 
premium to Rio Tinto shareholders. Given that you have also 
suggested that the growth is within BHP Billiton, rather than 
Rio Tinto, why should your shareholders accept a smaller 
proportion of the business combination than is there due? …” 
BHP Analyst 
Briefing 
12/12/07 
Unidentified 
analyst 
Examples that signal divergence on  ‘impact on market competition’ 
Market for 
iron ore may 
need further 
segmentation 
“… Finally, just a technical question about the whole deal. A lot 
of analysis has been done into the concentration of iron ore 
that arises from the combination. It’s starting to get split into .. 
lump, fines and pellets. On that basis, it looks like you have 
over 50% of the lump iron ore globally. Do you see that as 
being tested by any of the anti-trust authorities ..? …” 
BHP Analyst 
Briefing 
12/12/07 
Unidentified 
analyst 
China feels 
threatened 
by BHP-Rio 
combination 
Just when it appeared that BHP Billiton had settled on a 
strategy for taking over rival mining group Rio Tinto, its plans 
have been thrown into disarray by a GBP7.18bn ($14.1bn) 
intervention from China.  
Chinalco, one of China's largest mining companies, and Alcoa of 
the US revealed on Friday they had bought 12 per cent of Rio 
Tinto's UK-listed shares in an audacious dawn raid.  
Financial 
Times, 
1/2/2008 
 
 
Further examples of transgression markers are included in Table 4-17. These 
expressions could, for example, appear to be opinionated (e.g. ‘It seems that ...’), 
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sarcastic (‘The stock market  .. [is] .. obviously making a serious error every day ...’), 
suspicious  (‘Can you discuss the differences between .. [Orissa] .. and what you are 
facing in Mongolia ...’), or suggestive (‘Analysts say ...’). They permeated the discourse 
and could be seen as part of an ongoing and dynamic negotiation that involved 
decision makers and influencers, and that impacted the outcome of the acquisition 
discourse. The potential impact of individual comments was unlikely to be significant. 
However, they could contribute to patterns that slowly chipped away at the narrow 
margins that individual actors had to influence the acquisition discourse. 
Transgression markers are a function of discursive practices and as such they are 
multi-modal cues and not just linguistic. For example, share prices could be seen as a 
non-linguistic modality for marking boundaries. The graph of the actual share price 
ratio discussed earlier can be seen as the cumulative result of share transactions, 
where transactions at a particular price express an acceptance of either BHP’s or Rio’s 
constructs: the initial trading at a share price ratio of 3.4 marked the boundary of the 
ratio at which shareholders might be expected to exchange their Rio shares for BH 
shares. Kloppers appeared to take note of that cue when BHP stepped within the 
boundary that the market seemed to have set for ‘fair value’. Other examples of non-
linguistic discursive practices functioning as transgression markers include the refusal 
of Rio’s leadership to engage directly with BHP’s; the acquisition of Rio shares by 
Chinalco; and the (Chinese) support of emerging miners with contracts.  
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4.10 SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 
This chapter presented the findings from the case study. The main actors were 
identified as either decision makers (BHP’s leadership, shareholders, competition 
regulators) or influencers (Rio Tinto’s leadership, analysts, the media), depending on 
their formal power to authorize or prevent the acquisition.  
Whether the acquisition would proceed depended on, first, whether BHP’s leadership 
and shareholders could agree on the distribution of a presumed additional value pool 
through a mutually acceptable fair share exchange ratio, and second, whether key 
regulators would substantially agree with BHP on what the acquisition would mean for 
competition, that is, that the impact on competition was acceptable in their area of 
jurisdiction.  
The findings identified how time was brought into the pre-acquisition discourse 
through the discursive construction of the future, and how this influenced the 
negotiation of meaning of each of the three key constructs. The additional value pool 
was seen to be influenced by the construction of future cost savings and revenue 
enhancements. Future project pipelines, market demand and the calculation of net 
present value influenced the meaning of the relative value of Rio and BHP, and hence 
the construct of fair share exchange ratio. Lastly, the impact on competition was 
significantly influenced by acceleration of tonnage, the emergence of new iron ore 
producers and, for Australia, a long-term supply contract with the main steel customer 
of BHP. 
The analysis also identified the broader contextual discourses that went beyond the 
particular acquisition discourse, but had a clear influence on it. The additional value 
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pool and fair share exchange ratio were mainly influenced by the broader discourses 
on the primacy of shareholder value, the strategic drivers of organizational value, long-
term demand from China and India, and the emergence of mining super-majors. The 
key construct of impact on competition of the acquisition was mainly influenced by the 
broader discourse on the importance of competition, and part of the broader 
discourse on the strategic drivers of organizational value. 
Further, this chapter described how actors interacted in order to determine what the 
acquisition would mean. For the acquisition to proceed, actors had to converge 
sufficiently on the meaning of the three constructs. The negotiation resulted in an 
immediate convergence by external actors with internal actors on the meaning of the 
additional value pool; a convergence of internal actors with external actors on a fair 
share exchange ratio; and a continued, unresolved divergence on what the acquisition 
would mean for the impact on competition.  
The findings demonstrated how both internal and external actors, in these 
negotiations, brought to bear a wide range of multi-modal discursive practices and 
rhetorical strategies. Calculative devices were identified as a distinct and particularly 
pervasive modality, which took on the role of boundary objects. The findings showed 
how calculative devices develop as boundary objects and demonstrated that boundary 
objects must be considered legitimate and accepted by key actors, which enables 
these actors to protect their interests. 
Lastly, the findings showed how multi-modal discursive practices take on a role as 
transgression marker, that is, cues from actors that signal whether they converge or 
diverge on the meaning of key constructs. 
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5 DISCUSSION AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS  
In this concluding section, the thesis returns to the original research questions in order 
to offer a response to each and to outline in more detail the contributions of this 
thesis to theory. The case study of a failed acquisition – a ‘strategic episode’ (Hendry 
and Seidl, 2003) adds to a growing tranche of literature that shows how discursive 
practices can both enable and constrain strategizing (Hardy et al., 2000; Jarzabkowski 
et al., 2007; Mantere & Vaara, 2008; Pälli et al., 2009) and extends our understanding 
of the link between strategy and discourse, particularly during merger and acquisitions 
(M&As) (Hellgren et al., 2002; Kuronen et al., 2005; Risberg et al., 2003; Vaara, 2003; 
Vaara and Monin, 2010; Vaara et al., 2006; Vaara et al., 2003), but also during other 
strategizing activities. 
First, the discussion will highlight how the research contributes to our understanding 
of the role of external actors during a pre-acquisition discourse, how these actors 
enact their role through multi-modal discursive practices, and how rhetorical 
strategies are brought to bear not just by linguistic but also by non-linguistic practices. 
This first part of the discussion will also develop the concept of transgression marker 
and discuss how calculative devices act as boundary objects within the pre-acquisition 
discourse. Second, the discussion contributes to a discursive epistemology of 
strategizing by showing how temporal and contextual work shapes strategy discourse. 
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5.1 STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS OF THE PRE-ACQUISITION DISCOURSE 
The research was driven by two research questions. The first is: 
In the structure and dynamics of a pre-acquisition strategy discourse, what is the 
role of: external actors; multi-modal discursive practices, in particular calculative 
devices; and rhetorical strategies? 
This research question aimed to develop contributions to theory by analyzing how, in 
the case study of a pre-acquisition discourse, internal and external actors used a broad 
range of multi-modal discursive practices that, through embedded rhetorical styles, 
influenced the convergence or divergence of meanings of key constructs critical to the 
acquisition. As a result of the analysis of multi-modal discursive practices, the study 
developed the concept of transgression marker to indicate how actors signal their 
acceptance or rejection of meanings. Also, the role of calculative devices as a distinct 
modality and as boundary objects provides new insights into the dynamics of 
strategizing as the negotiation of meaning.  
THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL ACTORS 
The findings above contribute to discourse-based theories of strategizing, in particular 
strategizing during a pre-acquisition discourse, by providing a deeper understanding of 
the role of external actors. Although previous research has analyzed the role of the 
media (Hellgren et al., 2002; Kuronen et al., 2005; Vaara and Tienari, 2002), external 
actors are largely under-explored in strategizing studies (Cartwright et al., 2012; 
Jarzabkowski et al., 2007; Jarzabkowski and Spee, 2009). The research identifies that 
external actors are not simply a passive audience, but play a significant role in the 
production and dissemination of discourse that precedes a merger or acquisition 
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transaction. This role is enacted through a range of multi-modal discursive practices 
and rhetorical strategies. Therefore, in order to understand how organizations develop 
and implement an M&A strategy, we must first scan the landscape in which an 
organization operates for relevant external actors, and take note of the modes and 
rhetorical strategies that they bring to bear on the discourse. 
This exploration of the role of external actors led to the identification of three distinct 
overarching roles for external actors in a pre-acquisition discourse. The research found 
that external actors may determine the structure of the acquisition discourse, 
persuade others and decide whether the transaction will proceed. 
Turning to the first of these roles, a micro analysis of how actors negotiate the 
meaning of constructs could easily overlook the critical role of decision-makers in 
determining what constructs will be negotiated in the first place. The research 
suggests that external actors who are also decision-makers determine the structure of 
an M&A discourse in two ways. First, in line with other studies, it is argued that for 
actors to be able to influence or persuade others, they have to adapt their message 
(Erkama and Vaara, 2010; Vaara and Tienari, 2008) and ensure that it aligns with their 
audiences’ ‘beliefs’ (Jarzabkowski and Sillince, 2007) or ‘world-views’, for example, 
what broad economic trends may shape global demand, and what constitutes ‘good 
strategy’. Second, the key constructs that structure the discourse must reflect the 
specific interests of decision-makers. In the case of an individual shareholder this 
means that the transaction will increase the value of the shares held. To satisfy 
shareholders as a group requires additional value to be created and shared through a 
price that is neither too high (which would alienate shareholders of the acquirer) nor 
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too low (which would fail to persuade shareholders of the target organization). This 
price can be expressed in different ways, for example, in dollars, in a share exchange 
ratio or as a combination of both. In the case of competition regulators this means 
that the combined entity  would not hold an unacceptably large market share that it 
could exploit.  
The analysis of the negotiation of meaning related to the attempted acquisition sheds 
light on the second role of external actors, and extends our understanding of the 
complexity of this process. Here, the study shows that external actors are not simply 
an audience to be persuaded by the arguments put forward by the leadership of an 
acquirer. Rather, the negotiation of meanings in the pre-acquisition discourse is a 
much more dynamic process. It involves a multi-directional network of internal and 
external actors who swap roles as rhetor and audience on an ongoing basis, as they try 
to protect their own interests and persuade each other through discursive exchanges.  
The third role for external actors is that of ‘decision-maker’. The study was able to 
identify the crucial role that these decision-makers can play in influencing outcomes 
because, unlike earlier research into M&A discourse, the study focuses on the pre-
acquisition stage when the decision to proceed with the transaction (or not) is still 
being negotiated. During this stage, external actors have considerably more 
opportunity to influence convergence or divergence of meanings and ultimately the 
outcome of the strategizing.  
The different roles of actors are reflected in the model in Figure 5-1. The model 
differentiates between influencers and decision-makers, and locates the key 
constructs that structure the discourse at its centre. The arrows in the model 
PhD Thesis Maurizio Floris 
 Page 205 
represent the influence exerted by key actors as they negotiate the meaning of the key 
constructs and seek to influence the acquisition process and outcome.  
Figure 5-1: The Structure of a Pre-Acquisition Discourse 
 
The model generalizes the external actors and key constructs that shape a pre-
acquisition discourse. For each particular merger or acquisition the strategic landscape 
must be scanned to locate important external actors and key constructs that will shape 
the discourse. Depending on the particular context of the transaction, particular sets 
of external actors may choose to play an active role. For example, cross-border 
transactions where a foreign entity intends to acquire a domestic company may raise 
concerns about foreign ownership, and see other regulators or political lobby groups 
take an active role in the acquisition discourse. More generally, when a proposed 
transaction has the potential to impact their interests, external actors are likely to seek 
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a greater role in the discourse. If the institutional context grants these actors the 
power of decision-maker, or if these actors have significant influence over decision-
makers, the discourse with external actors becomes an essential part of organizational 
strategizing. The next section of the paper explores the multi-modal practices and 
rhetorical strategies used in the public discourse by actors internal and external to the 
acquiring organization. 
THE USE OF MULTI-MODAL DISCURSIVE PRACTICES 
Previous studies of M&A and discourse have predominantly focused on the analysis of 
speech and writing (Brennan et al., 2010; Green et al., 2008; Hellgren et al., 2002; 
Risberg et al., 2003; Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005; Tienari et al., 2003; Vaara, 2002; 
Vaara and Monin, 2010). Undoubtedly speech and writing remain critical modes to a 
comprehensive analysis of M&A discourse. However, other modes, like calculative 
devices, imagery and location (Fairhurst and Grant, 2010; Iedema, 2003, 2007; Kress, 
2010) can also be found in M&A discourse. The current study makes a further 
contribution to studies of M&A by highlighting the multi-modality of discursive 
practices that make up an acquisition discourse. The diversity of discursive practices 
that emerged from the case reminds us that, when considering a merger or acquisition 
process, we must pay greater attention to modes other than speech and writing. 
The study found that imagery was central to the acquisition discourse and included 
maps, graphs, photos and video. Imagery, including graphs and maps, is an important 
mediating instrument that helps to anchor the key constructs of an M&A discourse, 
that is, it summarizes large volumes of data in a single image, which can help 
individuals to visually integrate different elements of a strategy and facilitate 
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convergence around cognitions (Jørgensen et al., 2012; Stigliani and Ravasi, 2012). For 
example, maps can be used to visually suggest either the synergies (through 
geographical proximity) or market reach (through geographical dispersion) that a 
combination of organizations may deliver, and thus help mediate the negotiation of 
additional value, which is a critical construct for any merger or acquisition transaction.   
The analysis further shows that the choice of location mattered for meaning making, 
for example, as part of site visits, access to (analyst or press) group briefings, and visits 
from senior executives to important external actors. In line with arguments by Kress 
(2010) for differentiating between modes, actors take account of and adjust the 
location of their discursive practices to a location preferred by the community they try 
to influence. Also, location does communicate a priority of social relationships, as 
actors who are important decision-makers and influencers will receive physical access 
to a discrete location more readily than other actors. Further, the choice of location 
does represent a particular idea about the organization to an actor. In these ways 
location functions as a distinct mode in M&A discourse and can influence meaning 
making.   
Further, although calculative devices have not previously been explicitly identified as 
such, it is argued that in the context of M&A strategizing they are a distinct non-
linguistic mode.  What is identified as a suitable device, how it needs to be calculated 
‘correctly’, how this is socially negotiated, and how some of this may become 
increasingly difficult to question is largely a re-enactment of existing power structures 
(Oswick and Robertson, 2009). The development of calculative devices could be seen 
to go through four stages: identification, calculation, negotiation and objectification. 
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Identification: Earlier in the discussion it was argued that, in order to be persuasive, 
actors must identify a vehicle for influencing that aligns with the worldviews and 
interests of the actors they are attempting to influence. The same applies here. The 
identification of calculative devices that can operate as boundary objects is subject to 
the same imperatives as the identification of the constructs that shape the structure of 
the discourse. As a result, key constructs are translated into a calculative device (or 
small set of devices), which then provides a different modality to negotiate 
convergence of meaning.  
Calculation: Technical experts are those actors who have been trained in a particular 
discipline (e.g. accounting, finance, mining engineering, international economic 
development, etc.) and determine the appropriate way to calculate the calculative 
device. In doing this, they recreate the professional practices, standards and 
codifications of their discipline in their daily work as experts. If they deviate excessively 
from these, they may be considered either visionary or incompetent.  
Negotiation: This implies narrow margins for actors in negotiating what symbolic 
numerical manipulations constitute the device. Beunza and Garud’s (2007) analysis of 
the valuation of Amazon.com, during the early days of the Internet, provides an 
example of different analysts coming up with widely varying valuations for the 
company as there was then no generally accepted method for valuing this new breed 
of companies. This created vociferous debate and negotiation among analysts. Similar 
processes of negotiation were also shown in the findings. For example, BHP CEO 
Kloppers attempted to shift the valuation method of oil reserves by drawing on 
alternative professional standards from mining for valuing reserves. This illustrates 
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how actors had to dig deep in the different layers of a calculative device to find areas 
where there might be some flexibility to renegotiate meaning.  
Objectification: Objectification of calculative devices connects with the earlier 
discussion on rhetorical strategies, in particular logos and ethos. Logos follows from 
the logic of the symbolic numerical manipulations of the device, that is, the calculative 
logic that constitutes the device. As these calculations are not random but typically 
follow the reasoning behind formal codification and accounting standards, trying to 
argue against the calculative logic of the device means that one has to argue against 
the logic of these codifications and standards. Similarly, calculative devices draw 
extensively on ethos. This authority may stem from, for example, the status and 
reputation of its source for input data, the authority of widely accepted codification 
and accounting standards (this is in addition to the logic behind these codifications and 
standards), or the interpretative legitimacy awarded to the person or institution that 
presents the calculative device or indicator. This imbues a calculative device with 
significant potential appeal to logos and ethos, and may present a formidable 
challenge once the device has become objectified.  
Even if different actors use the same label for a calculative device (for example 
‘company value’), the calculations of actors may vary slightly. This study, therefore, 
sees calculative devices like company value as an object that behaves like a fire object 
(Law and Singleton, 2005), in that different people construct a different company in 
the equations of their calculative device, that is, no two objects are identical. Even if 
two actors calculate the same outcome, they may calculate it somewhat differently 
and create marginally different objects. This is important, because in the end the 
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possibility of pragmatic action in an acquisition depends largely on decision-makers 
agreeing on a number, and not insisting on identical calculative logic to create that 
number. 
While the term ‘indicator’ might be more commonly associated with the ‘outcome’ of 
a calculation, and the term ‘calculative device’ with the actual underpinning symbolic 
numerical manipulations, this differentiation is difficult to maintain. As the findings 
show, inputs of calculations are typically already the output of prior numerical 
manipulations, and hence the two terms are inextricably linked and could arguably be 
used interchangeably. Nevertheless, in this section the term ‘calculative device’ is used 
to emphasize the calculating that occurs. As the analysis shows, in the context of the 
pre-acquisition discourse, the calculative devices met the social and formal criteria for 
modes identified by Kress (2010). Also, calculative devices suggest a higher measure of 
precision and objectivity than speech or writing (Denis et al., 2006; Skærbæk and 
Tryggestad, 2010). As the research shows, actors use calculative devices to discursively 
construct their interests as ‘facts’ (Baxter and Chua, 2003; Miller, 1991), which are 
more difficult to contest. This is because actors must have highly specialized technical 
skills and knowledge to contest a calculative device. Also, calculative devices may 
come from habits or mechanisms (e.g. accounting standards) that have led to an 
acceptance of the device at face value, without full appreciation of the underlying logic 
and limitations of how that particular device was calculated.  
Stigliani and Ravasi (2012) show how non-linguistic modes can be used to create 
convergence around meanings in collaborative design settings and this study extends 
their work by showing how these modes can be used in a situation where there is a 
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perceived conflict of interest and actors aim to persuade or influence each other. The 
analysis shows how non-linguistic modes, such as imagery, location and calculative 
devices, interact with linguistic modes to influence and persuade by enacting 
rhetorical strategies. It is here that this study makes a contribution to our 
understanding of the role of discourse and rhetoric in M&A (Green et al., 2008; 
Hellgren et al., 2002; Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005; Tienari et al., 2003; Vaara and 
Monin, 2010; Vaara and Tienari, 2002).  
MULTI-MODAL RHETORIC 
The analysis shows how rhetorical strategies are embedded not just in linguistic modes 
but also in all modes. Further, it shows how a single mode may contain more than one 
rhetorical appeal, so that a single mode may appeal to a combination of logos, pathos 
or ethos (see Figure 5-2). As discursive practices often use a number of modes (both 
linguistic and non-linguistic) simultaneously, they work to persuade through a multi-
layered, simultaneous and powerful appeal to reason, emotion and authority.  
Figure 5-2: Examples of Modes versus Rhetorical Strategies 
 
Figure 5-2 summarizes a further contribution this research makes to studies of M&A 
discourse. It shows how both internal and external actors, through a discursive 
practice, can draw on multiple linguistic and non-linguistic modes simultaneously in 
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order to broaden and reinforce their persuasive appeal and influence the meaning of 
the key constructs. As these key constructs represent the interests of the decision-
makers, the outcome of the acquisition discourse depends on this negotiated 
meaning.  
Figure 5-3: Model of a Discursive Practice 
 
A multi-modal perspective is important, as a narrow focus on the use of linguistic 
modes by actors involved in the production and dissemination of an acquisition 
discourse runs the risk of overemphasizing the appeals to logic at the expense of other 
appeals. As it appears that the logic is most likely explicitly spelled out in speech and 
writing, this may explain why most previous research placed an emphasis on rational 
discourse (Hellgren et al., 2002; Tienari et al., 2003; Vaara and Tienari, 2002). The 
current study argues that meetings with important customers, shareholders or 
journalists contain an appeal to emotion, for example, through a demonstration of 
willingness to go through the extra effort of a one-on-one meeting, even if the 
linguistic communication during the meeting would only emphasize rational 
arguments. Similarly, appeals to authority permeate the discursive practices of an 
acquisition discourse. These may be embedded in imagery of advanced technology or 
subtle footnotes to identify authoritative data sources, in the use of independent 
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consultants or auditors, or in references to the authority of the share markets when 
they support the point made by an actor. Much of this richness, and hence 
persuasiveness of the appeals, would be missed if the analysis only considered 
linguistic modes and rhetorical strategies of logic. 
The motivation for focusing the analysis on logos, pathos and ethos (Aristotle, 1991) 
was to ensure that this case study would not overextend its ambitions but would 
emphasize the multi-modal discursive practices of actors. It would be straightforward 
in the model above to adjust the rhetorical styles and, for example, follow Erkama and 
Vaara (2010) and add autopoiesis and cosmos as rhetorical strategies; or to replace 
them altogether with the theorizations of change suggested by Suddaby and 
Greenwood (2005). The key contribution of the model above remains intact: if we 
want to understand how actors aim to persuade others, we need to look for their 
means of persuasion amongst all multi-modal discursive practices, not just language.  
One function of discursive practices that needs further discussion is that of discursive 
practices as cues from actors to indicate what that actor is or is not willing to accept as 
the meaning of a construct. Here these cues are further developed and labeled as 
‘transgression markers’, as they demarcate the limits of acceptable meaning. As 
identified in the findings, this function was observed in many instances and guises 
during the acquisition discourse.  
DISCURSIVE PRACTICES AS TRANSGRESSION MARKERS 
Transgression markers are defined as discursively constituted and multi-modal cues 
from one actor that signal disagreement with another actor who has overstepped 
acceptable limits for a practice or assertion. The cue may take any form of discursive 
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practice, that is, it can be spoken, written or enacted through, for example, imagery, 
practice, symbolism or other modalities of meaning making. Further, it can be explicit 
or implied, it may follow the assertion immediately or long after, and does not have to 
be conscious.  
As shown in the findings, the function of transgression markers could be most easily 
observed for constructs where actors disagreed. The evaluation of the acquisition 
discourse suggests that in the construction of meaning of the key constructs, actors 
could not deviate much from pre-existing worldviews (Suddaby and Greenwood, 
2005). For example, much of the discourse about a fair share exchange ratio was 
about the respective capabilities of the companies to exploit opportunities available to 
them. As a company itself is a main source for such information, it would be 
reasonable to assume that a CEO has some measure of influence over the perception 
of these capabilities. However, as shown in the findings, CEOs have to navigate narrow 
margins, and straying beyond the established meaning was likely to result in an 
immediate question or rebuke from, for example, an analyst, journalist or regulator. 
This can manifest itself in subtle informational questions about a subject where the 
questioner is not yet willing to accept the asserted meaning of a construct, or it can be 
an explicit and blunt disagreement. Repeated severe transgressions of acceptable 
limits to meaning by an actor may result in a loss of legitimacy or credibility on the 
part of the transgressor thereby reducing their ability to influence or persuade others.  
Many of the examples of discursive practices in the findings could function as 
transgression markers. The negotiation of meaning for constructs was described as the 
convergence or divergence of the meaning that decision-makers were willing to assign 
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to relevant core constructs. In this context the function of discursive practices to signal 
convergence or divergence throughout the acquisition discourse is critical to the ability 
of actors to determine whether or not they have sufficient support to be able to 
proceed with the proposed strategy. As such, the role of discursive practices as 
transgression markers complements their role of persuading through appeals to 
rhetorical strategies, in that they help identify how much ‘push back or give’ from an 
audience there is when trying to shift meaning. 
The definition of transgression markers enables the description and identification of 
how strategy or strategic practices are negotiated between actors (Maitlis and 
Lawrence, 2007) and how, for example, broader discourses or praxis are brought to 
bear in such negotiations. These may be embodied in, for example, accounting 
standards (Young, 2003) or strategic tools (Spee and Jarzabkowski, 2009), which are 
enacted in strategizing. Further, it enables us to understand how actors exert power 
on strategy by drawing on the subtle or not so subtle power of these cues, and in 
doing so demonstrates the propensity for strategy to unfold in correspondence with 
dominant praxis or dominant discourse (Chia and MacKay, 2007; Jullien, 1995). This 
unfolding may lead to recursivity or adaptation of the strategy (Jarzabkowski, 2004). 
As Roberts et al. (2006) illustrate, this might happen when a CEO or finance director 
meets with fund managers, which can be seen as ‘an almost ritual subjection ... to the 
litany of shareholder value’ (p.287). Failure to take notice of fund manager comments 
during the meeting would store up ‘a huge amount of trouble’ (Roberts et al., 2006, 
p.289) and might lead to pressure on the share price owing to disaffected fund 
managers selling off shares.  
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Roberts and his colleagues’ study (2006) draws attention to the dual and interrelated 
role of, what are called here, transgression markers. First, they provide an indication of 
the likelihood that key support for a strategy will be forthcoming when needed. 
Second, they may actively shape strategy: if support from certain actors is particularly 
important, it will be more likely that an organization’s strategy will remain within the 
limits accepted by key actors as ‘good strategy’. Internal and external actors can be 
influenced by and draw upon, for example, the prevailing broader discourses, which 
place limits around strategy and shape how it is played out by key actors. These limits 
may be ill defined or contested such that the actors involved are unable, at least 
initially, to agree on strategic action. Ultimately, however, as a result of this discursive 
activity, an acceptable strategy emerges, which is shaped by prevailing power 
relationships and processes (Hardy and Phillips, 2004; Mumby, 2004). These power 
relationships and processes are important variables in understanding how strategy 
unfolds (Phillips et al., 2008).  
CALCULATIVE DEVICES AS BOUNDARY OBJECTS 
As argued earlier, calculative devices constitute a distinct and critical modality through 
which an M&A discourse is enacted. The negotiation of the acquisition through 
calculative devices was helped because the devices allowed to summarize many 
disparate elements into a single number, that is, they provided a ‘single space’ (Callon 
and Muniesa, 2005) for symbolic numerical manipulations, for example, for each 
company’s valuation.  
The findings show the preeminence of calculative devices in the pre-acquisition 
discourse, and their suggestion of precision, objectivity or factuality make their role as 
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boundary objects particularly interesting for a detailed analysis. Calculative devices 
met the two criteria for boundary objects and are ‘both adaptable to different 
viewpoints and robust enough to maintain identity across them’ (Star & Griesemer, 
1989, p.387). Adaptation was achieved by groups of actors through variations in the 
symbolic numeric manipulations. Robustness and commonality across different groups 
resulted from extensive and detailed codification in, for example, accounting 
standards and stock exchange requirements on reporting, which limited the variability 
of the calculations.   
The findings show that calculative devices as boundary objects have two connected 
but quite different roles. The first role is a cognitive role that emerges as actors socially 
construct an object that enables communication across different groups. This role is 
about aligning views across groups and emphasizes boundary objects as a means of 
knowledge representation or knowledge sharing (Carlile, 2002; Orlikowski, 2002). The 
second role is to interpret the impact on the interests of a group – in this thesis the 
impact of the proposed acquisition. Star and Griesemer (1989) recognize both roles in 
their development of the concept of boundary objects but conflate them by switching 
frequently between terms like ‘views’, ‘goals’, ‘visions’, ‘sentiments’, ‘sets of concerns’ 
and ‘interests’. However, the wording of the criteria for boundary objects they 
proposed only explicitly emphasizes the cognitive role of boundary objects. As the 
findings show, much of what happens when two groups try to bridge their differences 
is a consequence of the second role, and is better understood by focusing on power 
and interests, than on cognition. This second role of boundary objects can be either 
generative or distributive. If it is generative then the boundary object suggests 
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additional benefits for both groups it is trying to connect, that is, the interests of both 
groups align. If it is distributive then the boundary object allocates a limited amount of 
benefits across both groups, that is, their interests do not align. The calculative device 
for the additional value pool is an illustration of a generative boundary object as both 
sets of shareholders recognized the potential of additional shareholder value as being 
in their interest. In contrast, the fair share exchange ratio was distributive as each 
variation of the ratio had opposite implications for the two sets of shareholders: one 
would gain more shareholder value at the expense of the other. Similarly, the 
calculative device for iron ore market share, as a proximate for the impact on 
competition, was distributive: each variation of calculated market share had opposite 
implications for how much market power either customers or the combined 
organization expected to have following the acquisition. These examples highlight the 
importance of considering the impact of a boundary object on the interests of actors 
in order to determine their potential effectiveness. Actors who tried to bridge the 
differences with other groups of actors emphasized generative boundary objects. For 
example, while the BHP leadership could not avoid talking about the share exchange 
ratio (which was a distributive), they emphasized the additional value for each group 
of shareholders (which was generative). Similarly, while iron ore customers 
emphasized market share (distributive) as a proximate indicator for impact on 
competition, the BHP leadership tried to (unsuccessfully) shift the discourse to the 
impact the acquisition would have on bringing more product to the market faster 
(generative).  
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While the original two criteria of plasticity and commonality (Star and Griesemer, 
1989) identify the cognitive role of boundary objects, they ignore the fact that 
communication and negotiations are not always between actors with similar positions 
of power or aligned interests. The earlier discussion about the role of powerful actors 
in the selection of key constructs in the acquisition discourse had already identified 
that powerful actors impose constructs to structure a discourse in a way that furthers 
their interests. In doing so, these constructs or the calculative devices that represent 
the constructs, take on the role of boundary object between groups of actors. For 
example, shareholders are willing to use a calculative device for share exchange ratio 
as boundary object, exactly because it provides an expression of their interests. This 
thesis argues that this suggests an additional third criterion for boundary objects: 
legitimacy. Powerful actors can deny a construct or calculative device legitimacy and 
prevent it from becoming a boundary object, if they perceive the construct or device 
as indifferent or a potential threat to their interests, even if it would meet the original 
criteria of plasticity and commonality.  
Previous research has explicitly identified the role of boundary objects related to 
power and interests (Bechky, 2003; Oswick and Robertson, 2009; Spee and 
Jarzabkowski, 2009). For example, Bechky (2003) identifies technical drawings as 
boundary objects that were preferred by engineers and helped protect the status (i.e. 
interests) of the engineers. Also, Oswick and Robertson (2009) show that there is more 
to boundary objects than providing bridges and anchors between disparate groups to 
facilitate a particular strategy. They can also enact barricades and mazes to reinforce 
existing power structures. However, these previous studies, whilst drawing attention 
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to power, do not go as far as to suggest as a third criterion for boundary objects - that 
they must be considered legitimate in order to be accepted as a boundary object. Such 
a criterion would encourage a critical interpretation of boundary objects as political 
devices. This criterion of legitimacy proposed here also implies the need for plausibility 
and generativity, which seem to be required to bring other groups of actors on board. 
While an all-powerful group of actors might be able to impose a particular calculative 
device on a discourse, this device would not operate as a boundary object between 
two groups if it is rejected outright by the other group of actors. 
The discursive approach taken by this thesis also offers a somewhat different 
perspective on the sociomateriality of boundary objects. The approach developed by 
Actor Network Theory (ANT) emphasizes the development of ‘objects’ as the result of 
the enrolment of human and non-human actors in a network of relationships (Callon, 
1986; Latour and Woolgar, 1986; Law, 2009). This gives the primacy of solidifying to 
these actors. In contrast, a discursive analysis shows how these ‘objects’ can be seen 
to emerge from a network of relationships with other discourses (Oswick and 
Robertson, 2009). This means that the acquisition discourse can be seen as a crossover 
of other discourses that are woven through the acquisition discourse and shape what 
it looks like. Calculative devices used in the acquisition discourse connect many of 
these discourses, including discourses related to accounting and finance standards, 
discourses on economic development, commodity demand, commodity prices, 
exchange rates, sovereign risk, in a single object. Key actors who play a direct role in 
the acquisition discourse generally play a minimal role in these broader discourses. 
While they are expected to weave them into the acquisition discourse to provide a 
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coherent and integrated narrative, they cannot significantly influence these 
discourses, creating a situation where the resulting objects are difficult to dispute. 
To conclude, the analysis of the use of calculative devices in an acquisition discourse 
contributes to the literature of boundary objects by proposing a third criterion, that of 
a requirement of legitimacy, in addition to the criteria of plasticity and commonality. 
This third criterion emphasizes a critical interpretation of the role of power in 
communication and negotiation between different groups.  
The next section will discuss in greater detail how the interweaving of discourses 
applies to the negotiation of meaning of the key constructs of the acquisition strategy 
more broadly, and involves drawing on discourses that relate to the broader context 
and other times. As such, it will develop a response to the second research question 
that has guided this thesis by showing how these different discourses interact (Hardy 
and Phillips, 1999; Leonardi and Jackson, 2004; Mittra, 2006; Tienari et al., 2003). 
 
5.2 TEMPORAL AND CONTEXTUAL WORK IN STRATEGIZING 
The second research question that guided the thesis aimed to develop insights 
regarding the epistemological foundations of strategizing. This question is: 
What is the role of time and context in the social construction of meaning in 
strategizing?  
The literature review showed these dimensions to be critical to strategizing. However, 
the exact role they play in a discursive perspective on strategizing, or how this role 
defines what is specific to strategizing, remains largely unanswered. This research aims 
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to contribute to a discursive epistemology that is specific to strategizing. By theorizing 
the construction of meaning as an epistemological instead of ontological act, this 
thesis itself remains ontologically mute (Gergen, 1994; Holt and Mueller, 2011). This 
limits the term to how it is mostly used in philosophical literature (Crotty, 1998; Kant, 
1976; Rorty, 1991), and enables researchers to claim they are social constructionists, 
irrespective of whether they identify ontologically as critical realists or as idealists. For 
example, in doing so it accommodates Kwan and Tsang’s definitions of a moderate and 
radical epistemology (Kwan and Tsang, 2001), as well as the social constructionist 
interpretation of Al-Amoudi and Willmott’s epistemic relativism (Al-Amoudi and 
Willmott, 2011). Also, it sits comfortably within epistemological considerations from 
discursive and social constructionist scholars with a broader perspective of 
organizational or management studies (Chia, 2000; Fairclough, 2005; Fleetwood, 2005; 
Holt and Mueller, 2011; Phillips et al., 2006; Reed, 2000), irrespective of whether they 
would identify themselves as social constructionist, critical realists, idealists or also 
remain ontologically mute. Importantly, this epistemology clearly emphasizes what is 
specific and different about strategizing. 
As set out in the introduction of this thesis, the objective was to determine an initial 
direction for the development of such an epistemology of strategizing, which may 
provide a personal research program for many years to come. There is no claim that 
what is presented here is a comprehensive epistemology of strategizing. The 
discussion draws interchangeably on the concepts of interweaving (Fairclough and 
Wodak, 1997) and intertextuality (Grant et al., 2005; Hardy and Phillips, 1999; Keenoy 
and Oswick, 2004; Oswick and Robertson, 2009; Riad et al., 2012; Vaara et al., 2006). 
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While the dimensions of time and context are well recognized in the discourse 
literature (e.g. Keenoy and Oswick, 2004; Sabelis et al., 2005), the aim here is to 
explore what may be specific about strategizing as discourse in relation to these 
dimensions. As will be argued, this can be understood by drawing on the concept of 
horizon, ‘a boundary which moves back as we move towards it’ (Taschdjian (1977) in 
Das, 1991, p.53). First, the time horizon and context horizon will be discussed 
separately, followed by a discussion of the implications of this conceptualization for an 
epistemology of strategizing. 
TIME HORIZON 
The findings show how accounts of the future were woven into the pre-acquisition 
discourse. This included examples such as the expected multi-decade demand for 
mining commodities; the pipeline of projects; the calculative device of net present 
value; and the presentation of a vision of becoming a resources super-major. Taken 
together the examples from the case study demonstrate thatstrategizing could not 
realistically be conceived without a temporal dimension, as each of the three key 
constructs were permeated by and depended on references to the future of the 
industry, the company’s future vision and future profits. Other examples also show 
that the temporal dimension is not limited to the future but includes the 
reconstruction of accounts of the past that were woven into the pre-acquisition 
discourse. This was particularly the case when actors made claims regarding the 
historic track records of BHP and Rio, which may have impacted perceptions of their 
respective abilities to deliver shareholder value and, by implication, the fair share 
exchange ratio. While different accounts of track records related to the past, they 
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were still future-oriented as these accounts were used to suggest future capability. 
This confirms previous research that argues that, while temporal work in strategizing 
involves weaving accounts of the past, current and future into strategic accounts 
(Kaplan and Orlikowski, 2013; Keenoy and Oswick, 2004), strategizing is foremost a 
future-oriented activity (Baghai et al., 1999; Das, 1987; Johnson et al., 2011; Kaplan 
and Orlikowski, 2013; Mintzberg, 1994; Mintzberg et al., 1998; Mosakowski and 
Earley, 2000; Taschdjian, 1977; Wright et al., 1996).  
Attention to this temporal dimension can be seen in most schools of strategy and is 
generally positioned as anticipating or forecasting the future and acting accordingly 
(Baghai et al., 1999; Kaplan and Orlikowski, 2013; Mintzberg et al., 1998). However, 
from a constructionist perspective such statements about the future are interpretive 
(Gioia et al., 2002; Weick, 1979) as discursive ‘imaginings of what might be possible’ 
(Kaplan and Orlikowski, 2013, p.966). Accounts of other times that are considered 
when strategizing can be seen as multi-modal discursive practices that construct a past 
or future, which we weave into the fabric of the current strategy discourse. Keenoy 
and Oswick (2004) refer to this as ‘temporality-in-the-present’, that is, ‘the past, the 
present, and future are simultaneously embedded within a discursive event (i.e. the 
‘past-in-the-present’, the ‘present-in-the-present’ and the ‘future-in-the-present’)’ 
(p.138). This means that the temporal work in strategizing constructs how we now 
recall the past or imagine the future (Kaplan and Orlikowski, 2013), in this ‘discursive 
moment’ (Keenoy & Oswick , p.138). These should not be seen as accurate histories or 
forecasts of other times but as (re-) constructions of that past or future. Each 
subsequent instance of reconstructing the past or the future is neither an exact replica 
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nor completely divorced from previous constructions. It always combines both 
recursivity and adaptation. As such, each instance implies a connection of past, current 
and future patterns (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997; Giddens, 1986; Phillips and Hardy, 
2002).  
The findings suggest that the concept of time horizon is critical in the process of the 
social construction of meaning as it occurs as part of strategizing. The concept of time 
horizon proposed here has some overlap with the temporal orientation and Shi’s 
temporal role of ‘when’ (Shi et al., 2012), and connects with the idea of a ‘textscape’ 
(Keenoy and Oswick, 2004), which considers how texts that relate to another time are 
woven into the current strategic discourse of an organization. If we interpret ‘text’ as 
discursive practices then many of the temporal dynamics observed by Kaplan and 
Orlikowski (2013) are the same as the dynamics that were identified in the findings of 
this case study, albeit described from a practice instead of a discourse perspective. 
They involve weaving together different discourses to form meanings of key constructs 
that are ‘coherent, plausible, and acceptable’ (Kaplan and Orlikowski, 2013, p.965) 
through persuasion and negotiation. Discursive practices that relate to a more distant 
future have a greater potential to recast current strategy discourse and explore ‘barely 
conceivable alternatives’ (Kaplan and Orlikowski, 2013, p.991). For example, in the 
BHP case study, the acquisition could only be conceived of as a potential strategic 
option if the time horizon were set out far enough to include fully realized annual cost 
and revenue synergies. If they had only included accounts for the next few years, then 
the additional value that was seen to be generated may not have warranted the effort 
and risk of this strategic option. While previous studies acknowledge the importance 
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of time and temporal work (Kaplan and Orlikowski, 2013; Keenoy and Oswick, 2004), 
this thesis argues that it is not enough to say that strategy discourse draws on 
discursive practices that relate to time. What is specific and core to the purpose of 
strategizing is to increase or improve strategic options for an organization, and this 
may require extending the time horizon beyond what would be considered in the day-
to-day discourse in order to draw on additional discursive practices that may help 
recast the existing discourse in the organization.  
The explicit inclusion of a time horizon in the epistemology of strategizing proposed 
here allows for a consistent definition of strategizing, irrespective of the level of 
seniority of a particular actor (Jacques, 1979). For example, front-line managers who 
are told to ‘be more strategic’ may have to extend their horizon beyond, maybe, three 
to six months, while CEOs who are told the same may need to extend their horizon to 
a future that is ten years or more out; for example, BHP CEO Kloppers considered the 
Olympic Dam mine development in South Australia a 50+ year project. Therefore, the 
concept of an extending time horizon provides a useful notion that can emphasize 
what is specific about strategizing.  
While the above shows how the future in strategizing is socially constructed, it 
remains problematic to argue that time only emerges as a result of social processes, 
that is, it is only added by social processes. In all the situations discussed, time remains 
sequential, and while there may be a perception of cyclicality or cyclical patterning of 
events, a particular event or discursive moment in time, once passed, cannot be 
undone or cycled back but – at most – forgotten or reinterpreted. Also, we cannot 
strategize without at least an implicit notion of time and, more broadly, we are 
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incapable of perceptions that are not conditioned by time. All our perceptions, that is, 
all phenomena, are shaped by time as a primary category (Kant, 1976). This is why 
Kant considered time one of two transcendental forms of perception (Kant, 1976) or 
primary conditioners of how we know as humans, that is, without which we cannot 
perceive or think about something. Kant’s second transcendental form of perception is 
space. Space, as will be argued, is echoed in the second strategic horizon: context. 
Context includes a Euclidian concept of space and a metaphorical projection of space, 
for example, when envisaging a discourse as a space where multi-modal conversations 
take place and other discourses are combined and interwoven. To date the term 
‘horizon’ has been used to designate a horizon for time only (Baghai et al., 1999; Das, 
1987; Taschdjian, 1977). Here this use is extended further to encompass a context 
horizon. 
CONTEXT HORIZON 
The concept of interweaving is used interchangeably with the concept of 
intertextuality to describe the connection between broader and local discourses 
(Erkama and Vaara, 2010; Hardy, 2004). The findings demonstrate how key actors in 
the acquisition discourse discursively constructed a number of broader discourses in 
the local acquisition discourse throughout the period under investigation. Some of the 
key broader discourses that were interwoven in the pre-acquisition discourse included 
the primacy of shareholder value; consolidation of mining companies into super 
majors; whether or not mining companies should extend into oil and gas; the demand 
of global markets; and the importance of competition. While the discourse of the 
global financial crisis also played a significant role, it only emerged at the very end of 
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the acquisition episode, and was therefore not included as a recurring theme in the 
findings.  
The findings also show how broader discourses, key constructs and actors co-emerge. 
For example, shareholders had decision-making power because a broader discourse of 
the primacy of shareholder value had been embedded in common practices, 
institutions and regulations that prioritized the interests of shareholders, like 
executive stock options, listing rules and the legal responsibilities of company directors, 
and key actors recursively enacted the resulting dynamics. Also, additional value pool 
and fair share exchange ratio emerged as key constructs because they reflected the 
interests of decision-makers, and reiterated the power of key actors as decision-
makers. The same dynamic was highlighted in the findings for the competition 
regulators as decision-makers.  
From a discursive perspective, the context of a particular text or discourse is primarily 
constituted by other sets of texts. Such ‘contexts are not simply a backdrop to text, 
they are actually embedded within it’ (Keenoy & Oswick, 2004, p.140). In this thesis a 
deliberate differentiation was made between a local strategy discourse and broader 
discourses. Such broader discourses have been variously described in previous 
research as ‘macro’, ‘meta’, ‘grand’, ‘capital D’ or ‘mega’ (Alvesson and Karreman, 
2000; Boje, 2001; Keenoy and Oswick, 2004; Phillips et al., 2008; Robichaud et al., 
2004). To avoid a suggestion of hierarchy, they are described here as interwoven. 
While it has been acknowledged that such broader discourses may have a critical role 
in shaping a particular local discourse, few studies have looked at how this occurs 
(Erkama and Vaara, 2010; Hardy, 2004). The discursive construction of contextual 
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discourses in the local strategy discourse is fundamental to any organizational activity. 
Here such contextual work is seen as linking key constructs of the local strategy 
discourse and broader discourses in a way that converges meaning and enables actors 
to agree on decisions. However, previous research does not identify what is specific to 
strategizing. This thesis argues that strategizing as discourse involves moving towards 
a contextual horizon by trying to influence the discursive construction of strategic 
options in the context of discourses that relate to increasingly distant locales (Keenoy 
& Oswick, 2004), or that were created by actors increasingly removed from the local 
strategic discourse (Briers and Chua, 2001; Law and Hassard, 1999; Steen et al., 2006). 
For example, does the proposed acquisition of Rio by BHP seem sensible in the context 
of broader discourses of the emergence of mining super majors or long-term demand 
for mining commodities? What will it mean for shareholder value or competition? If 
strategizing by extending the contextual horizon is done successfully, then such 
reinterpretations may create new strategic options that did not seem possible 
previously.  
The contextual horizon of strategizing can be extended or decreased in a number of 
ways, and can zoom out or in (Latour et al., 2012), or scale up or down (Hardy, 2004) 
interconnected discourses. While this suggests that actors might have some choice in 
selecting broader discourses to frame their local strategy discourse, this choice 
appears limited. This is due to the co-emergence of decision-makers and broader 
discourses discussed earlier. We saw how decision-makers shape the acquisition 
discourse and, in order to persuade, actors must frame their arguments to cohere with 
the worldview and interests of decision-makers. This may influence what is seen as the 
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appropriate context horizon for a local strategy discourse. The co-emergence of actors 
and broader discourse discussed earlier suggests that the contextual horizon of 
strategizing can be described not just in terms of broader discourses, but also in terms 
of other actors. In an acquisition scenario this is reflected in the differentiation of 
decision-makers who have an immediate and direct impact on the acquisition 
discourse, and influencers who have a less immediate impact and can be considered 
part of a broader context. Beyond that there are actors who play no role in the 
acquisition as such, but who still shape broader discourses that do influence the 
influencers and decision-makers indirectly. For example, for the case study this would 
have included key actors in the global financial crisis. 
This horizon of strategizing can also be generalized for different hierarchical levels of 
an organization. As with time horizons, strategizing by considering a broader 
contextual horizon is relative, and the highest levels of an organization’s hierarchy can 
be expected to draw on the broadest discourses. For example, in the case study this is 
illustrated by CEOs Kloppers and Albanese who drew on broad societal discourses of 
shareholder value to argue for or against the proposed acquisition strategy; division 
heads for petroleum and iron ore who drew on global market discourses for their 
respective commodities; and a shipping manager who commented on the inability of 
one particular port to cope in the context of growing production volumes in the region. 
While a practitioner in this context may refer to a ‘bigger perspective’, this notion is 
not unproblematic. Latour and colleagues (2012) suggest that the differentiation 
between an individual component and aggregated structure is itself socially 
constructed. Coming from an ANT perspective, they explain this in terms of actors: 
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actors are entirely defined by their networks (Law and Hassard, 1999, in Latour et al. 
2012) and – importantly – the opposite holds: the network is entirely defined by its 
actors (Latour et al., 2012). Something similar can be argued from a discursive 
perspective: the local strategy discourse is a point or space where other discourses 
overlap and are combined, and vice versa: those other discourses exist in other local 
discourses. Every individual text or discursive practice may be part of a local strategy 
discourse and a broader discourse simultaneously. For example, BHP’s profit and loss 
statement is part of its local strategy discourse, but at the same time it enacts a 
broader discourse on accounting standards. Further, whether a discourse is seen as 
local or broader is not an objective characteristic, but depends on the perspective of 
the actors: if they are main actors who shape and decide on the discourse then it is 
their locale and their local discourse. From the outset it informed the definition and 
analysis of broader discourse here, and the reason why the terms ‘mega’ or ‘big D’ 
discourses were avoided (Alvesson and Karreman, 2011), as these suggest a 
hierarchical logic in the relationship between a local and a broader discourse. If 
external actors predominantly shape a discourse that is woven into the local strategy 
discourse of numerous organizations, it is, for the purposes of this thesis, by definition 
a broader discourse. 
After the above discussion, it seems self-evident that strategizing by extending the 
contextual perspective of the local discourse is a social activity. The external 
environment is not objectively given. It is constructed in the local strategy discourse by 
drawing on, selecting, connecting and interpreting other socially constructed 
discourses. Even if a person appears to be strategizing ‘alone’, this process involves a 
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continuous drawing on and interweaving of such broader discourses that have been 
created and disseminated by others.   
This extension of horizon, whether imagined as an extension into broader discourses, 
or as an extension into broader networks of actors, echoes Kant’s second 
transcendental form of perception of space (Kant, 1976). While a discursive space 
differs from a Euclidian space, these other discourses or other actors appear logically 
positioned predominantly outside the local strategy discourse. They can be brought 
into the local discourse, but will largely continue to exist and develop outside the local 
strategy discourse. Traces or echoes of space as a form of perception also reside in the 
use of terms like ‘into’ and ‘outside’ when talking about the connection between local 
strategy discourse and broader discourses. Do we use such spatial terms because, as 
Kant argued, we cannot perceive without imposing space, or does space emerge from 
the use of the terms? There is no intent or possibility to consider this question at a 
metaphysical level in the context of this thesis, as Kant did. The aim here is far more 
modest: whether space (and earlier in the discussion, time) is a transcendental form of 
perception or simply a category of sense making that we must use when strategizing 
may not matter for a discursive epistemology of strategizing. In either case they 
remain essential to better understand how these horizons shape strategizing. 
 A DISCURSIVE EPISTEMOLOGY OF STRATEGIZING 
The discussion of a time and context horizon has shown how meaning in a local 
strategy discourse is constructed, in part, by interweaving discourses that relate to 
other times and broader contexts. This thesis argues that, while time and space 
dimensions are well recognized as fundamental to epistemology, their specific role in 
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strategizing is not well understood. That role derives from the purpose of strategizing, 
which was defined as the discursive construction and negotiation of new or improved 
options for a preferred future. The temporal or contextual work that comes with 
extending the time and context horizon changes the tapestry of interwoven discourses 
that make up a local strategy discourse and provide the opportunity to construct 
strategic options that were previously not considered possible. In the description of a 
social constructionist and discourse theoretical framework for the case study, it was 
argued that the world comes into being and is carved from an undifferentiated flux of 
sensory experience (Chia, 2000). Constructs, objects or concepts emerge from 
‘bracketing’ (Weick, 1979, 2006) those carvings. Strategizing is therefore about looking 
beyond the bracketing we take for granted on a day-to-day basis. It is about 
deconstructing taken-for-granted truths and meanings, and questioning conceptual 
fixedness, in order to create a fluidity that will enable recombining that which was 
bracketed in a different way. The more we succeed in changing the tapestry of 
interwoven discourses, the greater the potential to negotiate a very different strategy.  
From a practical perspective this does not mean that we should aim to extend our 
time and contextual horizons as far as we like. There is a price to pay when doing this. 
Resistance may come from powerful actors who fear that they may lose in a 
reconstructed discourse. The case of BHP’s failed acquisition of Rio Tinto shows that it 
is exceedingly complex and difficult to realise this potential.  
Part of why this is complex and difficult is that the temporal and contextual work in 
the negotiation of meaning is conducted as part of the local strategy discourse through 
constructions of the future (i.e. the future-in-the-present) and the broader context (i.e. 
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context-in-what-is-present). If these constructions are similar to enactments in the 
many other discourses in which they play a role, then actors may be able to converge 
relatively quickly on parts of the local strategy discourse. If they are dissimilar, then 
tensions arise between the local strategy discourse and other discourses. Such 
tensions have to be resolved in order to gain support from decision-makers, either by 
adapting the interpretation of a particular local strategy discourse (i.e. why is this 
acquisition different?) or by reshaping widely accepted discourses of the future and 
the context. For example, in the case study, the negotiation of the additional value 
pool appeared to cohere with the synergies that actors expected from this sort of 
transaction. The proposed acquisition strategy was interpreted as coherent and 
acceptable in the context of creating additional shareholder value, and convergence 
was swift. It did not require actors to reinterpret their concept of how additional value 
emerges from acquisitions over time. This was very different for the negotiation of the 
impact on competition where extensive temporal and contextual work occurred. In 
order to converge, external actors were asked to significantly reinterpret the meaning 
of the acquisition in the context of a broader discourse on the importance of 
competition. As shown in the findings, this included changing how they perceived the 
relevant (iron ore) market share; privileging a promise of ‘more product to market 
faster’ ahead of increased market concentration; and trusting that new producers 
would emerge rapidly. Such a reinterpretation would require actors to ignore how 
acquisitions are typically interpreted across other local strategy discourses, and 
creates tension between interpretations. Consequently, these reinterpretations were 
not considered coherent, plausible and acceptable, and a breakdown resulted (Kaplan 
and Orlikowski, 2013), which impeded the acquisition strategy.  
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MATERIAL OUTCOMES OF THE PRE-ACQUISITION DISCOURSE 
The discussion above adds to discourse studies by showing how strategizing as 
discourse can lead to material outcomes. Few studies have made the link between the 
role of discursive practices, rhetorical styles and the interweaving of discourses in the 
negotiation of meaning, and the resulting material outcomes (Green, 2004; Öberg, 
2012; Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005). This study establishes such a link. It does so by 
demonstrating how strategizing discourse not only establishes meaning, but can also 
shape opinions and influence behaviours that lead to material outcomes. Within the 
context of a broader shareholder value discourse, material outcomes are arguably 
those that appear to deliver significant monetary value to shareholders. The analysis 
identifies a number of examples where this was the case. In the example of the 
valuation of BHP’s oil business, a successful re-negotiation by BHP leadership of the 
meaning of ‘oil reserves’ in line with mining praxis (as opposed to traditional SEC 
praxis for oil companies) may have created hundreds of millions of dollars in 
shareholder value. In another example, the discourse surrounding the relevant iron 
ore market impacted the perceived level of market control of the merged entity, and 
subsequently the conditions imposed by the European regulator. A third example from 
the case study was the failure of BHP to convince its customers that an acquisition 
would be to their benefit, and the resulting raid on Rio shares to try to influence the 
acquisition outcome. Lastly, the failure of the acquisition strategy in the end is 
illustrative. Kloppers attributed this to the combination of the demands of competition 
regulators in the context of the global financial crisis. This can be seen as a significant 
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shift in the broader discourse of, amongst others, economic development, market 
demand for commodity products and the availability of capital. This shift created 
significant tension and uncertainty in relation to additional value pool, as it had 
undermined the coherence and alignment of different discourses that were woven 
into the calculation of that pool. The tight connection that had to exist in the 
acquisition discourse between additional value pool and the broader discourses, 
ultimately led to the undoing of the proposed acquisition transaction. 
 
5.3 SUMMARY TO CHAPTER 
The discussion shows that strategizing in the pre-acquisition phase is a multi-modal 
discourse in which internal and external actors of an organization construct and 
negotiate strategic options and a set of actions to bring about that future, while 
looking further ahead in time and considering a broader context. This thesis makes a 
number of contributions by showing that external actors play a significant role: they 
determine the structure of the acquisition discourse; try to persuade other actors; and 
decide whether the transaction will proceed. Further, internal and external actors use 
a broad range of multi-modal discursive practices, including speech, writing, imagery 
(maps, graphs, photos, video), calculative devices and location in order to persuade 
other actors and influence the pre-acquisition discourse. In contrast to previous 
research, the thesis shows how these discursive practices are multi-modal and 
persuade through a multi-layered, simultaneous and powerful appeal to reason, 
emotion and authority. Further, they may also function as multi-modal transgression 
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markers that signal convergence or divergence during the negotiation of meaning of 
the key constructs that structure the pre-acquisition discourse.  
Calculative devices were identified as a critical and distinct mode. They function as 
boundary objects that are adaptable to, and robust across, different groups of actors. 
It is argued that, for an object to be accepted as a boundary object, it must be 
considered legitimate by decision-makers and help them to interpret the impact of a 
proposed strategy on their interests. Boundary objects can be seen to develop through 
four stages: identification, calculation, negotiation and objectification.  
This study makes a further contribution by theorizing a discursive epistemology of 
strategizing as the interweaving of discourses that relate to the future and to broader 
contexts into the strategy discourse. While time and contextual dimensions are well 
recognized, their specific role in strategizing is not well understood. The temporal or 
contextual work that is specific to strategizing comes from extending the time and 
context horizons, which changes the tapestry of interwoven discourses that constitute 
a local strategy discourse and provide the potential to construct strategic options that 
were previously not considered possible. 
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6 CONCLUSIONS 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This research set out to better understand what happens during strategizing from a 
discursive perspective. This ambition arose from personal and professional 
experiences, some of which are discussed in the appendix. The selection of an 
acquisition in the mining industry as the case study was partly inspired by a desire to 
develop this understanding in a business environment that appeared as much as 
possible focused on ‘hard facts’ and ‘objective evidence’: a discursive understanding 
forged in such an environment will surely stand up in any other.  
The thesis had the benefit of being able to draw on a significant and growing body of 
M&A and discourse literature, and offers a number of contributions to that body of 
literature in return. The next section identifies the contributions in the context of 
previous studies. Following that, the chapter identifies how this research can also be 
used meaningfully by practitioners. All research is only ever provisional. Therefore, this 
chapter concludes with identifying the limitations of the research, and suggesting 
future directions to extend it. 
 
6.2 IMPLICATIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS TO THEORY 
This thesis adds to a still limited body of research into the discourses surrounding 
M&A transactions (see number (1) in Figure 6-1 below). While most research into 
acquisition discourses routinely ignores the structure and dynamics of pre-acquisition 
discourse (Teerikangas & Joseph, 2012a; Vaara, 2002), this thesis focuses on the 
period preceding the transaction. An initial contribution is that the research shows 
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that in a pre-acquisition discourse external actors are not a passive audience but play a 
significant role and interchange roles as rhetor and audience. They determine key 
constructs, persuade other actors and decide on the acquisition outcome. This 
contributes to previous research that has focused on internal instead of external 
actors in strategy discourse (Hellgren et al., 2002; Kuronen et al., 2005; Teerikangas et 
al., 2012).  
Figure 6-1: Locating Contributions to Theory 
 
While in the past empirical studies of discourse have predominantly looked at the role 
of linguistic modes, more recently there have been calls for considering multi-modal 
discursive practices (Grant et al., 2004b; Iedema, 2007; Jacobs & Heracleous, 2007; 
Royce et al., 2006). This thesis responds to that call and makes a contribution by 
showing how internal and external actors enact the pre-acquisition discourse through 
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a broad range of multi-modal discursive practices, including speech, writing, imagery, 
location and calculative devices (see number (2) in Figure 6-1). The case study makes a 
further contribution by showing how actors work to persuade each other not just 
using linguistic modes (Erkama et al., 2010; Sillince, 2005; Suddaby et al., 2005) but 
multi-layered rhetorical strategies were also brought to bear through non-linguistic 
modes (see number (3) in Figure 6-1). In addition, this contribution is extended by 
showing how multi-modal discursive practices also function as multi-modal cues, and 
theorizes these as transgression markers that signal convergence or divergence during 
the negotiation of meaning of key constructs.  
This study was able to make a number of further contributions by paying particular 
attention to calculative devices and identified these devices as a distinct and critical 
mode as they were prominent throughout the discourse (see number (4) in Figure 6-1). 
While previous studies show how actors use calculative devices to legitimize decisions 
(e.g. Baxter et al., 2003; Briers et al. 2001; Denis, Langley, & Rouleau, 2006), most do 
not pertain to pre-acquisition discourse and ignore the calculative aspect (Callon et al., 
2005). The thesis showed that calculative devices are imbued with logos and ethos 
through, for example, the calculative logic, accounting standards, and data sources 
that are woven together in the symbolic manipulations of the device. Further, the 
thesis makes a contribution to theory by showing how calculative devices act as 
boundary objects (see number (5) in Figure 6-1) and argues that the two widely 
accepted criteria for boundary objects of adaptability and commonality (Bechky, 2003; 
Spee & Jarzabkowski, 2009; Star & Griesemer, 1989) emphasize a cognitive role for 
boundary objects but underplay their role in reinforcing power structures (Oswick et 
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al., 2009). Consequently, it proposes a  third criterion for boundary objects, that is, 
objects will only be able to take on the role of boundary object if decision-makers 
consider them legitimate because they help determine and protect the impact on their 
interests. A final contribution in relation to calculative devices is made by showing how 
boundary objects develop over four stages, which were identified as identification, 
calculation, negotiation, and objectification. As calculative devices become 
increasingly objectified, it will take a formidable effort to try and change them. 
In addition to these dynamics, the thesis also outlines a discursive epistemology of 
strategizing through its analysis of the role of time and context in the social 
construction of meaning in strategizing (see number (6) in Figure 6-1). Temporal work 
(Kaplan et al., 2013; Keenoy et al., 2004) and contextual work (Grant et al., 2005; 
Hardy et al., 1999b; Keenoy et al., 2004; Riad et al., 2012) must construct coherent, 
plausible and acceptable connections between local and broader discourses, as well as 
discourses of the past, present and future to enable agreement on strategic choices 
(Kaplan & Orlikowski, 2013). Few studies explore how local and broader discourses 
interact (Erkama et al., 2010; Hardy, 2004). Also, previous studies on time and local 
discourse focus on how they change over time (Bushe & Marshak, 2009; Ford & Ford, 
2008; Grant et al., 2011; Huy, 2001), instead of how they draw on texts about (mainly) 
the future. Further, while the importance of time and context are acknowledged in 
organizational discourse, it remains unclear what is specific to strategizing. The thesis 
argues that the purpose of strategizing is to construct and negotiate new or improved 
options for a preferred future and the actions to bring these about, and makes a 
contribution to a discursive epistemology of strategizing by showing how temporal and 
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contextual work in strategizing extends the horizon of discourses that relate to the 
future and discourses that relate to the broader context. This creates new strategic 
options by reconstructing the tapestry of interwoven discourses that make up a local 
strategy discourse. 
While the case study pertained to a merger and acquisition discourse, it appears likely 
that similar dynamics exist across other forms of strategizing discourse. Taken 
together, these contributions to extant literature significantly extend a perspective on 
strategizing as a multi-modal and rhetorical discursive practice (see number (7) in 
Figure 6-1).  
 
6.3 IMPLICATIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS TO PRACTICE 
The findings of this research have immediate relevance for practitioners. This 
relevance is not an afterthought but is based on the application of a number of the key 
ideas from this thesis in executive development programs throughout the research 
period. This practical application benefited the research as it refined questions along 
the way and guided how the research would unfold. Key implications of the findings 
are concentrated in three areas that are critical to organizational leadership.   
First, the research provides a framework for strategic thinking that can be applied 
irrespective of someone’s level in the organizational hierarchy or their functional role. 
Managers can generate conversations that are more strategic by taking note of the 
current time and context horizon embedded in the local strategy discourse, and 
deliberately extending those horizons. Also, they can change the strategy discourse by 
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identifying, questioning and reimagining the categories and constructs that currently 
shape the local strategic discourse. Second, managers can improve their influence and 
organizational effectiveness by considering not just the language they use, but also by 
developing broad or reinforcing persuasive strategies that involve several layers of 
multi-modal rhetorical appeals to reason, authority and emotion. Also, awareness of 
(generative and distributive) boundary objects – including calculative devices – can 
help structure strategic discourses across groups. Lastly, understanding the roles that 
different groups of internal and external actors play in shaping strategy, and 
recognizing cues (transgression markers) of their support for, or resistance to, a 
proposed strategy, will support managers to be more effective in navigating 
organizational change.  
 
6.4 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
While this thesis offers of a number of contributions, it also recognizes that it has 
certain limitations. First, it uses a single exploratory case study approach. Although this 
enables a rich and detailed account of the attempted acquisition to be presented, and 
provides a good basis for theorizing, any generalizations about discourse during 
strategizing or as part of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) must be made with care. 
Second, only publicly accessible data, such as press reports, speeches, transcripts and 
imagery of analyst briefings, statements by regulators and so on, are used. No 
interview data are used in the study. While the intention was always to use only public 
data, which enabled  various multi-modal discursive practices and the context in which 
strategizing was taking place to be identified, it meant that perceptions and 
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recollections of key actors regarding what had happened were not evaluated and were 
not used to complement the existing findings. Further, the analysis here focuses on a 
particular period and needs to be seen as a snapshot of a longer history of strategizing. 
Events following BHP’s attempted acquisition of Rio remain undiscussed, even though 
they were direct outcomes of the abandoned acquisition and constituted a 
subsequent stage in the negotiation of strategy. Only a longer time frame would be 
able to position the acquisition attempt as part of long-term strategizing with external 
actors. Fourth, following an analysis of the suitability of a number of categorizations of 
rhetorical strategies, only Aristotle’s classic categories of logos, ethos and pathos are 
used to identify such strategies in both linguistic and non-linguistic modes. However, 
these categories originate in speech and writing and may have missed strategies that 
are persuasive but exclusive to a non-linguistic mode. Lastly, to some extent, the 
research relies on accounts of multi-modal practices instead of observation of these 
practices. While care was taken to be conservative when analyzing and interpreting 
such accounts, additional insights might have emerged from direct in-situ observation 
of some of the discursive practices, like customer visits, journalist site visits and 
analyst briefings. 
6.5 FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
A number of important opportunities exist that may extend the contributions of this 
study, either by overcoming its limitations or by building on its strengths. First, future 
empirical research could be designed to incorporate the use of interview data. This 
would provide a more detailed level of insight into the motivations and reasoning that 
come into play when key actors discursively engage in strategizing. Second, the case 
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study is of an abandoned acquisition. Moreover, the attempted acquisition was a 
hostile and public one. This raises the question of how different kinds of M&A are 
discursively played out and, specifically, the effect on this of being in the public 
domain. It might, therefore, be useful to examine some successful or non-public 
company M&A using a similar approach. Third, although the case touches on this, 
further research using a similar approach could explore in more detail how multi-
modal rhetoric is exercised by external actors and used in ways that either support or 
derail strategizing not only during an attempted M&A, but also during other instances 
where strategizing occurs, including joint ventures, board restructures or regulatory 
reform. Fourth, future studies of different M&A or other strategic episodes may be 
able to develop alternative categories of rhetorical strategies, which are embedded in, 
and exclusive to, non-linguistic modes. This future research could extend the analysis 
of the persuasive appeal of multi-modal discursive practices. 
This thesis also suggests some interesting directions for future theoretical research 
that go beyond a marginal extension of the current research. One such direction is to 
continue the exploration of a discursive epistemology of strategizing. To ensure that 
this would stand on a solid footing, further analysis would be required of how strategy 
theorists (and possibly other organizational scholars) define their epistemology and 
ontology, and how this differs from the use of the terms in the philosophy literature. 
Further, additional research into how actors in a local strategy discourse draw on 
other discourses may identify how they create different forms of transtextual 
relationships (Keenoy and Oswick, 2004). This could start with a reinterpretation of 
published empirical strategy discourse in order to create a framework that can then 
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guide empirical research. Third, the research for this thesis raises methodological 
questions around multi-modal research that appear to be underexplored: what 
happens when observations have been translated from one modality into another. For 
example, when analyzing written (or even video) accounts of multi-modal discursive 
practices instead of observing those practices directly? And even if present when such 
practices are enacted, what do we still miss (body language, relationships between 
actors, historic context, etc.), how does this influence and shape the interpretation of 
the discursive practice, and to what extent does it matter? 
 
6.6 CLOSING 
This thesis started with the aim to better understand, from a discursive perspective, 
what happens during strategizing. By analysing in detail what happened in one 
particular case study, it has been able to make a number of contributions to a 
discursive epistemology of strategizing, as well as to M&A and discourse literature. 
These contributions suggest that where discursive studies of M&A omit to examine the 
multi-modality of actors’ discursive practices, this is likely to lead to incomplete 
explanations and understandings of how actors are able to influence such important 
strategic events. In the case of BHP, they ultimately influenced its decision to abandon 
its attempt to acquire Rio. More broadly, this thesis suggests a discursive epistemology 
of strategizing that identifies what is specific to the temporal and contextual work that 
occurs as part of discourse when strategizing, and takes the linguistic and non-
linguistic discursive practices of key actors seriously because they shape how an 
organization’s strategy evolves and influence eventual outcomes.  
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7 APPENDIX: REFLECTIONS ON BECOMING A SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONIST  
 
‘attempts to be reflexive often draw all attention away from the subject of the research 
and refocus it on the researcher’ (Hardy et al., 2005a, p.799) 
 
At the end of the documentary ‘Manufacturing Consent’ (Herman and Chomski, 2002) 
about Chomsky’s similarly titled treatise on politics and language, the producer and 
camera man keep the camera running while packing up equipment in front of the 
camera. The act is deliberate to illustrate one of the key points of the documentary, 
that is, behind each ‘text’ (in this case the documentary) there are people with 
particular interests and perspectives, and that the documentary (or any other text) 
does not reflect some objective reality. The act is also surprising, simple, and 
remarkably effective.  
In a similar vein, it seems almost deceptive to write a PhD thesis from a constructionist 
perspective and hide the “I” behind academic language. The purpose of this appendix 
is therefore to make myself visible and, at least to some extent deconstruct my own 
epistemological roots: how and why do I look at the world the way I do? While I 
acknowledge that, of course, I am a child of my times, I will ignore how I may have 
been influenced by broad contemporary social changes and focus on particular 
experiences that I consider significant and relevant to my identity as a social 
constructionist. If after reading this appendix the author appears flawed, prejudiced, 
or biased, than I have succeeded in my intent. To take heed of the above warning of 
Hardy et al. (2005a) and avoid that these reflections draw the attention from the 
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subject of the research, the appendix seems an appropriate location for such a 
reflection.  
Born in 1964, I can identify a number of major elements in my early years in the 
Netherlands that seem relevant in why I have identified myself as a social 
constructionist for much of my life. Without a doubt, religion was a major element. 
Having an Italian father I grew up in a Catholic environment with regular visits to 
church, being an occasional altar boy, and attending a Catholic school with extensive 
religious education. Since I was about six years old, I wanted to become a missionary 
in developing countries, which to me appeared an exciting and heroic path of divine 
inspiration and a sense of adventure. Towards my 11th or 12th birthday the divine 
inspiration had dissipated due to the many contradictions I’d encountered in 
Catholicism that my logically inclined mind could not reconcile. What it left me with 
was skepticism to claims of absolute truths. The sense of adventure in developing 
countries remained, but shifted at that age to, initially, tropical forestry or tropical 
agriculture, and later to development economics.  
Also, when I was 11 my parents separated. With my father out of the house and a 
change of school, church visits largely became a thing of the past. My mother pursued 
her religious interests through a Dutch spiritualist organization and rose through its 
ranks. For a period of about 10 years, starting in my early teens, my mother was first 
Chairman of the local chapter, and then Secretary of the national chapter of this 
spiritualist organization. Consequently, Sunday afternoons and the occasional 
weekday afternoon or evening at our home would involve groups of visitors 
conducting paranormal and spiritualist practices, including séances, automatic writing, 
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card readings, medical diagnosing of photos, healing sessions, clairvoyants etc. etc.. 
Even in my late teens, many of these visitors appeared either emotionally unstable or 
gullible, and I was not inclined to take their world view or explanations at face value. 
Nevertheless, some individuals were remarkable and throughout that period I did have 
a number of experiences that appeared highly unlikely or impossible to explain in 
terms of normal science.  
A third identifiable and relevant element of my early years was growing up in a multi-
cultural environment. My father, some of his brothers and sisters, and many of his 
friends were country people who had moved from rural Sardegna (Italy) to the 
Netherlands to escape two years of military service and find better opportunities. 
Visits to Sardegna involved deep immersion in a rural Italian community for a number 
of weeks, with very limited language skills and quite significant cultural differences. 
These Italian experiences were in sharp contrast with my life in the Netherlands. Upon 
my parents’ divorce, my mother met her second husband, who had been was born 
outside the Netherlands to a Dutch father and Indonesian mother. That added further 
cultural experiences to my early years, and while always identifying myself 
unambiguously as Dutch, that identity included a significant measure of cultural 
relativism.   
I suspect that these three elements significantly contributed to developing a sense 
that neither science, nor any religious group or cultural group had privileged access to 
some sort of indisputable truth. Instead I found myself on many occasions seeking out 
explanations from multiple perspectives, without feeling compelled to commit to any 
perspective and beingcomfortable with ambiguity and pragmatic answers.  
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I obtained my first university qualification in 1989, after six years of studying 
Development Economics and Operations Research with (what I consider the Dutch 
equivalent of) a Masters Degree. I always enjoyed developing quantitative or financial 
models and then change variables to determine how they impact the model’s 
outcomes. As part of these studies I conducted a couple of major research projects 
that involved quantitative models. These included an in situ evaluation of a statistical 
cocoa crop forecasting model in Ivory Coast based on live crop data from 150 
plantations; the development of a computer simulation model for container 
transshipment at Europe’s largest container terminal in the port of Rotterdam; and 
developing a framework for conducting feasibility studies for rural industries over an 8 
month period in Peru, a country with at that time nearly 1000% inflation a year. Upon 
completion of my studies, I started working for the Royal Tropical Institute and worked 
mainly at development projects across West Africa. Part of the role involved teaching 
local and expatriate research staff how to use statistical software and design data 
structures for quantitative analysis of agricultural, environmental, or medical research. 
Potentially as a result of these quantitative sides of my studies and early career 
experiences I started to take note of the forcefulness of arguments that were 
underpinned by numbers. It appeared that such arguments suggested a detailed and 
explicit knowledge of the person drawing on the numbers, and it was difficult to 
counter an argument if you could not countermand those numbers with some of your 
own. As a ‘quant’ myself, I was not averse to numbers but while I had learned to be 
suspicious of my own numbers, it was still intimidating to be confronted by clearly 
intelligent and experienced people who had a strong opinion, and who presented their 
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numbers as if they were indisputable. However, increasingly I noticed that the 
numbers appeared to be a form of bluster that was not based on any real 
understanding of the calculative logic or source of the data: What is the source of the 
number? How was it calculated? Who was surveyed? What exactly was the question 
that was asked? What was the context of the research? These were questions that, 
when asked, seldom received satisfactory answers from users of these numbers, and 
what had appeared a source of solidity and intimidation turned into a signpost of their 
ignorance. But while numbers had lost their power over me, I continued to observe 
their ability to persuade and influence others, fuelling my wish to look at the social 
construction behind (particularly financial) calculative devices. 
This background is immediately relevant to my perception of any objectivist or 
positivistic approach to research, as during those formative years of initial academic 
study and early career I became increasingly suspicious and developed strong 
intuitions about what we can or cannot aspire to know. I call them ‘intuitions’, as only 
in the years afterwards these thoughts became enough developed and grounded in 
studies to be considered opinions or beliefs. 
A first intuition was that, although I enjoyed (financial, economic or operational) 
modeling, I became disillusioned with their ability to reflect “reality”, though in those 
days I may not have put quotation marks around “reality”. In very simple and 
controllable environments such models where useful and their inaccuracy tolerable. 
However, the moment you ventured into complex situations, the outcomes depended 
on the assumptions that I would build into the model. Sure, some of them could be 
maintained as variables and I could conduct sensitivity analysis. The values that would 
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be assigned to the variables were always defendable, but if I had sufficient variables I 
could keep them all comfortably within defendable ranges and still effect dramatically 
different outcomes. So the ultimate choice of what value to assign to each variable 
appeared more of an art an negotiation than an exact science. Other assumptions 
were so deeply architected into the structure of the model that only knowledgeable 
specialists in that particular niche would ever be able to understand and discuss them. 
This made the acceptance of the model a matter of persuasion and consensus, rather 
than an accurate reflection of some observable truth. From an intellectual perspective 
I still enjoyed the analytical work of modeling. From a learning perspective I also 
thought (and still believe) that there was value in modeling: it enforced a systematic 
and disciplined approach to better understand convoluted situations; it developed a 
deep appreciation of interdependencies; and - except for the most arrogant of 
modelers - it nurtured humbleness regarding how little we actually understood. 
The second intuition was a consequence of, in part, my early life experiences 
described before, as well as working for extended periods in other cultural 
environments and in multiple languages (Dutch, English, German, French and Spanish) 
as part of early career experiences throughout my formative twenties. This exposed 
me to a constant barrage of anecdotes or cultural experiences with similar patterns. 
These were often about misunderstandings, the inability to communicate effectively, 
ethical dilemmas, and often culminated in situations where a perfectly intelligent and 
well intended person comes across as doing something incredibly dumb. That went 
both ways: expatriates were being perceived as socially inapt, naïve, dumb or 
unreachably superior; or local counterparts were being perceived as such. For example, 
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part of my role had usually involved teaching some basic research methodology or 
statistical analysis to local researchers. On occasion very intelligent local colleagues 
would make the most fundamental methodological mistakes. Having embarrassed 
myself frequently enough in their cultural setting, I had no illusion that I had any claim 
to superiority, so what then caused such miscommunications? As I had no real answer, 
I became increasingly dissatisfied and, after having spent much of a three year period 
working abroad, I decided to return to university.  
I felt my initial education and work experiences had made me a good development 
economist, but had not provided me the skills to critically question the work I did. I 
sometimes liken this to being a tradesman who had mastered the tools, but who now 
felt the urge to learn about tool making to go beyond mastery and towards artistry, 
that is, become able to construct custom-made tools and not be limited by existing 
tools. In order to become a better tool maker, I completed what is probably the 
equivalent of an undergraduate degree in Philosophy (with a focus on epistemology 
and philosophical anthropology), complemented by 1.5 years of the Sociology of 
Scientific Knowledge, graduating with a Masters in Science Dynamics. Informed by 
these studies, I do not think science always deserves the elevated status that may have 
been traditionally awarded to it. That does not render science meaningless, but it does 
transform the value it can claim to deliver to society. That value does not come from 
discovering truths but stems from providing useful theories or perspectives that help 
guide conversations towards particular outcomes. This pragmatic perspective raises 
the need for research that is mindful of the interests of different groups and that 
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questions the motivations behind the acceptance or rejection of such theories or 
perspectives.  
Since those studies some 25 years ago, it has for many years now been a reflex to 
wonder why people belief or say something. What micro-sociological encounters 
shaped that? What macro-social context makes a certain belief, assumption or 
statement more acceptable than others? What are underlying power relations that 
shape these? What are my own psychological biases? What traces have all of these left 
in who I am? According to Reason (1988, in Stacey 2003, p.8) ‘I can never claim to 
stand outside my own experience … Instead, I have to take the role of enquiring 
participant’. These questions played below the surface when working as an enquiring 
strategy consultant for Andersen Consulting. When running a start-up in online 
learning (a joint venture between Oracle and 3 universities), these questions 
continued in relation to strategizing, but also came to the fore when working with 
professional instructional designers who took a constructionist approach to learning 
design – the application area had changed, but the underpinning philosophical 
perspectives remained.  
Returning to university to complete a PhD and looking back on this thesis, it appears a 
logical progression to creating the space and structure and develop a next level of 
response to the same sorts of questions that have been there all along. Plus ça change, 
plus c'est la même chose (i.e. ‘the more things change, the more they stay the same’). 
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